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*DOCUMENTS ON
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS*

NORWAY AND THE WAR

September 1939 — December 1940

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

NORWAY
AND THE WAR

September 1939 — December 1940

EDITED BY
MONICA CURTIS

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PREFATORY NOTE

OWING to war conditions it has not been possible to publish the complete annual volumes of the *Documents on International Affairs* as early as usual. It has therefore been thought desirable to issue a separate advance publication relating to Norway and the War. This publication is to be regarded as forming part of the regular series of *Documents on International Affairs* and is conceived on the same lines. The fact that it has been compiled during the war nevertheless makes certain differences. Certain texts which it would be desirable to publish, especially those emanating from enemy or enemy-occupied countries, are not available, or can be found only in newspapers instead of in the more official form which would normally be used. In some respects, therefore, the collection is not as complete as it would be in normal times. On the other hand, as the documents relating to Norway are being published in advance of the regular 1940 volume of the series, it is not possible to refer the reader to texts which are to appear in that volume. Some texts have therefore been included, although they would more logically find their place in other sections of the 1940 volume; there are, in addition, a few essential documents referring to earlier periods.

It would be difficult to acknowledge adequately the help which I have received in compiling this collection of documents from those who have supplied material, provided translations from the Norwegian, and allowed me to benefit at every stage from their expert knowledge of the subjects with which the volume deals.

MONICA CURTIS.

CHATHAM HOUSE
July 1941.

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INTRODUCTION

THE following collection of documents deals in the main with events from the outbreak of war in September 1939 to the end of 1940. Certain documents relating to 1938 and the earlier months of 1939 are, however, needed to provide a necessary background, and a minimum of the essential ones have been included.

The history of Norway, regarded from the international point of view, in the period September 1939–December 1940 falls into three main phases: neutrality, invasion, and German occupation.

Neutrality

The development of Norwegian neutrality, which is closely bound up with that of Scandinavian neutrality in general, had its origins at least as far back as the war of 1914–18, and its subsequent history is part of the general history of *'l'entre deux guerres'*. During that period it became clear that the attempt to achieve collective security was not going to be pressed through to success, and that a new armed conflict between the great Powers was likely. The countries which expected to be the neutrals in such a conflict, especially the smaller and less powerfully armed among them, had to consider how to protect themselves if it should occur. There were several possible courses. They might (as the Swiss did, for example) improve their defences in the hope that a tough even though small army might give pause to an aggressor contemplating a lightning invasion. But for some countries this would have meant not only material sacrifices, but the abandonment of a long-standing pacific tradition to which genuine moral value was attached; and there was no certainty that it would achieve its object. They might form combinations of neutral States which could, jointly, muster sufficient defensive force to act as a deterrent. The Scandinavian States already possessed well-developed machinery for consultation and co-operation on various questions, but this did not include defence matters, and it could not easily have been extended to cover them, because the different Northern countries stood in different relations to their great neighbours, Germany and the Soviet Union. A third course would have been to join one of the groups of countries which the Axis and the democratic Powers, in their different ways, were trying to form. This appeared to the Norwegians, as to many

other countries, to be at once the least neutral and the most dangerous course. They rejected them all; there remained only the narrow and precarious path of strict neutrality and the hope that an absolutely correct attitude would afford protection against attack. This attitude had been adopted with success in the war of 1914-18. On May 27, 1938, all the Scandinavian States signed a declaration¹ expressing their intention of adopting uniform rules concerning their neutrality in the event of a war between foreign Powers.

By the spring of 1939 it was evident that unless some last-minute means of averting it could be found, a European war was going to break out. The diplomatic effort to avert war took two forms: an attempt to lay down a basis for a general settlement, and an attempt to form a system of alliances which would provide a temporary bulwark against aggression until some more stable solution had been devised. The outstanding attempt of the first kind was President Roosevelt's appeal of April 14, 1939,² to Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini. This letter, which from its text was clearly meant to open the way for the discussion of a general settlement and not merely for the conclusion of a series of non-aggression pacts, asked the statesmen to whom it was addressed whether they were prepared to give an assurance that they would not attack a number of countries specified by name, which included the Scandinavian countries. Germany's diplomatic action as a result of this letter took the form of an inquiry addressed to a number of the countries in question as to whether they felt themselves in any way threatened by Germany, and whether they had been instrumental in having the question asked by President Roosevelt. This inquiry was put to the Norwegian Government by the German Minister at Oslo. The questions were so framed as to pass over the wider issues which the President's letter might have raised, and the Norwegian Minister replied to both of them orally in the negative. On April 28, the Norwegian Minister in Berlin was asked by Herr von Ribbentrop whether Norway was willing to make a non-aggression pact with Germany. The other Northern Governments were asked a similar question. They discussed the matter at a joint meeting of Scandinavian Foreign Ministers at Stockholm on May 9,³ but no uniform attitude was agreed on. Denmark concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany; the other Scandinavian countries replied in the negative. Norway's answer was given on May 17.⁴

The attempts made by the British and French Governments in the earlier months of 1939 to form a Peace Front did not include

¹ See p. 17.

² See p. 22.

³ See p. 25.

⁴ See p. 26.

any official steps towards the offer of a guarantee to the Northern countries. Hr. Hambro, President of the Storting, referring on March 19 to certain unofficial suggestions on these lines which had been thrown out in Great Britain, said that Norway did not desire such a guarantee, as 'a neutrality guaranteed from one quarter ceases to be neutral if the case arises'.¹

Such was the position when the situation became acute at the end of August 1939. On August 30 and 31 the Scandinavian Foreign Ministers met at Oslo² and reaffirmed their countries' intention of remaining neutral if war broke out. Norwegian neutrality was formally proclaimed by King Haakon on September 1.³ Consultations between the Northern Powers on the questions arising out of their neutrality continued to be held from time to time.⁴

The position of Norway, owing to her geographical situation and the importance of her maritime trade, was even more difficult than that of most neutral countries. Even if all the belligerents had sincerely desired to respect the rights of neutrals, the latter were bound to suffer indirectly both from military operations, which might impinge on their territory, and from economic warfare, which necessarily impeded their trade. The list of infringements of Norwegian neutrality by one side or the other is a long one and ranges from the accidental passage of aeroplanes or derelict barrage balloons over her territory to the mining, torpedoing, or bombing of her merchant vessels. These events are not very fully reflected in the documents which follow, because they were the subject of diplomatic notes of protest which were often not published—and some of which, addressed to Germany, were never even answered, as Professor Koht stated in his speech of April 6.⁵ Some idea of what was involved may, however, be obtained (from the Norwegian, British, and German points of view respectively) from the speeches of Professor Koht,⁶ Mr. Churchill,⁷ and Herr von Ribbentrop.⁸ It is hoped to deal with all these questions more fully in a subsequent publication when the material becomes available.

The 'Altmark' Incident

One episode which, owing to its striking character, calls for special mention, is the *Altmark* affair. Many of the documents relating to it are, however, unavailable or obtainable only in an incomplete form, and it is therefore quite impossible to deal adequately with the incident, and especially with its legal aspects. Such

¹ *Le Nord*, 1939, No. 2, p. 250. ² See p. 27. ³ See p. 27. ⁴ See pp. 28 and 29.
⁵ See p. 43. ⁶ See pp. 38 and 41. ⁷ See p. 68. ⁸ See p. 62.

of the official statements on the subject as are available have therefore been included. It is hoped to publish more complete material later on.

The *Altmark* was a German auxiliary naval vessel which had been co-operating with the pocket battleship *Admiral Graf Spee* during the latter's raids on commerce in the Atlantic, and had on board some 300 British prisoners who were being conveyed to Germany. On her way she endeavoured to avail herself of the protection of Norwegian territorial waters by following the Norwegian coast. She was intercepted by British warships, and took refuge in Joessing Fjord, where, after a protest had been made by the Norwegian vessels escorting the *Altmark*, she was pursued by the British destroyer *Cossack*, boarded, and the prisoners released. Official British¹ and Norwegian² accounts of the incident are available; the German version was given in a report by the captain of the *Altmark*, but no official statement is available.

The incident raised a number of important questions of international law, including the question whether the *Altmark* was to be regarded as a naval vessel, whether she was liable to search by the Norwegian authorities, whether she had the right of 'innocent passage' through Norwegian territorial waters, whether the passage of a ship carrying prisoners could be regarded as 'innocent passage', and whether Great Britain was justified, by breaches of law committed by the other side, in carrying out what was in itself a breach of Norwegian neutrality. It is impossible to deal adequately with these questions until further documents become available.

The questions of international law involved, as well as the dramatic and human interest of the story, have given it considerable prominence; but on the subsequent development of Norwegian neutrality and the events which followed, it probably had little influence.

The Russo-Finnish Dispute

If the war at sea was one main source of the difficulties with which Norway was faced in maintaining her neutrality, the other great problem which arose in the winter of 1939-40 was the Russo-Finnish War. The documents relating to this dispute will appear in a subsequent issue of the series of *Documents on International Affairs*. When Finland was invaded by the Soviet Union on November 30, 1939, keen sympathy was felt in Norway, as in the other Scandinavian countries, for the Finns, and many Norwegian volunteers went to fight in Finland. The Scandinavian Foreign Ministers, meeting in Geneva at the time of the Assembly of the

¹ See p. 34.

² See pp. 33 and 35.

League of Nations, agreed to do what was possible to bring about peaceful negotiations between Soviet Russia and Finland. Owing, however, to military and strategic considerations which are almost too obvious to mention, the Northern countries felt unable to do anything more. Thus the first demonstration was given that the system of inter-Scandinavian co-operation, which had been fruitful in the economic, social, and cultural spheres, but which did not extend to defence matters, would be inoperative in the case of an attack by a strongly armed Power on one of the countries concerned.

The British and French Governments, which had sent material aid to Finland, expressed their willingness to send an expeditionary force to that country if they were asked to do so; and according to Mr. Chamberlain's statement in Parliament on March 19¹ such a force was ready at the beginning of March. But it could not reach Finland without passing through Norway and Sweden; these countries feared that if they allowed the passage of such a force they would immediately be invaded by Germany; they therefore informed the Finnish Government that they could not permit the passage of the Allied force, but must maintain their neutrality. Finland consequently sent no request for a force. The German contention, as expressed by Herr von Ribbentrop,² was that the whole object of the Allies in offering help to Finland was to extend the war against Germany by this means. The justice of this statement can perhaps best be judged in the light of subsequent events. In any case, peace between the Soviet Union and Finland was concluded on March 12, and the question of sending an Allied force to Finland no longer arose.

It was not the Russo-Finnish dispute, but the problems of the war at sea, which were to provide the occasion (according to the German contention) or the pretext (according to the British and Norwegian view) for the German invasion of Norway. One of the factors which attracted the most public attention in the sphere of economic warfare was the valuable iron ore which was mined in the north of Sweden and usually transported by rail to the Norwegian port of Narvik and thence by sea. This ore was of great value to the German armaments industry, and it was of corresponding importance to Great Britain to be able to intercept it. By hugging the Norwegian coast, German vessels could take advantage of Norwegian territorial waters for the greatest part of the voyage from Narvik, and thus avoid meeting British naval forces. In this situation the British contention³ was, broadly, that Germany was

¹ See p. 30.

² See pp. 63 and 80.

³ See pp. 43, 59, 65, and 68.

seeking to profit by her adversary's strict observance of the provisions of an international law which she herself unhesitatingly broke whenever it suited her; the German contention¹ was that Great Britain was engaged in an unscrupulous and piratical warfare at the expense of neutrals, and was preparing at any time to throw off the hollow pretence of legality; the Norwegian view² was that Norway could do nothing but cling to the knife-edge of strict neutrality, protesting against anything which she regarded as a violation of her rights by either side, regardless of whether the violation was substantial or merely technical, well knowing at the same time that if either side chose to disregard her protests, she had no means of making them effective.

On April 8, 1940, the British and French Governments, in a broadcast statement³ officially announced that they had laid mines at certain places in Norwegian territorial waters, in order to deny to Germany the use of these waters, which were of particular value to her for the carriage of contraband of war. This statement, as well as Mr. Churchill's speech of April 11,⁴ set out in full the case of the Allies against Germany for her methods of conducting sea warfare and the case for the Allied action. This was not that the mining of Norwegian waters would, in normal circumstances, be in accordance with international law, but that that law itself recognized that when one belligerent had systematically violated its provisions, the other was justified in taking, by way of reprisal, measures which would not otherwise be legitimate. The Norwegian Government immediately protested⁵ to Great Britain and France. On the same night, Germany invaded Denmark and Norway.

Invasion of Norway

The events of the German invasion of Norway are set out so fully in the extracts from the Norwegian White Book which appear below⁶ that they need not be retraced here. The points which may be emphasized are these: the German military action was started, according both to the Norwegian White Book⁷ and to the memorandum presented to the Norwegian Foreign Minister by the German Minister at Oslo,⁸ before the German demands were submitted to Norway. German warships had been in action and had met with Norwegian resistance, and there had been loss of life on both sides some hours before the German demands were handed to Professor Koht at 5 a.m. on the morning of April 9. Dr. Bräuer himself stated⁹

¹ See pp. 54, 62 and 80.

² See p. 46.

³ See p. 43.

⁴ See p. 68.

⁶ See p. 46.

⁶ See p. 48.

⁷ See p. 48.

⁸ See p. 54.

⁹ See p. 51.

that when he presented his demands, German action had progressed so far that nothing but their immediate acceptance would make it possible to stop it. Secondly, no country which accepted the detailed demands put forward by Germany¹ could retain even a semblance of national independence, and it was also difficult to see how they could be reconciled with Dr. Bräuer's statement that Germany did not intend to use Norway as a base of operations against Great Britain and France.²

The German version of the reasons for the invasion of Norway is given in the memorandum itself³ and in Herr von Ribbentrop's speeches of April 9⁴ and April 27.⁵ The contention that it was a reply to the Allied mining of Norwegian territorial waters cannot, in view of the dates of the two events, be sustained. German naval forces were on their way to Norway before the mines were laid, and the very thorough preparations must have been made long in advance.

The German Government also alleged⁶ that it possessed documentary evidence that its action in occupying Norway was taken only just in time to forestall an impending occupation of certain points in Norway—or, according to Herr von Ribbentrop,⁷ of the whole of Scandinavia including Sweden—by the Allies. The Allies, they said, unable to come to grips with Germany owing to its West Wall, and finding their attempts at blockade unsuccessful, were determined to find some new territory on which to fight; they had selected the Scandinavian countries for this purpose; they had hoped to achieve their object by sending an expeditionary force to Finland; in spite of their disclaimers they would have done this with or without the consent of the Northern countries; their design had been foiled by the unexpected conclusion of the Russo-Finnish war; and they now intended, with or without a pretext, to occupy Norway so as to cut off the ore supplies and attack Germany on the flank. These accusations were made at length by Herr von Ribbentrop in the speech⁸ on April 27, addressed to the Diplomatic Corps and the Press, at which he presented a White Book published by the German Government in support of his statements. In this speech, Herr von Ribbentrop quoted a number of British and French statesmen. It will be found interesting to compare his versions with the actual words of the speaker. These are given in a footnote in each case.

It has not been possible to reproduce the German White Book

¹ See pp. 49 and 99.

² See p. 80.

³ See p. 57.

⁴ See p. 56.

⁵ See p. 54.

⁷ See p. 63.

⁶ See p. 62.

⁸ See p. 80.

here, as it is of great length and as much of its interest is lost unless the facsimile reproductions of the documents which it contains are included. A complete English text with facsimiles has, however, been published by the German propaganda authorities.¹ It contains a large number of operation orders, diaries, etc., stated to have been captured from the British forces in Norway, communications between the British and French authorities and their consular authorities in Norway on intelligence matters, and documents stated to have been found at the Norwegian Foreign Office. The nature of these documents is indicated in Herr von Ribbentrop's speech,² and a reply to the allegations concerning Norway was made by Professor Koht.³ The statement that the Allies had contemplated a preventive occupation of Norway was repeatedly denied by British statesmen, e.g. by Mr. Chamberlain on April 9.⁴ As to Herr von Ribbentrop's view that the British had made detailed and elaborate plans long in advance for an occupation of Norway, it was certainly not shared by the members of the House of Commons who, in the historic debates of May 7 and 8, made it one of the chief charges against Mr. Chamberlain's Government that it had not made an adequate preliminary survey even for the limited operations in Norway which were actually undertaken in order to counter the German invasion. What appears, in the light of these debates,⁵ to have happened was that the British Government had foreseen that the invasion of Norway by Germany was always a possibility; that it had expected the mining of Norwegian territorial waters to be followed by some reaction on the part of Germany; that it had made some preparation for such a contingency, but that it had allowed the force previously assembled for Finland to be dispersed, and had not made any preparations adequate to meet a German operation of the scope and thoroughness of that which actually took place. Herr von Ribbentrop's evidence therefore merely suggested that the British had not waited until Germany had actually invaded Norway before making some preparation for the contingency that Allied operations in Norway might at some time become necessary; it did not show that the Allies had prepared for an unprovoked invasion of Norway, and indeed it could not do so, since such a step was certainly never contemplated.

The circumstances in which Dr. Bräuer presented his demands, and the Norwegian Government refused them, are fully explained in the Norwegian White Book.⁶ Norwegian resistance therefore

¹ *Britain's Designs on Norway*. Full Text of White Book No. 4, published by the German Foreign Office. German Library of Information, New York, 1940.

² See p. 88. ³ See p. 91. ⁴ See p. 59. ⁵ See pp. 105 and 111. ⁶ See p. 48.

began immediately. But as the German invasion, which had been prepared with great thoroughness, was begun before the Norwegian Government had even been informed that demands were to be made on it, and as the Norwegian army was not mobilized, the Germans were able to obtain their immediate objectives in a very short time. This was at first believed to be due to widespread treachery in Norway; but subsequent information tended to show that sheer surprise and confusion were the principal factors. As the Germans gained possession of the principal broadcasting stations, they were able to send out false orders which greatly impeded Norwegian mobilization. In any case, in a country where communications are as difficult as in Norway, effective armed resistance could scarcely be organized at once. Published accounts from Norwegian sources generally emphasize at once the lack of military preparedness, and the courage and initiative shown by the Norwegian population in overcoming these difficulties.

It was realized from the first that it was essential that the legally constituted authorities round whom resistance could centre should escape capture by the invaders, and accordingly the King of Norway and the royal family, the Government and the members of the Storting, left Oslo on the night of April 8-9. The story of their flight is given in the Norwegian White Book¹ and in more detail in the eye-witness account written by the President of the Storting, Hr. Hambro.² The Storting, in accordance with paragraph 68 of the Norwegian Constitution, which allows the King to summon it outside the capital in case of extraordinary circumstances such as an invasion, met first at Hamar and then at Elverum. Hr. Nygaardsvold's Government offered its resignation; this was not accepted, but it was decided to strengthen the Government by adding to it representatives of the three other political parties. These were actually appointed on April 22. The Storting³ unanimously gave the Government wide powers to take whatever steps were necessary in the existing conditions, and it was agreed that the Government should, if necessary, continue to function even if it had to do so from outside the territory of Norway.

Immediately after the German invasion, Major Vidkun Quisling, the leader of the small Norwegian party known as *Nasjonal Samling*, which had been unable to secure more than a very small number of votes in the 1936 elections and had since then split into a number of fractions, announced that he had formed a Government. The

¹ See p. 51.

² *I Saw It Happen In Norway*. By Carl J. Hambro. Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1940.

³ See pp. 51 and 128.

Germans intended to exercise their authority in Norway through him. He was, however, unable to obtain any degree of popular support in Norway; indeed, several of the persons whom he had named as the members of his Government disclaimed all connexion with him. Norwegian writers have stated that his difficulties were increased by the fact that the police and Gestapo officials whom the Germans had sent with their invading forces to assist him went down when the warship *Blücher* was sunk by the Norwegians on the night of the invasion. In any case, his Government at that time lasted only for five days.

In the meantime Dr. Bräuer, the German Minister, had asked for an interview with the King of Norway with a view to fresh negotiations. It took place at Elverum on April 10. Dr. Bräuer said that the situation had now entirely changed and that the fulfilment of the demands in his original memorandum would no longer be sufficient. The Germans demanded the formation of a new Government possessing their confidence; it must be under Major Quisling. The King replied that he could not appoint a Government which, as the last elections had shown, would not have the confidence of the Norwegian people. The concessions offered by each side¹ did not touch this essential point, and negotiations were therefore broken off. From this time onwards the King and Government were obliged to conceal their movements from the advancing German forces and their bombing aeroplanes, as a determined attempt was made to capture or destroy the King and the royal family.

When it became clear that the opposition to Major Quisling was so strong that the Germans could not, for the time being, exercise their power through him, they were obliged to look for some other Norwegian authority with which they could work. At the same time, since the King and his Government were precluded from exercising day-to-day administrative authority in the occupied districts, it was clearly necessary from the Norwegian point of view that there should be some kind of body which could do so. As a result of this situation, the Norwegian Supreme Court—a judicial body which in normal times has no political functions—decided² to set up an Administrative Council as an emergency measure. The members of this council, of which Hr. Christensen was President, were persons who enjoyed general respect and were not of Nazi sympathies. Hr. Paal Berg, President of the Supreme Court, made it clear to the German authorities³ that the Administrative Council

¹ See pp. 52-3.

² See pp. 74-5.

³ See p. 75.

was not a Government but an organ of administrative control with no political functions; that its creation was conditional on the withdrawal of Major Quisling; and that the King of Norway would be acquainted at once with what had been done. On being informed, the King replied¹ that he understood the reasons for the Supreme Court's action, but that as the authority of the Administrative Council would be exercised under the influence of a foreign Power, he must reserve complete liberty for himself and the Norwegian Government as regards any decisions which it might take. The Norwegian Government's proclamation of April 17² also represented an approval, with the necessary qualifications, of the setting up of the Council; and later, in his broadcast of August 26,³ the King expressly thanked the members of the Council for their work in difficult circumstances.

The creation of this merely administrative body did not provide the Germans with a Norwegian Government in sympathy with them through which they could govern. Consequently, Herr Hitler on April 24 issued a decree⁴ appointing a German Reich Commissioner, Herr Terboven, to be in charge of the occupied parts of Norway. He was to be directly responsible to Herr Hitler, was to make use of the Administrative Council and the Norwegian authorities for carrying out his orders, and might also make use of German police. His appointment did not mean that Norway was incorporated in the Reich; Norwegian law was still to remain in force so far as the exigencies of the occupation permitted.

Great Britain and France, without awaiting any request for assistance from Norway, at once expressed their intention of sending military forces to assist Norway.⁵

It is intended to make only the briefest possible reference here to military and naval operations, partly because a fuller treatment would unduly extend the scope of the present publication, and partly because complete information is of necessity not available until after the war. At sea, the Germans sustained heavy losses from the British Navy and also by Norwegian action; but they were not thereby prevented from attaining their principal objectives on land. The Norwegians, having mobilized under conditions of extreme difficulty, endeavoured to stem the advance of much more heavily armed German forces up the Gudbrand and Oester valleys. The Allies, on April 15, landed forces near Narvik, which the Germans had captured either by treachery or by surprise. A few days

¹ See p. 76.

² See p. 77.

³ See p. 139.

⁴ See p. 78.

⁵ See pp. 61 and 62.

later, troops were landed at Namsos and Åndalsnes, originally with the idea of carrying out operations subsidiary to a direct attack on Trondheim.¹ The plan for the attack on Trondheim was, however, abandoned, and not long afterwards it became clear that these two forces would have to be evacuated. This was accordingly done, and the King of Norway, his Ministers, and his Commander-in-Chief left at the same time for Northern Norway. Many of the Norwegian troops who were co-operating in the withdrawal were, however, left behind. Resistance in Southern Norway thus came to an end, but in Northern Norway it was continued, both by the Norwegian Government and by the Allies. Narvik was recaptured from the Germans on May 27. Almost immediately afterwards, however, the catastrophic developments in other theatres of war compelled the Allies to withdraw all their troops from Norway. The Norwegian Government made an attempt, through the good offices of Sweden, to open negotiations with Germany with a view to an armistice arrangement leaving Northern Norway in Norwegian hands.² No reply from Germany was received. Resistance in Norway was discontinued, and King Haakon and his Government, on June 7, withdrew to Great Britain in order to maintain the struggle for Norwegian independence from there.³ In doing this, they were following the instructions given by the Storting at its last meeting on April 9.

In Great Britain, the failure of the Norwegian campaign produced results of the greatest importance. The historic debates in the House of Commons on May 7 and 8, as a result of which Mr. Chamberlain's Government was replaced by Mr. Churchill's, belong, however, to the history of Great Britain rather than to that of Norway during the war.

Norway under German Occupation

About the situation in Norway under German occupation it is difficult to obtain much reliable information while the war lasts. The Norwegian Press and wireless are of course under German control. It is, however, quite clear that the resistance of the Norwegians to the occupying authorities did not come to an end with the end of military operations. The Germans, having secured what was no doubt their primary aim, the control of the Norwegian seaboard, would apparently have preferred to find a Norwegian Government which would subserve their interests and which should, if possible, have at least some semblance of legality, rather than to

¹ See pp. 94, 107 and 114.

² See pp. 122 and 127.

³ See pp. 119 and 121.

have to expend much time and energy in governing a recalcitrant Norway directly. The unpopularity of Major Quisling still made it difficult to make use of him. So long as the King of Norway remained in possession of his functions under the Constitution, it was not possible, with any appearance of legality, to substitute some more permanent body for the Administrative Council without his consent. After the King had left Norway, the Germans made great efforts to induce the Norwegians to demand his abdication. A campaign was also initiated in the German-controlled Press in favour of replacing the Nygaardsvold Government as it could no longer exercise its functions. It does not appear to have been easy to induce the Norwegians to demand the abdication of their King at the bidding of a foreign Power. On June 27, however, a letter signed by certain members of the Presidential Board of the Storting (a committee of the presiding officers which has no constitutional functions) was sent to the King¹ stating that it was proposed to abolish the Administrative Council and replace it by a State Council (*Riksråd*), which would take over the functions of the King and Government; that the Storting was to be summoned (those members who were outside Norway being expressly excluded) to approve this step and to withdraw the authority given to the Nygaardsvold Government on April 9; and that the Presidential Board requested the King to abdicate. The King, in a letter of July 3,² declined, as the request emanated from a body which was subject to the control of the occupying authorities and was not a free expression of the will of the Norwegian people. The letter sets out in full the constitutional reason for this decision.

The proposals of the Presidential Board appear to have aroused strong opposition in Norway, and the proposed meeting of the Storting was not held at that stage. The State Council was not set up, and the Administrative Council continued to function. When, in September, the Storting, or what remained of it, actually met, its members were presented with a series of questions on the lines of the above-mentioned letter of the Presidential Board. Complicated negotiations then took place between Herr Terboven and its members. The former made great efforts to secure the necessary two-thirds majority in the Storting for the deposition of the King and Government, and he stated that this had been obtained. In fact, all the votes which were taken were merely provisional, and were conditional on certain guarantees from the German side which were not forthcoming. Even so, a two-thirds majority was not reached

¹ See p. 129.

² See p. 131.

even for the suspension of the powers of the King and Government. It appeared at one time as if an agreement had been reached between the four Norwegian parties—the Right, the Peasants, the Left, and Labour—under which Mr. Christensen, the President of the Administrative Council, was to form a Council of State. These negotiations, however, broke down, the reason being, according to Herr Terboven,¹ that 'contrary to the whole basis of the negotiations and to the terms of the resolution of the Storting, according to which the State Council was to work on its own responsibility, an attempt was made, by legal quibbles, surreptitiously to give the old parties a preponderant influence in the State Council, and a warning by the Reich Commissioner was not given due weight'. According to information from other sources, the Norwegian parties insisted on a written guarantee that the State Council should have real independence in dealing with purely internal affairs, that it should not be controlled by Major Quisling's party, that civil government should be carried on in accordance with Norwegian law, and that freedom of speech and of association should be preserved. It has also been stated that the Reich Commissioner attempted to play one party off against another, and that concessions granted at one stage were subsequently withdrawn.

After the breakdown of the negotiations, Herr Terboven, on September 25, issued a decree² stating that the Royal House had been repudiated by a two-thirds majority of the Storting (this statement, as has been shown, is contradicted by other evidence), that it had no further political importance and would not return to Norway, that the same applied to the Nygaardsvold Government, and that the activity of the Administrative Council was terminated. The decree appointed a State Council which did not include Major Quisling, though it is understood that his influence is predominant in it. The old political parties were dissolved, only the *Nasjonal Samling* being permitted.

The available information suggests that this new administrative machinery has little support among the Norwegian people, and that the various measures taken to introduce the Nazi system into Norway are meeting with resistance. One piece of evidence of this is that all the members of the Norwegian Supreme Court³ resigned on December 23, 1940, on the ground that the Reich Commissioner's decrees conflicted with the fundamental principles of Norwegian law, and were contrary to Article 43 of The Hague Convention of 1907, under which the occupation authorities are to apply the law

¹ *Frankfurter Zeitung*, September 27, 1940.

² See p. 140.

³ See p. 144.

of the occupied country unless an absolute impediment exists, as well as to the German decree of April 24,¹ which stated that Norwegian law was to remain in force so far as the exigencies of the occupation permitted. The pastoral letter from Norwegian bishops to their congregations,² read in Norwegian churches on February 16, 1941, also throws much light on the nature of the Nazi régime in Norway and the opposition which it has aroused.

NOTE. An account of the position of Norway before, during, and after the invasion, based on first-hand knowledge, is given in Professor Koht's book (Halvdan Koht): *Norway, Neutral and Invaded*. (London, Hutchinson, 1941), which appeared while the present volume was in the press.

¹ See p. 78.

² See p. 147.

I. NORWEGIAN NEUTRALITY

1. DECLARATION BETWEEN DENMARK, FINLAND, ICELAND, NORWAY, AND SWEDEN FOR THE PURPOSE OF ESTABLISHING SIMILAR RULES OF NEUTRALITY. SIGNED AT STOCKHOLM, MAY 27, 1938.¹

The Governments of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden,

Considering it to be highly desirable that, in the event of war between foreign Powers, they should all apply similar rules of neutrality,

Have drawn up, on the basis of the Declaration in this matter made by Denmark, Norway, and Sweden on December 21, 1912, Rules of Neutrality, the texts of which are appended hereto, to be enacted by the said Governments, each in so far as concerns itself,

And have agreed that, should any of them desire, in the light of their own experience, to modify the said Rules, as contemplated by the Convention on the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, signed at The Hague on October 18, 1907, they shall not do so without first giving, if possible, sufficient notice to the other four Governments to permit of an exchange of views in the matter.

In faith whereof the undersigned, duly authorized for the purpose by their respective Governments, have signed the present Déclaration and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done at Stockholm, in five copies, the 27th day of May, 1938.

(Signed) (L.S.) RICKARD SANDLER.

For Denmark:

(L.S.) OVE ENGELL.

For Iceland:

(L.S.) J. K. PAASIKIVI.

(L.S.) OVE ENGELL.

(L.S.) J. H. WOLLEBAEK.

NORWAY

RULES OF NEUTRALITY

Concerning the neutrality of Norway in the event of war between foreign Powers, the following provisions shall apply as from the date and to the extent to be fixed by the King:

¹ League of Nations *Treaty Series*, Vol. CLXXXVIII, Nos. 4350-71, 1938, No. 4365, pp. 295 and 317-23.

Article 1

Belligerent warships shall be granted admission to the ports and other territorial waters of the Kingdom subject to the following exceptions, restrictions, and conditions.

Article 2

1. Belligerent warships shall not be allowed access to ports and maritime areas proclaimed to be naval ports or to form part of the protection zones of coast defence works.

2. Belligerent warships shall, further, not be allowed access to inner waters the entrance to which is closed by submarine mines or other means of defence.

For the purpose of the present Decree, 'Norwegian inner waters' shall be deemed to include ports, the approaches to ports, gulfs and bays, and the waters between those Norwegian islands, islets and reefs which are not constantly submerged, and between the said islands, islets and reefs and the mainland.

3. Belligerent submarines ready for service shall be prohibited from navigating or remaining in Norwegian territorial waters.

The foregoing prohibition shall not apply, however, to submarines forced to enter prohibited waters by stress of weather or by damage, provided always that they indicate by means of an international signal their reason for entering such waters. Such submarines shall be required to leave the prohibited waters as soon as the circumstances which are the cause of their presence there have ceased. While in Norwegian territorial waters, submarines shall continuously fly their national flag and, save in the case of extreme necessity, shall navigate on the surface.

4. The King may, in special circumstances, for the purpose of safeguarding the sovereign rights and maintaining the neutrality of the Kingdom while at the same time observing the general principles of international law, prohibit access to Norwegian ports and other stated zones of Norwegian territorial waters other than those to which access is prohibited by the foregoing provisions.

5. The King may likewise prohibit the access to Norwegian ports and anchorages of any belligerent warships which may have failed to comply with the rules and regulations laid down by the competent Norwegian authorities or have violated the neutrality of the Kingdom.

Article 3

1. Privateers shall not be permitted to enter Norwegian ports or Norwegian territorial waters.

2. The armed merchant vessels of belligerents shall, if their armaments are intended for purposes other than their own defence, likewise be forbidden access to Norwegian ports or Norwegian territorial waters.

Article 4

1. Belligerent warships shall not be permitted to remain in Norwegian ports and anchorages, or in other Norwegian territorial waters, for more than twenty-four hours, save in the event of their having suffered damage or run aground, or under stress of weather, or in the cases enumerated in paragraphs 3 and 4 below. In such cases, they shall leave as soon as the cause of the delay has ceased. In the case of vessels having suffered damage or run aground, the competent Norwegian authority shall fix such time-limit as may be deemed sufficient to repair the damage or refloat the vessel. No vessel shall, however, be permitted to prolong its stay for more than twenty-four hours if it is clear that the said vessel cannot be rendered seaworthy within a reasonable time or if the damage was caused by an enemy act of war.

The above restrictions on the stay of vessels shall not apply to warships used exclusively for religious, scientific or humanitarian purposes, or to naval and military hospital ships.

2. Not more than three warships of a belligerent Power or of several allied belligerent Powers shall be permitted to remain in a Norwegian port or anchorage at the same time or, the coast having been divided into districts for the purpose, in ports or anchorages of the same coastal district of Norway.

3. In the event of warships belonging to both belligerents being simultaneously present in a Norwegian port or anchorage, a period of not less than twenty-four hours shall elapse between the departure of a ship belonging to one belligerent and the departure of a ship belonging to the other. The order of departure shall be determined by the order of arrival, unless the ship which arrived first is so circumstanced that an extension of its stay is permitted.

4. No belligerent warship shall leave a Norwegian port or anchorage in which there is a merchant vessel flying an enemy flag within less than twenty-four hours after the departure of such merchant vessel. The competent authorities shall make such

arrangements for the departure of merchant vessels that the stay of warships shall not be unnecessarily prolonged.

Article 5

1. In Norwegian ports and anchorages, belligerent warships shall only be permitted to effect such repairs as may be essential to seaworthiness, and they shall not increase their warlike strength in any manner whatsoever. In repairing damage manifestly caused by enemy acts of war, damaged vessels shall not be permitted to avail themselves of any assistance which they may have procured in Norwegian territory. The competent Norwegian authorities shall determine the nature of the repairs to be carried out. Such repairs shall be effected as rapidly as possible within the time-limit laid down in Article 4, paragraph 1.

2. Belligerent warships shall not make use of Norwegian ports or other Norwegian territorial waters to replace or augment their warlike stores or armament, or to complete their crews.

3. Belligerent warships shall only be permitted to revictual in Norwegian ports or anchorages to the extent necessary to bring their supplies up to the normal peace standard.

4. As regards refuelling, belligerent warships shall be subject, in Norwegian ports and anchorages, to the same provisions as other foreign vessels. They shall, nevertheless, only be permitted to ship sufficient fuel to enable them to reach the nearest port in their own country and in no case shall they ship more than is necessary to fill their coal bunkers, strictly so called, or their liquid fuel bunkers. After obtaining fuel in any Norwegian port or anchorage, they shall not be permitted to obtain further supplies in Norwegian ports and anchorages within a period of three months.

Article 6

Belligerent warships shall be required to employ the officially licensed pilots in Norwegian territorial waters whenever the assistance of a pilot is compulsory, but otherwise they shall only be permitted to make use of the services of such pilot when in distress, in order to escape perils of the sea.

Article 7

1. Prizes of foreign nationality shall not be brought into a Norwegian port or anchorage save on account of unseaworthiness, under stress of weather, or for lack of fuel or provisions. Prizes

brought into a Norwegian port or anchorage in any of the above circumstances shall leave as soon as such circumstances are at an end.

2. No prize court shall be set up by a belligerent in Norwegian territory or on any vessel in Norwegian territorial waters. The sale of prizes in a Norwegian port or anchorage shall likewise be prohibited.

Article 8

1. Belligerent military aircraft, with the exception of air ambulances and aircraft carried on board warships, shall not be admitted to Norwegian territory save in so far as may be otherwise provided in regulations applied, or to be applied, in accordance with the general principles of international law in regard to certain spaces.

2. Aircraft carried on board belligerent warships shall not leave such vessels while in Norwegian territorial waters.

Article 9

1. Belligerent warships and military aircraft shall be required to respect the sovereign rights of the Kingdom and to refrain from all acts infringing its neutrality.

2. Within the limits of Norwegian territory all acts of war, including the stopping, visit and search and capture of vessels and aircraft, whether neutral or of enemy nationality, shall be prohibited. Any vessel or aircraft captured within such limit shall be released immediately, together with its officers, crew and cargo.

Article 10

The sanitary, pilot, Customs, navigation, air traffic, harbour and police regulations shall be strictly observed.

Article 11

Belligerents shall not use Norwegian territory as a base for warlike operations against the enemy.

Article 12

1. Belligerents and persons in their service shall not install or operate in Norwegian territory wireless-telegraph stations or any other apparatus to be used for the purpose of communication with belligerent military, naval or air forces.

2. Belligerents shall not use their mobile wireless-telegraph stations, whether belonging to their combatant forces or not, in Norwegian territory for the transmission of messages, save when in distress or for the purpose of communicating with the Norwegian

authorities through a Norwegian inland or coastal wireless-telegraph station or a wireless-telegraph station on board a vessel belonging to the Norwegian navy.

Article 13

The observation, by any person whatsoever, either from aircraft or in any other manner in Norwegian territory, of the movements, operations or defence works of one belligerent with a view to the information of the other belligerent shall be prohibited.

Article 14

1. Belligerents shall not establish fuel depots within the territory of the Kingdom, whether upon land or on vessels stationed in its territorial waters.

2. Vessels and aircraft cruising with the manifest purpose of furnishing fuel or other supplies to the combatant forces of the belligerents shall not ship such fuel or other supplies in Norwegian ports or anchorages in quantities exceeding their own requirements.

Article 15

1. No vessel shall be fitted or armed in Norwegian territory for cruising or taking part in hostile operations against either of the belligerents. Nor shall any vessel intended for such uses, which has been partly or wholly adapted in Norwegian territory for warlike purposes, be permitted to leave such territory.

2. Aircraft equipped to carry out an attack on a belligerent, or carrying apparatus or material the mounting or use of which would enable it to carry out such an attack, shall not be permitted to leave Norwegian territory if there are grounds for presuming that it is intended for use against a belligerent Power. Any work on aircraft to prepare it for departure for the above-mentioned purpose shall likewise be prohibited.

2. COMMUNICATION OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO HERR HITLER
AND SIGNOR MUSSOLINI, APRIL 14, 1939.¹

The White House, April 14, 1939.

His Excellency Adolf Hitler,
Chancellor of the German Reich,
Berlin.

You realize I am sure that throughout the world hundreds of millions of human beings are living to-day in constant fear of a new war or even a series of wars.

¹ Released by the White House, April 15, 1939. *Press Releases*, The Department of State.

The existence of this fear—and the possibility of such a conflict—is of definite concern to the people of the United States for whom I speak, as it must also be to the peoples of the other nations of the entire Western Hemisphere. All of them know that any major war, even if it were to be confined to other continents, must bear heavily on them during its continuance and also for generations to come.

Because of the fact that after the acute tension in which the world has been living during the past few weeks there would seem to be at least a momentary relaxation—because no troops are at this moment on the march—this may be an opportune moment for me to send you this message.

On a previous occasion I have addressed you on behalf of the settlement of political, economic, and social problems by peaceful methods and without resort to arms.

But the tide of events seems to have reverted to the threat of arms. If such threats continue, it seems inevitable that much of the world must become involved in common ruin. All the world, victor nations, vanquished nations, and neutral nations will suffer. I refuse to believe that the world is, of necessity, such a prisoner of destiny. On the contrary, it is clear that the leaders of great nations have it in their power to liberate their peoples from the disaster that impends. It is equally clear that in their own minds and in their own hearts the peoples themselves desire that their fears be ended.

It is, however, unfortunately necessary to take cognizance of recent facts.

Three nations in Europe and one in Africa have seen their independent existence terminated. A vast territory in another independent nation of the Far East has been occupied by a neighbouring state. Reports, which we trust are not true, insist that further acts of aggression are contemplated against still other independent nations. Plainly the world is moving toward the moment when this situation must end in catastrophe unless a more rational way of guiding events is found.

You have repeatedly asserted that you and the German people have no desire for war. If this is true there need be no war.

Nothing can persuade the peoples of the earth that any governing power has any right or need to inflict the consequences of war on its own or any other people save in the cause of self-evident home defence.

In making this statement we as Americans speak not through selfishness or fear or weakness. If we speak now it is with the voice

of strength and with friendship for mankind. It is still clear to me that international problems can be solved at the council table.

It is therefore no answer to the plea for peaceful discussion for one side to plead that unless they receive assurances beforehand that the verdict will be theirs, they will not lay aside their arms. In conference rooms, as in courts, it is necessary that both enter upon the discussion in good faith, assuming that substantial justice will accrue to both; and it is customary and necessary that they leave their arms outside the room where they confer.

I am convinced that the cause of world peace would be greatly advanced if the nations of the world were to obtain a frank statement relating to the present and future policy of governments.

Because the United States, as one of the nations of the Western Hemisphere, is not involved in the immediate controversies which have arisen in Europe, I trust that you may be willing to make such a statement of policy to me as the head of a nation far removed from Europe in order that I, acting only with the responsibility and obligation of a friendly intermediary, may communicate such declaration to other nations now apprehensive as to the course which the policy of your Government may take.

Are you willing to give assurance that your armed forces will not attack or invade the territory or possessions of the following independent nations: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, The Netherlands, Belgium, Great Britain and Ireland, France, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Russia, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Iraq, the Arabias, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and Iran.

Such an assurance clearly must apply not only to the present day but also to a future sufficiently long to give every opportunity to work by peaceful methods for a more permanent peace. I therefore suggest that you construe the word 'future' to apply to a minimum period of assured non-aggression—ten years at the least—a quarter of a century, if we dare look that far ahead.

If such assurance is given by your Government, I will immediately transmit it to the governments of the nations I have named and I will simultaneously inquire whether, as I am reasonably sure, each of the nations enumerated above will in turn give like assurance for transmission to you.

Reciprocal assurances such as I have outlined will bring to the world an immediate measure of relief.

I propose that if it is given, two essential problems shall promptly

be discussed in the resulting peaceful surroundings, and in those discussions the Government of the United States will gladly take part.

The discussions which I have in mind relate to the most effective and immediate manner through which the peoples of the world can obtain progressive relief from the crushing burden of armament which is each day bringing them more closely to the brink of economic disaster. Simultaneously the Government of the United States would be prepared to take part in discussions looking towards the most practical manner of opening up avenues of international trade to the end that every nation of the earth may be enabled to buy and sell on equal terms in the world-market as well as to possess assurance of obtaining the materials and products of peaceful economic life.

At the same time, those governments other than the United States which are directly interested could undertake such political discussions as they may consider necessary or desirable.

We recognize complex world problems which affect all humanity but we know that study and discussion of them must be held in an atmosphere of peace. Such an atmosphere of peace cannot exist if negotiations are overshadowed by the threat of force or by the fear of war.

I think you will not misunderstand the spirit of frankness in which I send you this message. Heads of great governments in this hour are literally responsible for the fate of humanity in the coming years. They cannot fail to hear the prayers of their peoples to be protected from the foreseeable chaos of war. History will hold them accountable for the lives and the happiness of all—even unto the least.

I hope that your answer will make it possible for humanity to lose fear and regain security for many years to come.

A similar message is being addressed to the Chief of the Italian Government.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

3. COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED AFTER THE MEETING OF THE FOREIGN
MINISTERS OF DENMARK, FINLAND, NORWAY, AND SWEDEN
AT STOCKHOLM, MAY 9, 1939.¹

The Northern Foreign Ministers at their meeting first noted that their countries maintain the declaration made after last year's

¹ *The Times*, May 10, 1939.

meeting at Oslo that the Northern countries, as hitherto, remain outside all groups of Powers that may be formed in Europe and in the event of war will do everything to avoid being involved. On this basis they have now considered the suitability of their countries, individually or collectively, being parties to a more or less extensive Non-Aggression Pact and have exchanged information also on the points of view of the four Foreign Offices.

The result of the discussions will be submitted to their respective countries.

The Foreign Ministers expressed the unanimous view that the international policy which their countries have logically taken up and intend to maintain excludes them from being the object of any political combination whatever of the Powers.

They jointly welcome expressions from any other country of a desire to respect the Northern countries' integrity and independence. Corresponding respect by the Northern countries of other States is the obvious consequence of the whole policy of the Northern countries.

After their discussions the Ministers are convinced that the reply which, in accordance with a decision to be made in each country, must be given to inquiries respecting their attitude to Pacts of the kind now in question, should on all sides strengthen faith in the impartial neutrality policy which the Northern countries maintain in virtue of their right of self-determination.

4. OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED BY THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT, MAY 17, 1939.¹

At the end of last month the German Government approached the Norwegian Government on the subject of opening negotiations for a non-aggression pact based on reciprocity; an exchange of views has taken place and led to the following result:

Considering that Norway does not feel herself threatened by Germany, and that Norway, maintaining her principle of neutrality, integrity and independence does not intend to conclude non-aggression pacts with any other country, the Norwegian Government has communicated to the Government of the Reich that it does not consider a treaty of the type suggested necessary.

The two Governments then have agreed to abstain from any further discussion of this plan.

¹ *Le Nord*, 1939, No. 2, p. 252.

5. EXTRACTS FROM COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED BY THE CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF DENMARK, FINLAND, NORWAY, AND SWEDEN AT OSLO, AUGUST 30-31, 1939.¹

The Foreign Ministers of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden met in Oslo August 30 and 31. . . .

The Foreign Ministers then had an exchange of views and informations concerning the political emergency of Europe. In this connexion the Foreign Ministers discussed such questions as regard the carrying out of the absolute neutrality of the Northern countries in case of a possible war in Europe, and the efforts made in each country to meet this possibility. Furthermore they discussed the plans until now elaborated for the extension of economic co-operation between the Northern countries in case of a great or nearly universal war and the question to be first solved in this field of activity.

Concerning questions of neutrality, as concerning economic co-operation, there was at this meeting the same unanimity as has been expressed in previous *communiqués*, and the Foreign Ministers were in full agreement that it was essential to carry on this work to strengthen the position of their countries as regards self-sufficiency and possibilities for keeping out of the war. They still hoped for a peaceful solution of the burning questions of Europe, and are confident that the parties will respect the neutrality of the Northern countries if, in spite of all, a war should break out between the Great Powers. . . .

6. DECLARATION OF NEUTRALITY BY THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT, SEPTEMBER 1, 1939.²

Nous *Haakon* Roi de Norvège faisons savoir:

Nous avons décidé qu'une stricte neutralité sera observée par la Norvège pendant la guerre qui vient d'éclater entre la Pologne et l'Allemagne.

A cet effet sont applicables les dispositions édictées par Décret Royal du 13 mai 1938, voir le Décret Royal du 2 décembre de la même année et la déclaration signée en date du 27 mai 1938 par la Norvège, le Danemark, la Finlande, l'Islande et la Suède.³

¹ *Le Nord*, 1939, No. 3, p. 416.

² *Le Nord*, 1939, No. 3, p. 417.

³ See above, p. 17.

7. COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED AFTER A CONFERENCE OF RULERS OF THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES AND THEIR FOREIGN MINISTERS, OCTOBER 19, 1939.¹

The Kings of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, and the President of Finland together with their Foreign Ministers met in Stockholm on October 18 and 19.

At the meeting the general situation was scrutinized from the point of view of each country represented. A close examination was made, in particular, of difficulties which, in the present serious international situation, these countries are encountering in the maintenance of their right to self-determination in favour of the neutral position which these countries have always affirmed and confirmed in their declarations of neutrality at the outbreak of the present war.

The meeting unanimously stated that the Governments were determined in close co-operation to adhere consistently to strict neutrality. Their intention is to let their attitude with regard to all problems which may occur be determined by their solicitude to uphold a neutral position in full independence.

They demand as a right that this attitude founded on peaceful relations with other Powers be respected by all.

Recalling the declaration made by the Governments of Denmark, Norway and Sweden in the Great War at the meeting in Oslo in 1917 of the Kings of the Northern countries, according to which friendly and confident relations between the countries were to be maintained, however long the war might last and whatever developments might ensue, it was unanimously stated at the Stockholm meeting that Denmark and Iceland, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, in the present situation, would in policy follow the same principles as were by firm co-operation successfully applied in the war of 1914-18.

They furthermore discussed the difficulties of commerce and shipping to which neutral States were subjected in consequence of the measures taken by the belligerents. It was unanimously decided to continue mutual consultations, and to adhere to the principles laid down by the Copenhagen communiqué of September 19, 1939,² while maintaining traditional commercial relations in every direction and supporting each other in securing vital supplies for their peoples. There was unanimous agreement on the continuation of co-operation

¹ *The Times*, October 20, 1939.

² The principle that they were entitled, as neutral countries, to maintain their traditional commercial relations with all countries, including belligerents.

within the group of Oslo Powers and with other neutrals with a view to asserting their mutual interests.

On the occasion of the meeting the King of Sweden received telegraphic messages of sympathy from the Heads of State of the neutral republics of America. These messages have already been published, and will be highly appreciated in the Northern countries. The Governments represented at the meeting found in the messages valuable support for their efforts in favour of peace and international order under law.

The Governments of the Northern States recall the willingness to act in favour of smoothing out international difficulties, expressed already before the outbreak of war by the Heads of their States adhering to King Leopold's peace appeal. Their attitude remains unchanged. They would greet with deep satisfaction any sign of an understanding between the belligerents and possibilities permitting a neutral contribution towards the establishment of peace and security among all nations.

8. COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED AFTER THE MEETING OF THE FOREIGN
MINISTERS OF DENMARK, NORWAY, AND SWEDEN, FEBRUARY
25, 1940.¹

The conditions connected with the Finnish-Russian conflict were the subject of negotiations. The Foreign Ministers declared that it is the earnest desire of all the Northern peoples that the conflict might end as soon as possible with a peaceful solution that should preserve the full independence of Finland.

The Foreign Ministers found themselves to be unanimous on the policy of neutrality of their countries. They reject all allegations that this is exercised under pressure by one side or the other, and they intend to continue this policy impartially and independently in their relations with all States. They agreed to maintain the inviolability of neutral territory in accordance with the rules of international law.

The Foreign Ministers agreed to raise serious objections and endeavour to avert the violation of the principles of international law in the conduct of naval warfare, which inflicts considerable losses of human life and of economic values on neutral States, when they maintain their shipping in order to keep up their legitimate and necessary trade. They agreed that their Governments should support each other mutually in their negotiations with the belligerents on this question.

¹ *The Times*, February 26, 1940.

The Foreign Ministers were united in their conviction that, unless it comes to an end before violence and prolonged fighting have brought about disasters even greater than the present, the war will create such bitter feeling between the nations that the road to an enduring conciliation will be rendered still more difficult to open. They will therefore gladly welcome any endeavour to initiate negotiations between the belligerents with a view to a just and permanent peace.

9. EXTRACTS FROM SPEECH BY THE RT. HON. NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, PRIME MINISTER, MARCH 19, 1940.¹

. . . Now let me come to what is, perhaps, even more important, the question of men. In the middle of January our representative was informed by Field-Marshal Mannerheim that he did not then require men, as his resources in man-power were sufficient, in his opinion, to last until the thaw came. He did, however, say that he would be very glad to have some 30,000 men in May, but he stipulated that they should be trained soldiers. . . .

We had this subject thoroughly explored. We had plans prepared. Those plans were discussed and approved at a meeting of the Supreme War Council which was held on 5th February. Preparations for the expedition were carried on with all rapidity and at the beginning of March the expedition was ready to leave. . . .

Let me say something of the size of the expedition, because there are some who have expressed scepticism as to whether such an expedition ever existed. Let me tell the House what the facts are. Let me say this first. In constructing our plans for the expedition there were two overriding factors which had to be borne in mind. The first was this. No effective expedition could arrive in Finland except by passing through Norway and Sweden. Therefore, before such an expedition could be dispatched or before it could arrive in Finland it was necessary to obtain the assent of the Governments of those two countries. It did not take much imagination to conceive what would be the attitude of Germany if such assent were given. We were conscious that these two countries would have to brave the wrath of Germany. As a matter of fact, we know now that Germany, as soon as she heard any rumours of such a force passing through those two countries to the assistance of Finland, did threaten Norway and Sweden with her intervention if they gave their assent. Therefore, we felt that we must be ready also to provide a force to

¹ In the House of Commons. *Hansard*, March 19, 1940, coll. 1841-7.

come to the assistance of Sweden in defending herself if she should be attacked by Germany.

The second factor was that if these two Governments gave their assent in the circumstances which I have described, the transport facilities in Norway and Sweden placed a definite limit on the size of the force which could be transported in any given period. What did we do in these circumstances? We decided to provide the largest force which would be permitted by the physical conditions we had to encounter. As I have already stated, part of that force would be required for the assistance of Sweden if she were attacked by Germany, and part of it would be the expedition which was destined to help Finland; and, of course, in addition to that certain troops would be required to guard the long line of communications. The size of the force arrived at on that basis was about 100,000 men. It was heavily armed and equipped, and plans were made for it to begin reaching Scandinavia in March and for the whole of it to arrive before the end of April. Of course, hon. Members will realize that this was not necessarily the last force which we should have had to send. It was the largest force that we could send at one time to begin with. The question of further reinforcements was one which would have had to depend on the development of the fighting after the fighting had begun.

In the second half of February we informed the Finns of these plans, and arrangements were made with them to cover the main points which would have to be settled beforehand, such as the relations of the command to the command in Finland and the area in which the troops were to be employed. But bearing in mind the very difficult position of Norway and Sweden if their assent were required, we suggested to the Finns that they should make a public appeal for assistance not later than 5th March, and after that public appeal had been made, we proposed ourselves to make a formal appeal to the Governments of Norway and Sweden to allow the passage of the expedition which I have described. We hoped that, in face of a public appeal from Finland, the two countries concerned would feel that they could not stand in the way of what might be the salvation of their near neighbour and friend.

When we communicated this information to the Finns, who also recognized the difficulties of Norway and Sweden, they said they would prefer at once to make an informal approach to the Government of Sweden. They did so and the Swedish Government replied that they would continue to permit and facilitate the passage of munitions and of volunteers in small groups through their country,

but they could not grant a passage for any regular armed forces because in their opinion—and we now know what ground they had for that opinion—that would enlarge the area of the war and would turn Sweden into a battlefield. That was very discouraging news for us, but we did not on that account discontinue our preparations for the dispatch of this force. We hoped that, in spite of all the difficulties and with the promise of assistance which we should be in a position to give, the Governments of Norway and Sweden might even at the last hour change their minds and be prepared to face the consequences and allow us to give Finland the aid we had all ready for her. . . .

In the end, the date which the Finns themselves had fixed as the final one on which they would give us their decision passed without any decision being given, and the next day we heard that peace terms had been accepted. . . .

Secondly, it is clear that, in spite of the fact that we had received no appeal, in spite of the fact that we had repeated refusals from Norway and Sweden to permit the passage of our troops through their countries, nevertheless, we went on with our preparations until they were complete, and even at the last moment we could have sent the expedition if the conditions had changed. . . .

And yet, when Finland was once more threatened, when once more she put her tiny forces into the field to resist the huge hordes that came against her, Germany publicly professed her neutrality; but behind the scenes she used every threat to prevent others from saving Finland and from performing the task which she had always declared to be her own. The responsibility in this affair stands squarely and firmly upon the shoulders of Germany and no other country. It was the fear of Germany which prevented Norway and Sweden from giving us the permission to pass our troops through their countries, the fear of Germany which prevented Finland from making her appeal to us for help.

What is the result to Scandinavia? The security of Finland has gone, but has the security of Norway and Sweden been preserved? On the contrary, the danger has been brought closer than ever to those two countries, till to-day it stands upon their doorsteps. We here, I think, are bound to feel some sympathy for the position of these two countries, who for long years have thought they stood far enough outside the centre of disturbance to be safe, who felt that the one thing they desired was not to suffer in their countries the fate which had overtaken Czecho-Slovakia and Poland, who thought that by scrupulously observing, stretching perhaps to the

furthest limit, the restrictions of neutrality, they could escape that terrible fate. One must have some sympathy for them in their comparatively unarmed condition, faced with such alternatives as lay before them, but I am bound to point out that this doctrine of neutrality, which paralysed the action of Norway and Sweden, was based on the assumption that anything was better for a small neutral country than to be involved in the war between Germany and the Allies. That, in turn, was based upon another assumption, the assumption that it was a matter of indifference to these small neutral States whether the war ended in the victory of Germany or the victory of the Allies. Until those assumptions are abandoned, and the necessary deductions are drawn from that abandonment, the policy of these small neutral States will neither correspond to realities nor will it be adequate to safeguard their own interests. Nothing will or can save them but a determination to defend themselves and to join with others who are ready to aid them in their defence. . . .

II. NORWAY AND THE WAR AT SEA

1. 'ALTMARK' INCIDENT

(a) *Statement issued by the Norwegian Foreign Office, February 17, 1940.*¹

On the afternoon of February 16, Friday, the German steamer *Altmark* was passing through Norwegian territorial waters under escort of a Norwegian torpedo-boat. At 4.30 in the afternoon two British destroyers fired warning shots and tried to stop the *Altmark*. The commander of the Norwegian torpedo-boat protested, and the *Altmark* entered Joessing Fjord.

After a new protest from the Norwegian torpedo-boat, the British force, which now consisted of one cruiser and five destroyers, withdrew outside the three-mile limit. Later on one destroyer entered Norwegian territorial waters and at a very short distance from the shore used its searchlights.

At 11 p.m. the British cruiser came into the fjord and Britons went on board the *Altmark*. Some British subjects who were in the *Altmark* were taken on board the British warships, whereupon the warships left.

The Norwegian guard, including only two small torpedo-boats, could do nothing against the overwhelming British force apart from an energetic protest.

¹ *The Daily Telegraph*, February 19, 1940.

The Norwegian Government to-day instructed the Legation in London to inform the British Government of these facts and to make a serious protest against this gross violation of Norwegian territorial waters, which has aroused strong indignation, as it took place in a Norwegian fjord, and consequently cannot be due to an error or to a difference of opinion as to the limit of territorial waters.

The Legation has been instructed to demand that the British Navy be given orders to respect Norwegian sovereignty in future. The Legation has also been instructed to ask that the British Government will hand over the prisoners to the Norwegian Government and pay damages and give satisfaction.

The Prime Minister, who is at present acting as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Koht being absent from Oslo, to-day conferred with the British Minister in Oslo, and in strong words expressed the horror and indignation felt by the Norwegian Government at this gross violation of Norway's neutrality.

(b) *Note from the British Government to the Norwegian Government, February 17, 1940.*¹

It was notorious that the *Altmark* had participated in depredations of the *Graf Spee*, to which she had been acting as an auxiliary.

We had the best of reasons, confirmed by the British subjects taken off the *Graf Spee*, and previously imprisoned in the *Altmark*, for knowing that there were some 300 or 400 British subjects aboard who had for long been living under intolerable conditions.

The *Altmark* was also credibly believed to possess offensive armaments.

The record of this ship must have been well known to the Norwegian Government, and in the view of His Majesty's Government it was incumbent on the Norwegian authorities when she entered Bergen and requested passage through Norwegian territorial waters to subject her to a most careful search.

His Majesty's Government would be grateful for full particulars as to how this search was conducted and what facts were discovered.

Reports received by His Majesty's Government indicated that the examination had been perfunctory, as shown by the fact that no prisoners had been discovered.

So far as the facts were at present known to His Majesty's Government it appeared to them that the Norwegian Government had failed in their duties as neutrals.

If they had in fact found British prisoners on board, what would

¹ Text as communicated to the Press. *The Times*, February 19, 1940.

they have done with them? Either they would have released them or would at any rate have held them pending full examination of the position.

His Majesty's Government felt therefore that they had every right to complain of the inaction of the Norwegian Government.

As stated above, 300 British subjects had been kept for weeks and months in close confinement, and if these prisoners had found their way to a camp in Germany the Norwegian Government would have been responsible for the fate of these men.

Meanwhile the case against the ship itself was such that His Majesty's Government were justified in pressing that the *Altmark* should be interned.

(c) *Protest presented to the Norwegian Foreign Office by Dr. Heinrich Sahn, German Minister in Oslo, February 17, 1940.*¹

I protest most energetically against the act of violence committed by the British destroyer *Cossack* against the German steamer *Altmark* in the inner part of the Joessing Fjord, that is, within Norwegian territorial waters, as a result of which Germany sustained dead and wounded.

I enter the strongest protest against the unheard-of violation of international law in Norwegian coastal waters and against the fact that the Norwegian Government did not provide adequate protection for our ship *Altmark*.

The only parallel to this violation of international law is to be found in the bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807. It is unique in world history, and I must, while reserving my Government's right to make further demands, insist that the *status quo ante* on board the *Altmark* should at once be reconstituted so far as is possible after the losses suffered, that reparation should be made for the damage caused, and that action should be taken against the perpetrators by all available means.

I must draw attention to the fact that the situation is of the most serious character, and may bring about the gravest consequences.

(d) *Official Statement by the Norwegian Government, February 25, 1940.*²

The German steamer was stopped by a Norwegian torpedo-boat in Norwegian territorial waters on February 14, and the German captain declared that his ship was on the route Port Arthur-Texas-

¹ *Völkischer Beobachter*, February 18, 1940. Translation prepared by the Information Department.

² *The Manchester Guardian*, February 27, 1940.

Germany. The *Altmark* was armed with small anti-aircraft guns for self-defence, but they had been taken down before the ship entered Norwegian territorial waters.

Later the *Altmark* was stopped by another Norwegian torpedo-boat, the commander of which asked whether she had on board persons belonging to another belligerent's navy or seamen who were subjects of another belligerent. The captain replied, 'No'.

When the *Altmark* was stopped a third time, north of Bergen, the captain refused to let his ship be searched. He said that she had already been inspected and as she was an auxiliary ship of the German Navy she had the same immunity as a warship. The Norwegian authorities, he said, were not entitled by international law to make further investigations or to prevent the ship from proceeding in Norwegian territorial waters.

The Norwegian Government stresses that the *Altmark* had not called at Bergen or any other Norwegian port, as the British Foreign Secretary apparently believed, and that therefore no question of a 24-hour limit arose. Neither The Hague Convention of 1907 nor the Norwegian neutrality regulations of 1938¹ contained a stipulation introducing a time-limit for passage. Since the *Altmark* did not call at a Norwegian port the Norwegian Government has no reason to consider the question of what ought to have been done with the ship or prisoners if she had.

In general the Norwegian Government can only reply that in such a case they would have striven to fulfil all international obligations. The British Government itself has strongly maintained the right of warships to passage. It did so in a letter of May 23, 1939, regarding the Norwegian neutrality regulations.

The Norwegian Government maintains that it was its duty in this case to apply the rules of international law correctly to both sides and that no doubt can exist as to those rules.

When it is stressed from the British side that the prisoners had been badly treated and that Norway ought from humanitarian considerations to have taken note of this, the Norwegian Government can only say that they understand the British feelings but that a neutral State must base its actions in disputes among belligerents only on positive stipulations in treaties or international law.

The Norwegian Government hopes that the British Government will feel convinced that Norway acted in strict conformity with international law. If the British Government is maintaining its position the Norwegian Government will propose that the difference

¹ See above, p. 17.

of opinion between the two Governments shall be submitted to arbitration of a kind to be settled through mutual agreement.

(e) *Statement issued by the British Foreign Office, February 27, 1940.*¹

The attention of His Majesty's Government has been drawn to the suggestion made in a Norwegian newspaper that the statement with regard to the *Altmark* case made by Professor Koht, the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, on February 20 was intentionally given inadequate publicity in this country. The facts are that no steps were taken by His Majesty's Government to influence newspapers in any way with regard to the prominence to be given to this statement, which was indeed published on February 21 in *The Times* in a conspicuous position.

In view, however, of the tendentious comments which have been made on this point in certain quarters, His Majesty's Government find themselves constrained to state that the account given by Professor Koht of the communication received by the Norwegian Government from His Majesty's Government during the summer of 1939 was not accurate. According to *The Times* report, Professor Koht stated that in the summer of 1939 the British Government asked the Norwegian Government how the passage in the Norwegian Neutrality Regulations dealing with the passage through territorial waters was to be understood, 'emphasizing that warships must have the right to sail in Norwegian territorial waters as long as they desired and without regard to the 24-hour limit'. There is no foundation for such a statement. The only observation dealing with the right of passage in the communication from His Majesty's Government, which was made to the Norwegian Government in Oslo on May 23, 1939, is as follows:

'While His Majesty's Government do not deny that there may in special circumstances be a right to refuse to belligerent warships entry into neutral territorial waters, they have always maintained and must continue to maintain the existence of such a right of entry for the purpose of innocent passage, and they are not aware of any case in which it has been refused by neutrals to belligerents for this purpose.'

This passage was quoted in a statement issued by the Norwegian Foreign Department on February 21.

The Norwegian Minister has now conveyed to Lord Halifax a message from Professor Koht in which the latter spontaneously

¹ *The Times*, February 27, 1940.

acknowledges that his statement of February 20 was made from memory, and that he had been mistaken in saying that His Majesty's Government had made any reference to the 24-hour limit whatever. It should therefore be clearly understood that the extract quoted above represents the only statement made to the Norwegian Government by His Majesty's Government on the point before the present incident.

2. EXTRACTS FROM SPEECH BY PROFESSOR KOHT, NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, FEBRUARY 29, 1940.¹

. . . We have evidence that nine ships have been sunk by German U-boats or in other ways by the German forces. Eight are missing and we have no information about their fate. Of the remaining thirty-three ships, we know that most were mined, but some of them we believe to have been torpedoed, even if we have so far been unable to prove it.

Of all the ships that have been mined only two have been sunk in notified minefields, and we have to suppose that the belligerent Powers have not always observed international regulations. The question of making a joint remonstrance to the belligerent Powers on this illegal mine warfare has been discussed several times by the neutral States, but so far without result. At their meeting in Copenhagen on Sunday last,² the Foreign Ministers of the Northern States agreed that Norway, Denmark, and Sweden should make separate demands to the belligerent Powers to cease from laying minefields contrary to international law. Such an application has now been prepared by our Foreign Department.

With regard to torpedoings, I must at once record that all ships that we know to have been sunk by such means have been sunk by German U-boats or bombers. Some of these ships are known with certainty to have been sunk in defiance of international law and contrary to international agreements. . . .

At first we protested separately on each case, but now so many sinkings have taken place that it is time to take up the whole question. We intend to make remonstrances to the German Government in the very near future, and in this case all the Northern Governments will support each other. I hope more neutrals will subscribe. We have seen more or less official German declarations

¹ In the Storting, in reply to a question by Hr. Hambro, President of the Storting, as to what the Government had done and what they intended to do with regard to the losses which the Norwegian merchant fleet had suffered owing to the war at sea. *The Times*, March 1, 1940.

² See above, p. 29.

that the best way to avoid sinkings is to stop sailings to Great Britain. Furthermore it is of vital importance that Norway should maintain her trade with Great Britain. We cannot abandon our shipping, which is the principal trade of our country. The Germans also say that we endanger our ships by going to British control ports. But the fact that the British force our ships to enter control ports does not entitle Germany to sink our ships. We claim free traffic for legal neutral trade. This question must be discussed and settled, and it will be the subject of negotiations in the near future.

3. EXTRACTS FROM SPEECH BY THE RT. HON. NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, PRIME MINISTER, MARCH 19, 1940.¹

. . . Do not let us forget that we are all the time contrasting the immorality of Hitler with the efforts which we are making to keep within the rules of international law. I entirely agree that, so far as Germany is concerned, she has absolutely forfeited any right to appeal to international law against any violation of that law which we might embark upon in order to do injury to her. But there are very few cases in which the matter is so simple as that, and when it comes to infringing the rights of neutrals in our endeavour to engage the enemy at closer quarters, you must have some respect for those rules of international law to which we have so often appealed ourselves.

Let me take the particular instance to which the hon. Member has referred in connexion with Norway. He says that Norway is tolerating continued and outrageous violations of her neutrality by German warships. I asked him whether he had any evidence of that, and he replied that it was merely an impression. I can only say that the British Navy and the Royal Air Force have kept a constant and continuous watch upon these waters in order to see whether in fact German warships were violating them. If we had been able to establish a single case of the kind, we would not have hesitated ourselves to enter these territorial waters and to attack such a ship, but we have not, up to the present, been able to establish evidence that such violation has taken place, with the one exception, now some months ago—I am leaving the *Altmark* at the moment—when three vessels were, according to our information, destroyed in territorial waters. The hon. Member must know that the Norwegian Government deny, in two cases, that these vessels were in territorial waters, and, in the third, plead that there was no evidence to show

¹ In the House of Commons. *Hansard*, March 19, 1940, coll. 1944-5.

that the vessel was destroyed by German agency. We might or might not accept that, but, personally, I do not believe that it is correct. At any rate, that was some considerable time ago, and I can honestly say that over a very long period we have been unable to establish any violation by German warships of Norwegian neutral waters which would justify us in going into these waters and, in turn, violating that neutrality. . . .

4. EXTRACTS FROM SPEECH BY THE RT. HON. NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, PRIME MINISTER, APRIL 2, 1940.¹

. . . Returning now to the meeting of the Supreme War Council, the picture which was presented to the Allies by the present situation was of a Germany putting her own interpretation on the obligations of neutrals, and accompanying it by threats of the dire consequences which might result to them from failure to comply with German demands. This problem which Germany has raised of a double standard of neutrality is one which we and the neutrals now have to face. The policy of the Allies has been determined by a scrupulous regard for neutral rights, whereas Germany has not hesitated to destroy neutral property and murder the nationals of neutral States, whenever it suited her policy to do so. She has not scrupled to threaten the invasion of neutral countries in order to prevent them taking steps to assist their neighbours against aggression or to protect their own interests. Our respect for neutral rights and our sympathy for the practical difficulties of neutrals must not blind us to the fact that any aid they may give to Germany might if carried far enough render them in the end liable to the hideous fate that has overtaken the previous victims of German policy.

If we are to bring this war to a close with the least possible destruction and dislocation of our common spiritual and material civilization we must deprive Germany of the materials most essential for the prosecution of her aggressive policy. The Allies are therefore determined to prosecute the economic war to the utmost of their power. Already much has been accomplished. Negotiations for war trade agreements have been successfully concluded with Norway, Sweden, Iceland, Belgium and Holland, and an agreement with Denmark has been signed this afternoon at the Foreign Office. . . .

. . . All the war trade agreements into which we have entered contain stipulations regulating the exports of neutral countries' own domestic produce to Germany. For example, these stipulations

¹ In the House of Commons. *Hansard*, April 2, 1940, coll. 41-3.

provide for the strict limitation of the export to Germany of the fats essential to her war effort.

Another weapon in our armoury is that of purchase. It is obviously out of the question to purchase the entire exportable surplus of Germany's neighbours, but concentration on certain selected commodities such as minerals, fats and oil, is to an ever-increasing extent reducing the supply of these commodities available for Germany. For instance, we have completed arrangements to purchase the entire exportable surplus of Norway's current catch of whale oil. . . . British trade with a number of Germany's neutral neighbours is undoubtedly capable of being substantially developed, and I look forward to an intensification of trade exchanges to our mutual benefit. At the same time the countries concerned must realize that we cannot agree to make available to them products drawn from Empire sources, unless in return they are prepared to give us guarantees as to the limitation of their future trade with Germany.

Most important of all the weapons of our economic warfare is the employment of our sea power, and the Allies are determined to continue and intensify the use of this weapon to the full. His Majesty's ships have already taken certain practical steps to interfere with the unimpeded passage of German cargo ships from Scandinavia. These operations have been carried out in close proximity to German naval bases, showing once again how empty are the German boasts that the control of the North Sea has passed into their hands. Other measures are under consideration. The House may be assured that we have not yet reached the limit of our effective operations in this region, the scene of the sinking of so many neutral ships and the murder of so many neutral seamen.

5. EXTRACTS FROM SPEECH BY PROFESSOR KOHT, NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, APRIL 6, 1940.¹

. . . A neutral country has to observe the same rules of conduct towards all the belligerents. This maxim the Norwegian Government have tried most carefully to observe, and I dare to assert that nobody can justly complain that we have broken it. Regarding trade, too, we have pursued the same policy. When the war began, Norway immediately informed Germany that she would maintain the normal amount of commerce, and the same information was given to France and Great Britain. On this basis trade agreements

¹ In the Storting. *The Times*, April 8, 1940.

were signed with Germany on February 23, and with England on March 11, and an agreement with France will be signed in the near future. I was pleased to see some days ago that Mr. Chamberlain had declared in the House of Commons that the agreement between Norway and Britain complied with British claims of what Norwegian neutrality should be in matters of trade.¹

All other questions, too, we are treating in the strictest accordance with international law, and we feel confident that in that way we are doing justice to both sides while remaining on safe ground ourselves. Only once have we been threatened on account of our adherence to our duties as a neutral, namely, in connexion with the *City of Flint*, five months ago. Germany then threatened us with the 'worst consequences' if we did not defer to the German claims. When the case came to be cleared up, however, there was no question of any further threats, and the matter was discussed quietly and amicably.

Three months ago the British Government thought they had reason to accuse us of allowing German submarines to use Norwegian waters for operations of war. We asserted that the complaint was unfounded, and I noted with great pleasure that Mr. Chamberlain on March 19 stated in the House of Commons that, since the incidents at the beginning of December which caused the complaint, the British had detected no sign that the Germans were abusing Norwegian territorial waters. I appreciate highly that Mr. Chamberlain should so honestly have admitted this. Unfortunately, French and English newspapers continued long afterwards to make the old accusation against Norway, and even called on their Governments to take control of Norwegian territorial waters. I hope that our British and French friends will understand how offensive was this discussion of plans for enterprises within our borders. They must understand that we wish to maintain our independence without encroachments from any side, because we love our liberty as greatly as they love theirs.

I suppose, however, that this inclination to violate our territory arises not so much from the imaginary war activities of Germany as from the desire to secure the peaceful and legal passage of cargo ships, which they believe is a one-sided advantage enjoyed by Germany. . . .

Moreover the free passage of merchant ships through our territory is more to the advantage of England than of Germany, as our trade with England is much larger than with Germany. If the Allies

¹See above, p. 40.

should ask us to stop the free passage of merchant ships it would be a great disadvantage to themselves, and if they demanded that we should only forbid passage to the ships of one belligerent party it would be an open infringement of neutrality, which would immediately bring us into the war. . . .

So far we have lost 54 ships, totalling more than 120,000 registered tons, and 392 lives. About half of these losses have been due to mines and many others are due to unknown causes, but in at least 12 cases we know that the ship was sunk by a U-boat or by bombers and, in nine of these cases, without regard to the safety of the crew. Against these sinkings we have protested in the sharpest possible manner. Moreover, on March 8, the Norwegian, Danish, and Swedish Governments made a mutual application to the German Government asking that the problem of sea warfare should be discussed officially, but so far no reply has been received.

It is difficult to keep calm when one hears of the bombing of peaceful seamen, as for instance in the last case, when the liner *Mira*, with 100 passengers on board, was bombed several times. We cannot admit any justification for such action, even if the ship were under cover of British guns, and we cannot understand how this conduct can tally with the German sense of honour or with love of mankind. It creates resentment in this country which ought to be unwelcome to any belligerent.

The English Press insists that we ought to protest to Germany against the killing of our sailors rather than against British technical violations of neutrality. I must point out, however, that small technical violations may involve great political consequences, and even a possibility that our country may be made a theatre of war. . . .

6. MINING OF NORWEGIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS.

(a) *Extracts from Broadcast Statement by the British and French Governments, April 8, 1940.*¹

In recent weeks the German campaign against the merchant shipping of all nations has been intensified and pursued with even greater brutality than before. The number of neutral ships destroyed by German action is now well over 150, and the number of neutral lives lost is nearly 1,000. These attacks have been carried out in almost every case in defiance of the recognized rules of war, frequently in circumstances of the greatest barbarity, and on many occasions without the slightest justification for interference of any

¹ *The Times*, April 9, 1940.

sort with the ship. Germany has announced that she regards herself as entitled to destroy any neutral ship *en route* to any British port, including contraband control harbours, and there have, moreover, been repeated cases of vessels being destroyed on voyage between two neutral ports, when the vessel had no intention of touching at a British port at all. It is obvious that the German Government are engaged in an indiscriminate campaign of destruction throughout the waters in which their unnotified mines are laid, or in which their submarines are in a position to operate.

While in recent weeks the greatest losses have fallen upon neutral shipping, British and Allied vessels have also suffered from the adoption of this policy of destruction, a new development of which is the bombing from the air of British and neutral trawlers and fishing boats and the machine-gunning of their crews. The innocent character of fishing boats has hitherto been universally recognized, but this has not prevented Germany from committing nearly 200 attacks on fishing vessels, aimed at sinking them and murdering their crews. Even lightships, the object of which is to protect shipping of all nations and which are by international usage treated as non-combatants, have been with their crews ruthlessly attacked by bombs.

It is a fact deserving of constant emphasis that these German attacks have been deliberately aimed at the destruction of neutral lives and property, and it is abundantly clear that the purpose behind them is pure terrorism. The Allies, on the other hand, have never destroyed nor injured a single neutral ship or taken a single neutral life. On the contrary, they have not only saved the lives of many innocent victims of these German outrages, but they have also not failed to rescue from drowning German airmen and submarine crews who have been guilty of the inhumanities in question.

The position is therefore that Germany is flagrantly violating neutral rights in order to damage the Allied countries, while insisting upon the strictest observance of rules of neutrality whenever such observance would provide some advantage to herself. International law has always recognized the right of a belligerent, when its enemy has systematically resorted to illegal practices, to take action appropriate to the situation created by the illegalities of the enemy. Such action, even though not lawful in ordinary circumstances, becomes, and is generally recognized to become, lawful in view of the other belligerent's violation of law. The Allied Governments therefore hold themselves entitled to take such action as they may deem proper in the present circumstances.

The Allied Governments have observed that a heavy proportion of the losses inflicted upon neutral countries, both of human life and in material, has fallen upon the Norwegian Mercantile Marine. Yet, while the German Government repeatedly sink Norwegian shipping and murder Norwegian seamen, they continue to demand from the Norwegian Government the fullest use of Norwegian territorial waters for their own commerce, and the Norwegian Government have even felt obliged to provide armed escort in these waters for German ships, while unable to take effective action against German brutality on the high seas, of which their own vessels have been the victims.

Whatever may be the actual policy which the Norwegian Government, by German threats and pressure, are compelled to follow, the Allied Governments can no longer afford to acquiesce in the present state of affairs by which Germany obtains resources vital to her prosecution of the war, and obtains from Norway facilities which place the Allies at a dangerous disadvantage. They have therefore already given notice to the Norwegian Government that they reserve the right to take such measures as they may think necessary to hinder or prevent Germany from obtaining in Norway resources or facilities which, for the purpose of the war, would be to her advantage or to the disadvantage of the Allies. If the successful prosecution of the war now requires them to take such measures world opinion will not be slow to realize both the necessity under which they are constrained to act and the purpose of their action. Their purpose in this war is to establish principles which the smaller States of Europe would themselves wish to see prevail and upon which the very existence of those States ultimately depends. The Allies, of course, will never follow the German example of brutal violence, and any action they decide to take will always be carried out in accordance with the dictates of humanity.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government have accordingly resolved to deny the continued use by the enemy of stretches of territorial waters which are clearly of particular value to him, and they have therefore decided to prevent unhindered passage of vessels carrying contraband of war through Norwegian territorial waters. They accordingly hereby give notice that the following areas of Norwegian territorial waters have been rendered dangerous to navigation on account of mines.

Vessels entering these areas will do so at their peril.¹ . . .

It will be observed that the laying of mines in these areas will in

¹ There followed a passage giving the position of the mined areas.

no way interfere with the free access of Norwegian nationals or ships to their own ports and coastal hamlets.

In order to avoid the least possibility of Norwegian or other vessels inadvertently entering these areas before there has been time to give warning of the mines being laid, arrangements have been made for the limits of the areas to be patrolled by British naval vessels until a period of 48 hours has elapsed from the laying of the first mine in each area. This measure, in conjunction with the broadcast warning, should fully provide for the safety of shipping.

(b) *Official Statement issued by the Joint Meeting of the Norwegian Cabinet and the Foreign Committee of the Storting, April 8, 1940.*¹

The British and French Governments early to-day mined three places in Norwegian territorial waters with the object of stopping free navigation within Norwegian territory, and British warships are patrolling these areas. The Norwegian Government make a serious and solemn protest against this open breach of international law and this violation by force of Norwegian sovereignty and neutrality. Throughout the war Norway has observed all the rules of neutrality with the greatest care, and it is in full accordance with regulations which are generally recognized that Norwegian waters have been kept open to all legitimate traffic by ships belonging to belligerent countries.

Since the British and French Governments have now taken steps to bar traffic with Germany, the Norwegian Government must remind the British Government that on March 11² they signed an agreement with Norway by which Norwegian goods, including goods which are regarded as contraband, may be sold and exported by Norway to Germany. The Norwegian Government had therefore all the less reason to expect that the Allied Governments would forcibly interfere and try to stop this traffic.

The Norwegian Government cannot in any way agree to a belligerent country placing mines in Norwegian territory. They must require that such mines be immediately removed and all foreign warships withdrawn. The Norwegian Government must reserve their right to take all suitable steps which such a violation of neutrality may occasion.

(c) *Extracts from Speech by Professor Koht, Norwegian Foreign Minister, April 8, 1940.*³

. . . I believe that all neutral countries were alarmed when they heard of this action. I will not use strong words as I feel it speaks

¹ *The Times*, April 9, 1940.

² See above, p. 40.

³ In the Storting. *The Daily Telegraph*, April 9, 1940.

for itself. After you have considered these documents we shall deliberate on the steps we shall take to defend our rights.

The first document is the Note which the British and French Ministers handed to me on Friday, and which was simultaneously transmitted by the two Powers to Sweden.

The Note declared that developments during the last three months had clearly shown that, without regard to the wishes of the Norwegian or Swedish peoples, the German Government was not willing to allow the Norwegian and Swedish Governments to have that freedom in matters of foreign policy to which they were entitled.

'His Majesty's Government', the Note said, 'understand the difficult position of the two Governments owing to the threats and pressure from Germany, but they cannot but reach the conclusion that under the present circumstances the Swedish and Norwegian Governments are not to be regarded as free agents in every respect.' . . .

The Allied Note went on, 'apart from this fact, the Allied Governments can no longer tolerate the present situation, which means that Germany receives from Norway and Sweden important war materials, and that Germany benefits from advantages in those countries to the disadvantage and danger of the Allied Powers.

'They consequently feel that the time has now come to state clearly to the Norwegian Government that the Allied Governments will maintain certain vital claims, and defend these claims in every way that they deem necessary themselves.'

The two Governments then state those claims. I shall only enumerate those which foreshadow the measure which the Allied Powers took to-day.

The Allied Governments' Note says that they are bound to take appropriate steps to defend their interests, if the Norwegian Government refuses to grant, or cuts down, those advantages to trade and shipping which the Allied Governments deem necessary for their warfare, and which they feel that a neutral Government may reasonably approve.

The Note adds that the Allies are fighting as much on behalf of the small nations as for their own cause, and that they cannot tolerate their progress being hampered owing to advantages Germany is now getting from Norway and Sweden.

Consequently they reserve the right to take any steps which they may deem necessary to prevent Germany from receiving from those countries materials or advantages which will benefit Germany in war, or be harmful to the Allies.

I told both the British and French Ministers that there was no reason to accuse the Norwegian Government of not being free and independent. I said I thought it unfair to address the Norwegian Government in that way.

I also added that there was no reason to indicate that the Norwegian Government would not respect the agreements which it recently signed regarding trade and shipping. But otherwise I could not and would not make an immediate reply. Moreover the Note said nothing about the measures which were under consideration.

I placed the Note before the Government on Saturday and spoke by telephone with the Swedish Foreign Minister. We agreed to prepare replies following the same lines, but before our replies could be sent, developments occurred which created a completely new situation.

At five o'clock this morning the British and French Ministers telephoned to the Foreign Ministry and said that they had another Note. Forty-five minutes later they came to the Ministry and delivered a Note, which said that their Governments would at once publish a statement¹ to the effect that they were laying mines in certain areas off the Norwegian coast. . . .

I am not going to say much about the ideas and thoughts underlying that Note. These violations are carried out solely because the States concerned have the power to do so.

The Western Powers are carrying the war into Norwegian territory because they think they can more easily win the war by doing so.

The Norwegian Government at once published a statement² to-day, and the replies sent to Great Britain and France have the same contents as that statement. I have not a single word to add to that statement.

III. INVASION OF NORWAY

1. EXTRACTS FROM THE NEW NORWEGIAN WHITE BOOK CONTAINING INFORMATION ON THE GERMAN INVASION OF NORWAY (APRIL TO JULY 1940).³

[*Negotiations with Germany, April 9 and 10*]

At 4 a.m. on the morning of April 9, the German Minister in Oslo, Dr. Bräuer, arrived at the Foreign Office and delivered to Hr. Koht, the Foreign Minister, a series of demands from his Government.

¹ See above, p. 43.

² See above, p. 46.

³ *Ny Norsk Kvitbok*. Issued by the Press Bureau of the Norwegian Foreign Affairs Department, London, July 1940. Translation prepared for the Information Department.

But already, several hours before these demands were delivered, German forces had begun the attack on Norway. About midnight it had been reported that four warships were passing Faerder at the entrance of the Oslo Fjord, and three-quarters of an hour later a report was received that shots had been exchanged between these warships and the Norwegian forts at Bolaerne and Rauer. About 2 a.m. five large German warships were reported passing the outer fortifications of Bergen. At 3.30 a.m. there was a report of two warships which had passed Agdenes into the Trondheim Fjord. At the same time the warships which had entered the Oslo Fjord—four large warships with a number of small ones—had reached Filtvet, and immediately afterwards fighting began between these warships and the fort of Oscarsborg. Thus fighting was already in full swing, and it also began immediately after this outside Bergen.

As already stated, it was at this time that the German Minister in Oslo arrived with his demands upon the Norwegian Government. He delivered to the Norwegian Foreign Minister a memorandum¹ . . .

To this memorandum was annexed a so-called 'note' containing a list of the steps which the German Government desired that of Norway to take. They were as follows:

1. The Government should issue an appeal to the people and army to refrain from all resistance to the German troops when they occupied the country.

2. It should order the Norwegian army to enter into contact with the German troops entering the country, and conclude the necessary agreements as to loyal co-operation with the German command. The Norwegian troops should be allowed to retain their arms in so far as their behaviour permitted. As a sign of willingness to co-operate, a white flag of truce should be hoisted alongside the national flag on all military buildings approached by the German forces. Liaison detachments should be sent (a) to the Commander of the German troops entering the Capital (military, naval, and air officers), and (b) to the local troop-leaders. The German Commander would reciprocally send liaison officers to the Norwegian Higher Command. The object of the liaison should be to secure a frictionless co-operation and prevent clashes between German and Norwegian troops.

3. The military appliances and buildings needed by the German forces to secure Norway against an external enemy, especially the coastal fortresses, should be handed over undamaged.

¹ The White Book goes on to summarize the German memorandum, the full text of which will be found below, p. 54.

4. Exact information in writing should be placed at the disposal (of the Germans), regarding any mines which might have been laid by the Norwegian Government.

5. A complete black-out of Norwegian territory for aerial defence purposes should be carried out from the evening after the first day of occupation.

6. The maintenance of means and ways of communication and of information should be kept up and safeguarded without damage to them. The means of communication (the railway), the internal and coastal shipping and the centres of information should be placed at the disposal of the German forces of occupation to the extent necessary for their work and subsistence.

7. War and merchant ships should be forbidden to leave the country, and no 'plane should be allowed to start. But shipping to German ports and neutral Baltic ports might be exempted.

8. Norwegian pilots should be instructed to continue their services according to the requirements of the German authorities, and lighting along the Norwegian coast should be directed on instructions from the German authorities.

9. The service of weather reports should be kept up and put at the disposal of the German army of occupation, but public weather reports should cease.

10. The carriage of all news and mails over sea to foreign countries should be stopped. News and postal connexion with the Baltic States should be confined to certain specified routes, and supervised according to the requirements of the commander of the forces of occupation.

11. The Press and radio should be charged only to publish military news with the approval of the German army authorities, and all broadcasting stations should be placed at the disposal of the German command for their announcements.

12. An export prohibition should be prepared against the conveyance of war material from Norway to foreign countries.

13. The repetition of all the proclamations and orders which would be issued in accordance with the above points should in the first place—in so far as wireless was used—only be made in a cipher or code not known to Germany's opponents. The commander of the forces of occupation should decide if messages in clear from broadcasting stations could be permitted.

When the Foreign Minister had read the whole of this German memorandum, with the annexed special demands, he said that the

Minister naturally understood that he could not take so important a decision as was here in question alone, on his own responsibility, but must at least lay the matter before the Government. The Minister replied that the settlement of the matter was a question of the greatest urgency, since the German action had already progressed so far that the German demands must immediately be fulfilled, if it was to be stopped. He mentioned that the German fleet had orders to have occupied the different towns before 9 or 10 a.m.

The Foreign Minister said that it would not take long to get the view of the Government, since it was already assembled at the Foreign Office. It had been assembled there all the night after the attack began. The Minister then agreed that the question should be submitted to the Government, but repeated his reminder that the matter was of great urgency. When the Foreign Minister had accordingly informed the Government of the contents of the German proposals or demands, it very quickly took the view that an independent country could not agree to such demands. The Foreign Minister therefore reported this reply to the German Minister. He reminded the Minister of what the German *Führer* had lately said—that a people which meekly submits to an aggressor without making the least resistance does not deserve to survive, and we, said the Foreign Minister, will preserve and defend our independence.

Thus the decision was taken, and the German invasion was carried out in the course of the next few hours. The King, the Crown Prince, the Government and the Storting thereupon felt themselves compelled to leave Oslo at once the same morning so as not to fall into the hands of the Germans, and so that the discharge of all the functions of a Norwegian Government should not be rendered impossible.

The Storting met at Hamar the same day, and was there informed of all that had occurred. The Government at the same time announced that they placed their offices at the disposal of the Storting and the King; but the Storting unanimously agreed to recommend that the Government should continue in office. It received at the same time power to add three advisory Cabinet Ministers to its numbers. The discussions were interrupted in the evening by a report that a German military detachment was on its way to Hamar, and the Storting thereupon removed its session to Elverum. While still at Hamar a telephone message had arrived from Oslo to the effect that Dr. Brüner desired fresh negotiations with the Government, and the Storting now accepted a proposal from the Government to appoint a delegation to conduct the negotiation with him

in Oslo. As members of the delegation were chosen Dr. Koht, the Foreign Minister, and Ivar Lykke, Johan Ludwig Mowinkel, and Jon Sundby, who were members of the Storting, and they made plans to travel south during the night. However, in the evening there came a fresh telephone message from Oslo that Dr. Bräuer urgently desired audience of the King to discuss certain proposals. The Minister expressed his willingness to come either that very night or early the next day. He got the reply that the King could receive him at Elverum next day at 11 a.m. The delegation accordingly postponed its journey and waited at Elverum for a further agreement, while the other members of the Storting began to depart, since the Storting had concluded its discussions for the time being.

During the night, it was reported that the German military detachment already mentioned was now on its way to Elverum, and the members of the Government with the exception of the Foreign Minister thereupon left. The attack was repulsed, and in the forenoon of April 10 the King came to the meeting-place at Elverum to receive the German Minister. Dr. Bräuer also arrived, considerably delayed by various causes, so that the meeting could not begin until 3 p.m.

In the discussions which followed, first between the King and the (German) Minister alone, afterwards between these two in the presence of the Foreign Minister, the German Minister declared that the situation now was so changed that the German Government could no longer be satisfied with the demands which were presented in the memorandum of the previous day. The German Government must now demand the creation of another Government in Norway, one in which it had confidence, so that there might be friendly collaboration between Norway and Germany. With reference to the contents of the memorandum itself the Minister said that there too it would be necessary to propose a number of stricter provisions, but the basis of the whole thing was the creation of the new Government, and the German Government demanded that the King should appoint Major Quisling as head of the Government, and as Ministers with him those men whom he had announced as his Government, possibly supplemented none the less with a few other persons.

The King declared with the agreement of the Foreign Minister that he could not appoint a Government which had not the confidence of the Norwegian people, and it had been made perfectly clear in several elections that Major Quisling had not the confidence of the people to a sufficient extent. His Government in Norway would only be a new Kuusinen Government. The Foreign Minister

informed the Minister that the Nygaardsvold Government had declared its complete willingness to resign, and he asked if the German Government could consider the creation of a friendly Government which could co-operate with Germany, composed of other persons than those now mentioned. The Minister said that the question which men should sit with Quisling in the Government might be discussed, but it had been decided by the *Führer* that Quisling must be the man who should stand at the head of the Government.

The King then said in conclusion that he would lay the matter before his legal Government and must wait to give a final answer until this had been done. The German Minister emphasized that there was great urgency in getting a decision, and it was then agreed that when he travelled south he could telephone to the Foreign Minister from Eidsvoll, since by that time it could be counted on that the King would have been able to take counsel with his Government. After this the Storting's negotiating delegation had a short conversation with Dr. Bräuer. But it came merely to consist in a repetition of what had been said in the discussion with the King, and there was no question of any negotiation on the demands in the German memorandum of April 9, since the condition precedent for negotiation was now the appointment of a new Government.

About 8 p.m. the Foreign Minister received a message from the Government that the King had taken his decision in agreement with it; the King could not appoint a Quisling Government on German orders. Just then Dr. Bräuer also rang up from Eidsvoll and received this news. The Minister asked if this meant that the Norwegian resistance to the German invasion would be continued, and the Foreign Minister replied to this: Yes, as long as it is at all possible. The same evening, therefore, the Government agreed upon the appeal to the Norwegian people which was sent out next morning,¹ and it started to organize military resistance against the attack. In the following days the Government had to move from place to place because wherever it settled down it was pursued by German 'planes; in particular there was a violent bombardment directed against the King and the Government at Trysil on Thursday, April 11. The barbarous methods of war which the German authorities have thus employed have compelled the Norwegian Government to keep its whereabouts secret for the time being. But the struggle will be kept going, and the Government has received promises of military help from the Allied Western Powers. It believes that by

¹ See below, p. 64.

collaboration with these States it will be successful in regaining Norway for the Norwegian people.

2. MEMORANDUM FROM THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT TO THE NORWEGIAN AND DANISH GOVERNMENTS, APRIL 9, 1940 (5 A.M.).¹

Contrary to the sincere wish of the German people and of their Government to live in peace and friendship with the English and French peoples, and despite the lack of any reasonable ground for a conflict between them, the rulers in London and Paris declared war on the German people.

With the outbreak of this war of aggression against the existence of the German Reich and of the German people, for which they had long been preparing, England and France began a sea war which was aimed also against the neutral world.

By attempting, in complete disregard of the most elementary rules of international law, to establish a hunger blockade against German women, children, and old people, they at the same time subject neutral States to their ruthless blockade measures. The direct consequence of these methods of war, introduced by England and France in defiance of international law, which Germany had to meet by counter-measures, was the infliction of the most serious damage on neutral shipping and trade. In addition, this English method of proceeding dealt a destructive blow to the conception of neutrality in itself.

Germany, for her part, made every attempt to safeguard the rights of neutrals by endeavouring to limit the war at sea to the maritime zones lying between Germany and her opponent. England, on the other hand, with the object of diverting danger from her own islands and at the same time preventing Germany from trading with the neutral world, has increasingly endeavoured to carry the war at sea into neutral waters. In pursuing this typically British method of warfare, England has more and more, in flagrant contravention of international law, undertaken belligerent action, on sea and in the air, in the territorial waters and over the territory of Denmark and Norway. Germany foresaw this development from the beginning of the war. She was able, by her internal and external economic policy, to frustrate the British attempt at a hunger blockade against the German people and the cutting off of German trade with neutral countries.

¹ *Frankfurter Zeitung*, April 10, 1940. Translation prepared by the Information Department.

This, in recent months, increasingly demonstrated the complete breakdown of the British blockade policy. This development, as well as the hopelessness of a direct assault on the German fortifications in the West, and the ever-increasing anxiety felt in England and France at the successful German counter-attacks at sea and in the air, have recently led both countries more and more to try by all possible means to shift the theatre of war to neutral territory both in and outside Europe. That England and France should, in this connexion, think first of all of the territories of the small European countries is, in accordance with British tradition, a matter of course. English and French statesmen have in recent months quite openly proclaimed the extension of the war to these territories as the basic strategic principle of their conduct of the war.

The first opportunity for this was provided by the Russo-Finnish conflict. The English and French Governments stated quite publicly that they were prepared to intervene with military forces in the conflict between the Soviet Union and Finland, and to make use of the territory of the Northern States as a basis of operations for that purpose. Only the speedy conclusion of peace in the North, which came sooner than they desired or expected, prevented them even then from carrying out this design. If English and French statesmen subsequently declared that they meant to make the carrying out of this action dependent on the consent of the Northern countries concerned, that is a gross untruth. The German Government possesses documentary proof that England and France had jointly decided, if necessary, to carry out their action through the territory of the Northern States against the will of the latter.

The decisive consideration is, however, as follows: it is clearly established from the attitude of the French and English Governments before and after the conclusion of peace between Soviet Russia and Finland and from documents in the possession of the German Government that the decision to help Finland against Russia was also intended to subserve more far-reaching plans. The real aim which England and France were and still are pursuing in Scandinavia is:

- (1) to cut Germany off from her Northern ore supplies by the occupation of Narvik;
- (2) to create a new front by landing Anglo-French forces in the Scandinavian countries, so as to be able to make a flank attack on Germany from the north.

For this purpose the Northern countries were to serve as a battlefield for the Anglo-French troops, while, according to the old British tradition, the Northern peoples were expected to play the part of auxiliary and mercenary troops. When this plan was, for the moment, frustrated by the Russo-Finnish peace, it became more and more clearly known to the German Government that England and France were making definite attempts to realize their designs in a new form. In their constant effort to prepare for intervention in the North, the English and French Governments have in the last few weeks openly proclaimed the thesis that there must be no neutrality in this war, and that it is the duty of the small countries to take an active part in the fight against Germany. This thesis was prepared by the propaganda of the Western Powers and supported by increasingly strong attempts at political pressure on neutral countries. Concrete reports of imminent attempts by the Western Powers to effect a landing in Scandinavia have piled up in recent days. If, however, there could still be the slightest doubt about the definite decision of the Western Powers to intervene in the North, it has been finally removed in the last few days; the German Government have indubitable evidence that England and France intend in the next few days to occupy certain territories in the Northern States by surprise.

The Northern States, for their part, have not only opposed no resistance to English and French violations, but have tolerated even the most serious infringements of their sovereign rights without taking adequate counter-measures.

The German Government must therefore assume that the Royal Norwegian Government will adopt the same attitude towards the actions of England and France which are now planned and on the point of being carried out. But even if the Royal Norwegian Government desired to take counter-measures, the German Government is convinced that the Norwegian military forces would not suffice to oppose the English and French action successfully.

In this decisive phase of the fight for existence which England and France forced on the German people, the German Government can in no circumstances tolerate that Scandinavia should be made by the Western Powers into a theatre of war against Germany, and that the Norwegian people should, directly or indirectly, be misused for war against Germany.

Germany is not prepared to tolerate, or inactively to await, such a realization of the plans of her opponents. The German Government has therefore to-day begun certain military operations which will

result in the occupation of strategically important points in Norwegian territory. The German Government therewith takes over the protection of the Kingdom of Norway during this war. Germany is resolved, from now onwards, with all the forces at her disposal, to defend peace in Norway against any Anglo-French attack, and to safeguard it definitely.

The German Government did not desire this development. England and France alone bear the responsibility for it. It is true that both these States hypocritically set themselves up as defenders of small countries. In reality, however, they do them violence in the hope that by this means they can carry out their ever more openly proclaimed design of destroying Germany.

It is therefore in no hostile spirit that German troops enter Norwegian territory. The German High Command does not intend to use the points occupied by German troops as bases for operations in the fight against England unless it is compelled by British and French measures to do so. The sole aim of the German military operations is to protect the North against the intended occupation of bases in Norway by Anglo-French forces. The German Government are convinced that in taking this action they are at the same time serving the interests of Norway. For the protection afforded by the German forces represents the only guarantee that the Scandinavian peoples can have that their countries will not even yet, in the course of this war, be made a battlefield and the scene of military operations which may be of the most terrible character.

The German Government therefore expects that the Royal Norwegian Government and people will regard the German action with comprehension, and will offer no resistance to it. Any resistance would have to be, and would be, broken by the German occupying forces with all the means at their command, and would therefore result only in entirely useless bloodshed. The Royal Norwegian Government is therefore requested to take all measures as rapidly as possible to ensure that the action of the German troops may proceed without friction or difficulty.

In the spirit of the good relations which have existed in the past between Germany and Norway, the German Government declares to the Royal Norwegian Government that it is not Germany's intention, by the measures taken, to interfere with the territorial integrity and political independence of the Kingdom of Norway now or in the future.

3. SECOND COMMUNICATION (APPELL) OF DR. BRÄUER, GERMAN
AMBASSADOR TO NORWAY, TO THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT,
APRIL 9, 1940.¹

In repetition of the communication of this morning I wish once again to point out most seriously to the Norwegian Government that Norwegian resistance to the action which we have undertaken is quite senseless and is only calculated to make the situation very seriously worse for Norway. I repeat that Germany does not intend, by the measures which it is taking, to interfere with the territorial integrity and political independence of the Kingdom of Norway either now or in the future.

4. PROCLAMATION BY GENERAL VON FALKENHORST, GERMAN
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN NORWAY, TO THE NORWEGIAN
PEOPLE, APRIL 9, 1940.²

Without any grounds, and against the sincere desire of the German people and its Government, which wanted to live in peace and friendship with the English and French peoples, the rulers of England and France declared war on Germany in September last year. Their intention was, and is, if possible to force decisions also on more distant, and for them consequently less dangerous, theatres of war, in the hope that it would not be possible for Germany to counter them effectively there.

On these grounds, England has, among other things, repeatedly disregarded the sovereign territory and sovereign waters of Norway and Denmark. She persistently sought to secure that Scandinavia should become a seat of war. When, after the Russian-Finnish peace, an external pretext no longer seemed to exist, it was publicly threatened that German commerce in Norwegian and Danish territorial waters would no longer be tolerated. She announced her intention of taking over 'police powers' there herself. Finally, all measures were taken to take possession by surprise of the necessary bases on the Norwegian coast.

The greatest warmonger of the century—Churchill—who already in the first world war had worked for the harm of humanity, stated openly that he did not intend to be deterred 'by such scraps of paper as legal agreements or neutral rights'. A few days ago he was appointed as the responsible chief of the entire British war effort. The German Government had hitherto looked on at this man's

¹ *Frankfurter Zeitung*, April 10, 1940. Translation prepared by the Information Department.

² *The Times*, April 10, 1940.

proceedings. They cannot, however, tolerate that now, in accordance with the wishes of English and French war-makers, a new theatre of war should be created.

These attempts have been known by the Norwegian and Danish Governments for months. Their attitude has also been no secret to the German Government. They neither desire an English invasion nor are they in a position to meet it with effective resistance.

On these grounds, therefore, Germany decided to forestall this English attack and through her own strength to assume protection of the neutrality of the Kingdoms of Norway and Denmark, and thereby conclusively to secure it for the duration of the war. It is not the intention of the German Government thereby to establish for themselves a base in the fight against England, but it is their exclusive aim to prevent Scandinavia from being made into a battlefield for the English extension of the war. For this purpose, strong German forces have since this morning taken possession of militarily important objectives in Norway and Denmark.

Agreements between the German Government and the Norwegian Government on these measures are at present being reached. They are intended to respect and secure in full measure the existence of the Kingdom, the preservation of its armed forces, the freedom of the Norwegian people, and the future independence of the country.

Until the conclusion of these negotiations it must be expected of the common sense of the armed forces, as well as of the intelligence and good will of the population and all administrative officers, that they shall not undertake any passive or active resistance. It would certainly be useless and would be broken with all our power. All military and civil offices are therefore called upon to establish immediate liaison with the German military commanders. The population should pursue its normal daily occupations and should take care that peace and order are preserved. From now on the German armed forces will take care of the security of the country against English attacks.

(Signed) GERMAN COMMANDER VON FALKENHORST.

5. SPEECH BY THE RT. HON. NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, PRIME MINISTER, APRIL 9, 1940.¹

The House will be aware that Germany has to-day invaded Denmark and Norway. Ever since the beginning of the present war she has attempted to dominate Scandinavia and to control both the

¹ In the House of Commons. *Hansard*, April 9, 1940, coll. 509-11.

political and the economic policy of the Scandinavian States. Her pressure on those States has been steadily increasing, and, as is now well known, she claimed and exercised the right to dictate their policy towards Finland during the Finnish-Soviet war. The House will recall that, in the statement which I made at the end of that war, on March 19,¹ I used the following words in speaking of the struggle:

‘What is the result to Scandinavia? The security of Finland has gone, but has the security of Norway and Sweden been preserved? On the contrary, the danger has been brought closer than ever to those two countries, till to-day it stands upon their doorsteps.’

After expressing sympathy with those States, to whom I said that the issue of the war could not be a matter of indifference, I concluded:

‘Nothing will or can save them but a determination to defend themselves and to join with others who are ready to aid them in their defence.’

Some of my listeners then may have thought those words exaggerated, but now we see the fulfilment to the letter of the prophecy they contained. Since that date the situation has further developed. As was pointed out in the statement issued by His Majesty’s Government yesterday,² the German Government have claimed and exercised the right to destroy neutral, and particularly Scandinavian, ships on the seas around this country, by all the means in their power, but, at the same time, they have insisted upon the strictest observation of the rules of neutrality where this would provide some advantage to them, as it did in Norwegian waters. The Allies then decided that they could not acquiesce indefinitely in this state of affairs, and, having given notice to the Norwegian Government that they reserved the right to take such measures as might be necessary to redress the balance thus weighted against them, they laid mine-fields in Norwegian waters so as to prevent the unhindered passage of German traffic through them, while in no way interfering with normal Norwegian trade. At no time did the Allies contemplate any occupation of Scandinavian territory so long as it was not attacked by Germany. Any allegations by Germany to the contrary are pure invention and have no foundation in fact.

The German Government have now issued a statement to the effect that they have decided to take over the protection of Denmark

¹ See above, p. 32.

² See above, p. 43.

and Norway. German motorized and armed forces crossed the Danish frontier at daybreak and a considerable area of Danish territory is in German occupation. Their troops are reported to have landed at Copenhagen this morning. His Majesty's Government have learned that the German Minister at Oslo, early to-day, made a formal demand for the surrender of Norway to Germany, stating that in the event of refusal all resistance would be crushed. This demand was, of course, immediately refused by the Norwegian Government, as they have officially declared. We have now heard that fighting has already started, and there are Press reports that Oslo and Christiansand have been bombed. German troops have landed on Norwegian territory at various places.

It is asserted by the German Government that their invasion of Norway was a reprisal for the action of the Allies in Norwegian territorial waters. This statement will, of course, deceive no one. So elaborate an operation, involving simultaneous landings at a number of ports by troops accompanied by naval forces, requires planning long in advance; and the information which is now coming to hand clearly indicates that it was not only planned, but was already in operation, before the mines were laid in Norwegian waters. The facts of the German operation, which are becoming public property, suffice in themselves to prove what I have just said. It is reported that, among others, the Norwegian port of Trondheim has been invaded by German armed forces this morning. The distance from the nearest German port, Cuxhaven, to Trondheim is nearly 700 miles; and assuming that the expedition started immediately after the announcement of the mining operations within Norwegian territorial waters, they could not yet have arrived. There is, therefore, no doubt that the German plans for the invasion of Norway and Denmark were made and put into operation long before the Allied mining of Norwegian territorial waters.

It remains to say that His Majesty's Government have at once assured the Norwegian Government that, in view of the German invasion of their country, His Majesty's Government have decided forthwith to extend their full aid to Norway; and have intimated that they will fight the war in full association with them. Powerful units of the Navy are at sea. Hon. Members will realize that it would not be in the public interest to give details at this stage as to any operations in which they are now engaged. Needless to say, we are facing this new menace to the independence of free peoples in the closest collaboration with the French Government, whose forces are operating together with our own. I have no doubt that

this further rash and cruel act of aggression will redound to Germany's disadvantage, and contribute to her ultimate defeat.

6. OFFICIAL STATEMENT ISSUED THROUGH THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE, APRIL 9, 1940.¹

The German Government have issued a statement saying they have decided to take over the protection of Denmark and Norway. It adds that this action is in reply to the laying of minefields in Norwegian territorial waters by Great Britain and France yesterday.

Information has now reached His Majesty's Government to the effect that the German Minister at Oslo has demanded the surrender of Norway to Germany; in the event of refusal all resistance will be crushed. This demand was, of course, immediately refused by the Norwegian Government. Information has been received that German troops have already occupied Norwegian territory.

The German statement that their action is in reply to steps taken by the British and French Governments will deceive nobody. So elaborate an operation, involving simultaneous landings at a number of Norwegian ports by troops, accompanied by naval forces, must have been planned well in advance. It is not surprising that the Norwegian Government have decided to resist this latest exhibition of German aggression.

His Majesty's Government and the French Government have at once assured the Norwegian Government that in view of the German invasion of their country they have decided forthwith to extend their full aid to Norway and have intimated that they will fight the war in full association with them.

The necessary naval and military steps are accordingly being taken in conjunction with the French.

7. STATEMENT BY HERR VON RIBBENTROP, GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER, TO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FOREIGN PRESS IN BERLIN, APRIL 9, 1940.²

The Anglo-French infringement of Norwegian neutrality yesterday is the most flagrant breach of law and of neutrality imaginable. It is a worthy successor to the series of countless similar British

¹ *The Times*, April 10, 1940. A similar communication was handed by M. Paul Reynaud, French Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Norwegian Minister in Paris on April 9.

² *Völkischer Beobachter*, April 10, 1940. Translation prepared by the Information Department.

breaches of neutrality from the bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807 by the British Navy down to the present day.

The infringement of Norwegian territory by England and France did not come as a surprise to Germany. As you have learned from the German Government's Note¹ to the Norwegian and Danish Governments, the object of England and France is to cut Germany off from her imports of ore from the North and to create a new theatre of war in Scandinavia so that Germany can be attacked on the flank from the north. The violation of territorial waters which took place yesterday by the laying of mines and the sinking of all the coastal shipping without warning by England and France is only the first part of a British plan which is known to the German Government.

According to information in the possession of the German Government, the second part was to have been carried out immediately afterwards. It consisted in the occupation of the whole of Scandinavia, namely, Denmark, Norway, and also Sweden, for the occupation of Sweden would have been the only means by which England and France could have cut Germany off from her supplies of Swedish ore. The Anglo-French troops were then to have advanced southwards in Scandinavia by the most rapid route and attacked Germany from the north.

The German Government has for some time had information that English and French military and naval staff officers were present in all parts of Norway to decide upon and prepare landing-places and to make plans for the advance to the south.

The German Government had already been aware of these plans for some time, but it is only now, after the violation of Norwegian neutrality, carried out without warning, that the world has become aware of the full extent of the monstrous cynicism and brutality with which England and France wished to create a new theatre of war against Germany in the peaceful North, and the full implications of this.

The Anglo-French Note of April 8² to the Norwegian Government proclaims a new international law, according to which a belligerent has a right to undertake an action which becomes just owing to the situation created by the illegal action of the enemy.

We have acted upon this theory. England has violated Scandinavia, and to this breach of international law the *Führer* has to-day given the appropriate retort: the German forces will see to it that for the rest of this war no Englishman or Frenchman shall again

¹ See above, p. 54.

² See above, p. 44.

be seen in Norway and Denmark. Germany has thus preserved the Scandinavian countries and peoples from destruction, and will until the end of the war defend true neutrality in the North.

I am convinced that this action of the *Führer* has saved an ancient and respected part of Europe from that certain ruin and utter destruction to which our English and French enemies are clearly indifferent.

8. PROCLAMATION TO THE PEOPLE OF NORWAY BY H.M. THE KING OF NORWAY AND HR. NYGAARDSVOLD, PRIME MINISTER, APRIL 10, 1940.¹

The German Government has demanded that the King of Norway shall appoint a Government which enjoys the confidence of Germany, and which has been designated by the German *Führer*. The King has been unable to submit to this demand, which would make Norway a dependency. No other Government can have control here but that which has the confidence of the Norwegian people.

The Government, which has now stood for five years in control of the country in collaboration with the Storting, is still the only legal Norwegian Government.

This Government offered to resign when the German attack upon Norway was started. But the Storting unanimously requested it to remain in office. And the Government remains.

It now turns to the whole Norwegian people, and asks their assistance in upholding a rule of the country according to law—Norwegian constitution, Norwegian liberty, Norwegian independence.

Germany has perpetrated against Norway one of those hideous acts of violence of which history has known too many instances. It has forced its way into the country with bombs and every other kind of destructive weapon. It has flagrantly and dishonourably violated all the rights of a small people, which merely wishes to live in peace.

The Norwegian Government is convinced that this crime is condemned by the whole civilized world. But above all it is confident that the Norwegian nation will use all its energies to restore the liberty and independence which a foreign Power has wished to destroy by force.

The outlook for Norway may seem dark at this moment, and the masters of force may succeed in destroying much. But the Government has the confident hope that a new and brighter future for the country will one day appear.

¹ *Ny Norsk Kvübok*. Translation prepared for the Information Department.

It therefore exhorts the whole Norwegian nation to cling fast to the Norwegian heritage of liberty in loyalty to the great ideas which have carried our country forward for centuries.

Long live our fatherland! Long live a free Norway!

JOHAN NYGAARDSVOLD.

I associate myself completely with this appeal which the Government has addressed to the Norwegian people. I am convinced that I have the whole nation with me in the decision which has been taken.

HAAKON R.

9. EXTRACTS FROM SPEECH BY THE RT. HON. VISCOUNT HALIFAX,
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, APRIL 10, 1940.¹

. . . Certain definite facts, of course, clearly emerge from the welter of uncertainty. We know that the whole of Denmark has been occupied by German troops, that Norway has been attacked and part of her territory occupied, and, as the Prime Minister stated yesterday in the House of Commons, we immediately—and when I say ‘we’ I mean the French Government and ourselves, acting as we do in all these matters in conjunction also with Poland—assured Norway that she would receive our full aid and that we should fight the war to its end in association with her, and that because we thought, and think, that that was the best way from the point of view of Norway herself of saving her from becoming a vassal State of Germany. It was for that reason that at the meeting of the Supreme War Council yesterday the French Government, with the British Government, endorsed and renewed that pledge of full assistance. I have seen a report that Norway is now preparing to negotiate with the German Government. I do not know whether that report is or is not well founded; but, if it were well founded, I have no doubt whatever that the Allied Governments would only regard that action as taken under duress—and that it would in no way whatever affect our determination to resist on behalf of a powerless Norway both the effect for Norway of this brutal exhibition of violence and for ourselves of an extension of German strategic power in the North Sea and the Atlantic which it would be impossible for this country to accept.

As the Prime Minister also stated yesterday, His Majesty’s Navy is operating in these waters with powerful forces. You may take it

¹ At a luncheon given by the National Defence Public Interest Committee. *The Times*, April 11, 1940.

from me that they are not idle, and that the fullest information that is possible and consistent with the public interest will be given. I understand that the First Lord of the Admiralty expects to make a full statement in Parliament to-morrow.

There are two considerations that occur to me that perhaps you will allow me to place before you. We cannot exactly judge what may have been the German motives in thus opening the war in Scandinavia. It may well be the result of some internal weakness in Germany of which we are not, perhaps, fully aware. But this I think I can say with certainty, that it is not likely to be of unmixed advantage to Germany. The second thing that I would say is this, that I think in these events lies a moral for neutral States. It is very easy to make aggressive war if you are completely devoid of, and can act without any regard for, any of the ordinary scruples by which relations between States are conditioned. This country or France could at any moment during the last six months have occupied any port or place in Norway that we chose, and this kind of thing, I venture to think, is liable to happen if neutral States are not prepared to ask in time for the help that they often ask for when it is all too late to render it effectively, and if they do not realize in time that, in a world where German assurances are surely by now abundantly proved to be utterly worthless, it is to their ultimate essential interest to stand together.

Mr. Chamberlain also stated yesterday in the House of Commons that for some time past—indeed, since the beginning of the war—German pressure on Scandinavia had been steadily increasing. It is that pressure that has now culminated in these two wanton acts of aggression. The fact that the more defenceless of Germany's neighbours have been chosen for this aggression is quite in keeping with the conventional behaviour of a bully who prefers as objects of attack those who are not sufficiently powerful to defend themselves. . . .

Norway had been careful to give Germany no cause for offence. In some respects—though all allowance should rightly be made for her difficult position—there were those who said she had been too accommodating to Germany. It is therefore clear that neither non-aggression pacts nor absence of provocation is of the slightest value against German policy if German policy demands otherwise.

For months past Germany has been violating every provision of international law that it suited her purpose to ignore. While neutral ships on voyage to the United Kingdom have been ruthlessly bombed, machine-gunned, and sunk, and something like 1,000 **neutral subjects killed in violation of every rule of neutrality, the**

same doctrine of neutrality was constantly invoked to allow German ships to pass to Germany unmolested. I do not think the Allies could have been expected indefinitely to acquiesce in an injustice so blatant and so glaring. They therefore took steps which are familiar to you all, which consisted in the laying of certain minefields to deny this unhindered passage through Norwegian territorial waters to German ships. These minefields did not, and do not, interfere in any way with normal Norwegian traffic or involve any danger to any single human life.

I only refer to that at this moment because the Germans have represented their action as a reprisal for Allied action in this matter of mine-laying. I find it difficult to believe that even Dr. Goebbels, with his vast experience of the room for manoeuvre in the field of credulity, can suppose that world opinion will recognize as reasonable reprisal against this country action of which the immediate objective is the destruction of two other countries' independence. Simultaneous landings at a number of ports, those lying and carefully argued documents that saw the light this morning, and the leaflets distributed over Copenhagen—all that, of course, argues long and elaborate preparations. And information is accumulating that all these designs had been planned and indeed put in operation long before any ostensible excuse existed.

The Germans, I observe, claim that if they had not occupied Norway the Allies would themselves have done so. To that the best answer perhaps is that supplied by the Norwegian Foreign Minister himself, who said that the Norwegian Government did not believe that the Allies had any intention of taking any such measure, and he, of course, is right. The truth is that in face of this kind of information nobody who is not in a position to defend himself is safe. The behaviour of Germany is really that of a homicidal lunatic or of a mad dog that runs about biting where he may, until after a time everybody who is concerned to defend themselves against that sort of thing gets their gun down in order to make an end of it.

If anything was required to stiffen British and French relations and make them realize what it is they have to fight, these events would, I think, have supplied it. They believe that this war is not merely a struggle between the belligerents nor will the issue affect them alone. More and more is it becoming plain that this war is part of the eternal struggle between right and wrong, and is being fought, not only on behalf of States engaged now, but of all States that love liberty and wish to preserve their independence. . . .

10. EXTRACTS FROM SPEECH BY THE RT. HON. WINSTON CHURCHILL,
FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY, APRIL 11, 1940.¹

. . . The strange and unnatural calm of the last few weeks was violently broken on Monday morning by the German invasion of Norway and Denmark. This crime had, of course, been long and elaborately prepared, and it was actually set in motion in the last week of March. For several months past we have received information of large numbers of German merchant ships being fitted as transports and of numerous small vessels being assembled in various Baltic ports and, also, in the river mouths of the Elbe. But no one could tell when they would be used or against what peaceful country they would be used. Holland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden were, as it seemed, all equally liable to a sudden, brutal, capricious and, in any case, unprovoked attack. Which would be selected as the first victim or when the blow would be struck remained, inevitably, a matter of pure speculation.

The Nazi German Government is accustomed to spreading through its channels a continuous flow of threats and rumours. These are put forth by all their agents in neutral countries, by the 'hangers-on' of their legations and by their sympathizers and backers, wherever they may be found. . . . All these countries have been threatened, and as the German Government are not restrained by law or scruple, and as they have an obvious preference for striking at the weak rather than the strong, all the small countries on their borders were, and still are, in a high state of alarm. Even those neutrals who have done the most to placate Germany, and have been the greatest aid to her, could not feel any sense of security that they would not be attacked without any reason or without any warning, swiftly overrun, reduced to bondage and pillaged of all their property, especially all eatables. Fear was, therefore, general in all these unfortunate countries, and none of them could tell, and none of us could tell, which one of them would be the next to be devoured.

In the small hours of Monday morning we learned that Norway and Denmark had drawn the unlucky numbers in this sinister lottery. Denmark, of course, had special reason for apprehension, not only because she was the nearest and the weakest of Germany's neighbours, but because she had a recent treaty with Germany guaranteeing her from all molestation and because she was engaged in active commerce both with Germany and Great Britain, the continuance of which in time of war had been foreseen by Germany, and was

¹ In the House of Commons. *Hansard*, April 11, 1940, col. 735-40.

guaranteed by special trade arrangements between the German and Danish Governments. This, obviously, placed her in a position of peculiar danger. The extraordinary configuration of the Norwegian western coast provides a kind of corridor, or covered way, as every one knows, through which neutral trade and German ships of all kinds, warships and others, could be moved to and fro through the Allied blockade, within the territorial waters of Norway and Sweden, until they were under the effective protection of the German home Air Force in North Germany. They could go to and fro along this route without molestation.

The existence of this geographical and legal covered way has been the greatest disadvantage which we have suffered and the greatest advantage which Germany has possessed in her efforts to frustrate the British and Allied blockade. Warships moved up and down it as they thought it convenient. U-boats used it as they thought fit. Stray German liners and merchant ships, trying to get back to Germany from outer seas, followed this route, which is over 800 miles long, and can be entered or quitted at any convenient point. There has been no greater impediment to the blockade of Germany than this Norwegian corridor. It was so in the last war, and it has been so in this war. Therefore, the British Navy has been forced to watch an endless procession of German and neutral ships carrying contraband of all kinds to Germany, which at any moment they could have stopped, but which they were forbidden to touch by those very same conventions of international law which Germany, in this war, as in the last, has treated with the utmost perfect contempt. During the last war, when we were associated with the United States, the Allies felt themselves so deeply injured by this covered way, then being used specially for U-boats setting out on their marauding expeditions, that the British, French and United States Governments together induced the Norwegians to lay a minefield in their territorial waters, across the covered way, in order to prevent the abuse by U-boats of this channel. It was only natural that the Admiralty, since this war began, should have brought this precedent—although it is not exactly on all fours, and there are some differences—this modern and highly respectable precedent, to the notice of His Majesty's Government and should have urged that we should be allowed to lay a minefield of our own in Norwegian territorial waters in order to compel this traffic which was passing in and out to Germany to come out into the open sea and take a chance of being brought into the contraband control, or being captured as enemy prize by our blockading squadrons and flotillas. It

was only natural and it was only right that His Majesty's Government should have been long reluctant to incur the reproach of even a technical violation of international law. After all, we are seeking to establish the reign of international law, and any one can see the dilemma upon which those who have to consider these matters are liable to be impaled in such a situation as that. It is intolerable that the good cause should suffer by respecting the conventions which those who champion the bad cause have profited by tearing to pieces. But gradually, as this cruel, deadly war has deepened and darkened, the feeling grew that it was placing an undue burden upon the Allies to allow this traffic to continue and that it was intolerable to watch, week after week, the ships passing down this corridor carrying the iron ore to make the shells which will strike down the young men of France and Britain in the campaign of 1941.

It was, therefore, decided at last—and the scruples caused us injury at the same time as they did us honour—to interrupt this traffic and make it come out into the open sea. Every precaution was taken to avoid the slightest danger to neutral ships or any loss of life, even to enemy merchant ships, by the minefields which were laid and declared on Monday last at dawn, and British patrolling craft were actually stationed around them in order to warn all ships off these dangerous areas. The Nazi Government . . . have sought to make out that their invasion of Norway and of Denmark was a consequence of our action in closing the Norwegian corridor. It can, however, undoubtedly be proved that not only had their preparations been made nearly a month before, but that their actual movements of troops and ships had begun before the British and French minefields were laid. No doubt they suspected they were going to be laid. It must indeed have appeared incomprehensible to them that they had not been laid long before. They therefore decided in the last week of March to use the Norwegian corridor to send empty ore ships northward, filled with military stores and German soldiers, concealed below decks, in order at the given moment to seize the various ports on the Norwegian seaboard which they considered to have military value. They also set in motion the invading forces which they had long prepared against the innocent neutral countries—or against two of the innocent neutral countries, because there are others not yet affected—who had helped them in so many ways.

I here must say a word about Norway. We have the most profound sympathy with the Norwegian people. We have understood the terrible dilemma in which they have been placed. Their sentiments, like those of every other small country, were with the Allies. They

writhed in helpless anger while scores of their ships were wantonly sunk and many hundreds of their sailors cruelly drowned. They realize fully that their future independence and freedom are bound up with the victory of the Allies. But the feeling of powerlessness in the ruthless grip of Nazi wrath made them hope against hope until the last moment that at least their soil and their cities would not be polluted by the trampling of German marching columns or their liberties and their livelihood stolen away by foreign tyrants. But this hope has been in vain. Another violent outrage has been perpetrated by Nazi Germany against a small and friendly Power, and the Norwegian Government and people are to-day in arms to defend their hearths and homes. We shall aid them to the best of our ability, we shall conduct the war in common with them, and we shall make peace only when their rights and freedom are restored. In their very large, wild, mountainous country—freedom, it is said, dwells in the mountains—in their very large country, sparsely populated, but rugged and full of positions where free men can shelter and can fight, they should be able to maintain vigorous and prolonged resistance, costing enormous labour to those who wish to subjugate them to tyranny.

But what an example this Norwegian episode is to other neutral countries. What an example it is of the danger of supposing that friendly relations with Germany, or friendly assurances from Germany, or treaties of any kind, or friendly offices rendered to Germany, or advantages given to Germany—what a danger to suppose that any of these are the slightest protection against a murderous onslaught the moment it is thought by Germany that any advantage can be gained by such action. If the Norwegian Government had not been so very strict and severe in enforcing their neutrality against us and in leaving their corridor open to German operations and machinations, and if they had entered into confidential relations with us, it would have been very easy to give them more timely and more opportune support than is now possible. It is not the slightest use blaming the Allies for not being able to give substantial help and protection to neutral countries if they are held at arm's length by the neutral countries until those countries are actually attacked on a scientifically prepared plan by Germany, and I trust that the fact that the strict observance of neutrality by Norway has been a contributory cause of the sufferings to which she is now exposed and in the limits of aid which we can give her will be meditated upon by other countries who may to-morrow, or a week hence, or a month hence, find themselves the victims of an

equally elaborately worked out staff plan for their destruction and enslavement. . . .

11. EXTRACT FROM SPEECH BY M. REYNAUD, FRENCH PRIME MINISTER, APRIL 11, 1940.¹

Messieurs, la bataille du fer continue. En vain l'Allemagne se jette-t-elle sur de petits peuples pour les asservir, au mépris de la parole donnée.

Dès à présent, je l'ai dit hier au Sénat, une chose est sûre: la route permanente du minerai de fer suédois vers l'Allemagne est et restera coupée. Se sentant menacée sur un point vital, l'Allemagne, qui a besoin d'acier pour pouvoir nous attaquer, vient de mettre au jeu toute sa méthode, toute son audace, tout son prestige. Elle vient de nous donner le spectacle de la sortie d'un pays assiégé.

Sur terre, après avoir piétiné le Danemark, elle a bondi sur la Norvège. Là, elle croyait trouver la passivité de l'Autriche de 1938; elle a trouvé la résistance de la Belgique de 1914. Le peuple norvégien est debout derrière son roi.

Dans son appel admirable, le gouvernement norvégien a dit: 'L'avenir immédiat de la Norvège est sombre. L'envahisseur peut faire de grands ravages. Mais le gouvernement est sûr que notre peuple a devant lui un avenir de liberté. Il gardera son héritage, il restera fidèle aux grandes idées qui l'ont guidé depuis des siècles.'

Cet appel, qui est tout plein des mots de liberté et auquel le roi s'est associé, se termine ainsi: 'Vive la Norvège libre!' . . .

12. APPEAL TO THE NORWEGIAN PEOPLE FROM H.M. THE KING OF NORWAY, APRIL 13, 1940.²

In this time of trial, the most difficult in which my people and country have been involved for more than a hundred years, I address an urgent request to all Norwegian women and men to do all that lies in the power of each individual to save for our dear fatherland its liberty and independence.

Our country has been exposed to a lightning attack from a nation with which we have always maintained friendly relations.

This powerful opponent has not shrunk from bomb-attacks on the peaceful population in town and country. Women and children are being exposed to death and inhuman sufferings.

¹ In the Chambre des Députés. *Le Temps*, April 13, 1940.

² *Ny Norsk Kvittbok*. Translation prepared for the Information Department.

In the situation to-day I cannot report to you the whereabouts in Norway of myself, the Crown Prince, and the Government. The German forces have in fact engaged in a violent attack on us, while we were staying in a little place which was unfortified and undefended. High explosive and incendiary bombs and machine-gun fire were used against the civilian population and ourselves in the most unscrupulous and brutal fashion. The attack could have had but one object—immediately to annihilate all of us who were assembled to resolve questions in the best interests of Norway.

I thank those who are to-day at their posts, with myself and the Government, in the struggle for Norway's independence and liberty.

I ask all to remember those who have given their lives for the sake of the Fatherland.

God save Norway.

HAakon.

13. STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APRIL 13, 1940.¹

Force and military aggression are once more on the march against small nations, in this instance through the invasion of Denmark and Norway. These two nations have won and maintained during a period of many generations the respect and regard not only of the American people, but of all peoples, because of their observance of the highest standards of national and international conduct.

The Government of the United States has on the occasion of recent invasions strongly expressed its disapprobation of such unlawful exercise of force. It here reiterates, with undiminished emphasis, its point of view as expressed on those occasions. If civilization is to survive, the rights of the smaller nations to independence, to their territorial integrity, and to the unimpeded opportunity for self-government must be respected by their more powerful neighbours.

14. PROCLAMATION ISSUED BY GENERAL VON FALKENHORST, GERMAN COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN NORWAY, APRIL 14, 1940.²

It is my task to protect Norway against an attack by the Western Powers. The Norwegian Government have declined several offers of co-operation. The Norwegian people must now themselves determine the fate of their fatherland.

¹ Department of State, *Bulletin*, II, p. 373.

² *The Times*, May 7, 1940.

If my proclamation meets with the obedience which was very sensibly accorded by the Danish people when faced with similar circumstances, Norway will be spared the horrors of war.

If opposition is offered and the hand of friendship is rejected I shall be forced to employ the severest and most relentless means to crush such opposition.

Any one who assists the mobilization ordered by the former Government, now evacuated, or any one who spreads false rumours will be court-martialled.

Any civilian who is found carrying arms will be shot.

Any one found guilty of the sabotage of the means of transport or communication or of public undertakings will be shot.

Any one making use of war material which offends against international regulations (e.g. dum-dum bullets) will be shot.

The German army, victorious in many a battle, the large and powerful Air Force, and Navy will see to it that this my proclamation is enforced.

15. COMMUNICATIONS EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL IN OSLO, APRIL 16-19, 1940.¹

On April 16, 1940, Paal Berg, Judge of the Supreme Court, telephoned the following report to Minister Willebaek in Stockholm:

'The Supreme Court has issued the following proclamation: Since German forces have occupied certain parts of Norway and have thereby rendered it practically impossible for the Norwegian Government to maintain the administrative control of these districts, and since it is urgently necessary that the civil administration be kept going, the Supreme Court has considered it necessary to take steps for the erection of an Administrative Council to control the civil administration of the occupied districts—for such time as these districts are occupied by German forces. Trusting that the King of Norway, under the present extraordinary circumstances, will approve the Supreme Court's resort to this emergency expedient, the Supreme Court nominates as members of the temporary Administrative Council: Christensen, the Provincial Governor (*Fylkesmann*), Director Bache-Wiig, Chief Medical Officer Andreas Diesen, Judge Harbek, Director Gunnar Jahn, Lecturer Mork, and Seip the Rector of the University.'

. ¹ *Ny Norsk Kvittbok*. Translation prepared for the Information Department.

Berg told Wollebaek: It was the express condition of this proclamation that Quisling and his men should withdraw, and further, in a memorandum to the German Minister, attention was called to the point that the Supreme Court intended to acquaint the King as soon as possible with what had been done. It is further stated in the memorandum: 'It is assumed by the Supreme Court that this temporary Administrative Council has nothing to do with foreign affairs.'

After this, Berg dictated the following letter to the King:

'The Supreme Court considered that it ought to act as it did from the consideration that Norwegian interests demanded that there should not be administrative chaos in the places conquered by the Germans. We have expressly emphasized to the German Minister that this temporary Administrative Council is *not* a Government, but exclusively an institution for civil control which has no political function. An express reservation was further made that, when and inasmuch as the Administrative Council was set up, Hr. Quisling and his men should retire, and that Hr. Quisling should give an assurance of his loyalty to the Administrative Council. This he did publicly on the Norwegian radio yesterday. The Administrative Council has come into operation. On the Norwegian radio yesterday assurances of loyalty were simultaneously given by the leading organizations connected with food supplies, including the Workers' Agricultural Union.

'From my conversation yesterday with the German Minister I can report that his standpoint is: He has offered to negotiate with the Norwegian Government. His offer has been refused. He cannot take any fresh step to initiate negotiations. The initiative must come from the Norwegian side. He still holds to his earlier memorandum. The German Under-Secretary of State from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Habicht, who is here, has expressed to me the same point of view. I have considered that I ought to bring this to Your Majesty's knowledge.

'Meanwhile I have been privately requested to suggest to Your Majesty whether the Crown Prince could address some words on the radio to people in the conquered districts as to behaving themselves sensibly and quietly and refraining from sabotage and acts of destruction. On this subject there has been a public appeal from different influential quarters in Oslo. I think it might be right and necessary that people in the districts which the Germans have annexed should have a fresh appeal of this kind

in such form and in such manner as Your Majesty may think most useful.'

Berg emphasized to Wollibaek that what has been done is not the creation of a Government of any sort and that the Foreign Office and the defence department lie quite outside the scope of the new arrangements.

After this telephone message had reached the King in Norway, it was agreed in a Cabinet Council of April 19 to send the following answer to the Judge of the Supreme Court:

'To Paal Berg, Judge of the Supreme Court, Oslo.

'I have received on April 18 the letter addressed to me which you dictated over the telephone to Minister Wollibaek in Stockholm on April 16.

'This letter has already to all intents and purposes been answered by the Proclamation issued from the Cabinet on April 17, a copy of which I enclose.¹ You will see from this Proclamation that I completely understand the emergency which has caused the Supreme Court to intervene to create an Administrative Council for the districts occupied by the German army. I note also that this temporary Administrative Council does not in any way regard itself as a Government, but only as an auxiliary to the civil administration for such time as the military occupation lasts. I assume it is obvious that all Norwegian citizens in the occupied districts still consider themselves as citizens of the Norwegian State and therefore as belonging to the authority of myself and the Norwegian Government. But the authority exercised by the Administrative Council is for practical purposes dependent on foreign power and will not be exercised on behalf of myself or the Norwegian Government. I must therefore reserve to myself and the Norwegian Government complete liberty in regard to the decisions which the Council may take at this time.

'I note that questions of defence and foreign policy lie completely outside the matters with which the Administrative Council is concerned, and that thus no other Norwegian authority but the legal Norwegian Government has any voice in these matters. Since in your letter to me you report that representatives of the German Government in Oslo maintain that they can no longer take the initiative towards any negotiation with the Norwegian Government, but say at the same time that they still stand by the demands which were put forward in the German memorandum

¹ See below, p. 77.

of April 9, I must merely add the observation that there is in that case no basis for negotiation, since the memorandum in question came as an absolute demand with no possibility of alteration. This memorandum included such far-reaching demands for German control over Norwegian affairs and was also based on using Norway as a tool in Germany's war against the Western Powers, that it was impossible for a neutral and independent State to accept such conditions. The Norwegian Government cannot negotiate on any other basis than the removal of German power from the country.

'Your suggestion that the Crown Prince should speak over the wireless to Norwegians in the occupied territories cannot be carried out in practice since the Crown Prince has not access to broadcast transmitters in these districts. I of course agree that the people in the districts occupied by the German forces must behave sensibly and not undertake any action contrary to law. But no one can expect that I or the Crown Prince should appeal to the people to obey German authorities. I am sure that my people under all circumstances will keep the firmness befitting Norwegians, and will maintain their national spirit.

'JOHAN NYGAARDSVOLD.

'HAAKON.
'O. TOSTRUP.'

16. PROCLAMATION FROM THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT, AGREED
BY THE KING IN COUNCIL, APRIL 17, 1940.¹

The so-called Government, formed by Major Quisling simultaneously with the occupation of the capital by the German army, has had to retire, and it is a pleasure to know that the attempt to create a new Government, in conflict with the lawful Government presided over by the King, has now been abandoned. Norway has at present only one Government, that which has been appointed by the King, and which the Storting has unanimously requested to remain in power.

The Administrative Council which has in the last few days been set up in Oslo for those districts of the country which the Germans have occupied, is an emergency institution which does not take the place of the Norwegian Government. This Council is forced to govern according to the direction of that Power which has forced its way into the country with brutal violence. It therefore does not represent the will of the Norwegian people, and has no legal basis

¹ *Ny Norsk Kvithok*. Translation prepared for the Information Department.

in any Norwegian law. It may nevertheless assist to some extent in safeguarding the rights of Norwegian citizens during the time while certain parts of the country are controlled by hostile power. But it is a matter of course that the Council must give way, whenever the Government of the Kingdom of Norway recovers its power.

Every Norwegian citizen should rest assured that the King and the Government are exerting all their energies to free the land from alien rule based on force, and restore Norway free and independent as soon as possible. All Norwegians, as surely as they wish to be and to bear the name of Norwegians, must help this struggle for freedom. By a common effort we shall win back our fatherland again, and make the Norwegian people masters in their own country.

17. PROCLAMATION BY HERR HITLER CONCERNING THE EXERCISE OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS IN NORWAY, APRIL 24, 1940.¹

The Nygaardsvold Government, by its proclamations and its attitude, as well as by the military operations which have taken place by its decision, has created a state of war between Norway and Germany. In order to safeguard public order and public life in the parts of Norwegian territory which are under the protection of German troops, I decree:

1. The occupied districts of Norway shall be in the charge of the Reich Commissioner for Norwegian Occupied Territory. His seat is at Oslo. The Reich Commissioner is the guardian of the interests of the Reich, and exercises supreme Government authority in the civil sphere.

2. For the carrying out of his orders and the exercise of administrative authority, the Reich Commissioner may make use of the Norwegian Administrative Committee and Norwegian authorities.

3. The existing law remains in force, in so far as it is compatible with the occupation. The Reich Commissioner can create laws by way of decree. The decrees will be published in the 'Bulletin of Decrees for Occupied Norwegian Territory'.

4. The commander of the German troops in Norway exercises supreme military authority; his requirements in the civil sphere are carried out solely by the Reich Commissioner. In so far and for such time as the military situation may require, he is empowered to order such measures as are necessary for the execution of his military functions and for the military security of Norway.

¹ *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1940, I, p. 677. Quoted in the *Neue Züricher Zeitung*, April 29, 1940. Translation prepared by the Information Department.

5. The Reich Commissioner may use German police organs for the enforcement of his orders. The German police organs are at the disposal of the commander of the German troops in Norway, in so far as military necessities require and the duties of the Reich Commissioner permit.

6. The Reich Commissioner is directly subordinate to me and receives directions and instructions from me.

7. I appoint *Oberpräsident* Terboven as Reich Commissioner for Occupied Norwegian Territory.

8. Regulations for carrying out and supplementing this proclamation are issued on my directions by the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery for the civil sphere, and by the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces for the military sphere.
Berlin, April 24, 1940.

(Signed) ADOLF HITLER,
Führer.

GÖRING,
President of the Ministerial Council for Defence of the Reich,
General Field-Marshal.

DR. LAMMERS,
Reich Minister and Chief of
the Reich Chancellery.

KEITEL,
Chief of the High Command of the
Armed Forces.

FRICK,
Reich Minister of the Interior.

18. EXTRACTS FROM PROCLAMATION OF A STATE OF WAR BETWEEN
FOREIGN STATES, ISSUED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, APRIL 25, 1940.¹

Whereas section 1 of the joint resolution of Congress approved November 4, 1939, provides in part as follows:

"That whenever the President, or the Congress by concurrent resolution, shall find that there exists a state of war between foreign states, and that it is necessary to promote the security or preserve the peace of the United States or to protect the lives of citizens of the United States, the President shall issue a proclamation naming the states involved; and he shall, from time to

¹ Department of State, *Bulletin*, II, p. 429.

time, by proclamation, name other states as and when they may become involved in the war.' . . .

NOW THEREFORE, I, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority conferred on me by the said joint resolution, do hereby proclaim that a state of war unhappily exists between Germany and Norway. . . .

19. PROCLAMATION ISSUED BY HERR TERBOVEN, COMMISSIONER OF THE GERMAN REICH IN NORWAY, APRIL 26, 1940.¹

By order of the *Führer*, I, as Reich Commissioner, have assumed full authority in the civil sphere for the duration of occupation of Norwegian territory.

I regard my main task as the maintenance of peace, security and order, guarantee of orderly economic and cultural life of the population as well as the establishment of all conditions for military needs which prove necessary in the land in which regrettably there still is fighting counter to the will of the German Government.

To that end, the decisive condition is that the population loyally receives my measures and willingly follows them. Norwegian administrative authorities have offered their co-operation. They will remain in office and administer their duties as heretofore.

20. SPEECH BY HERR VON RIBBENTROP, GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER, APRIL 27, 1940.²

Your Excellencies, gentlemen of the diplomatic missions, and gentlemen of the foreign and home Press, I have invited you to come here to-day so that I might make directly available to you a series of documents which, in the view of the German Government, are of the utmost importance to the public of the world, and particularly to the Governments of neutral countries. I have the following statements to make on behalf of the German Government in connexion with these documents:

On September 3 the rulers of England and France declared war on the German Reich. They had no sort of reasonable ground for doing so. The German people and its *Führer* have since January 1933

¹ *New York Times*, April 27, 1940.

² At the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, at a meeting to which the Diplomatic Corps and German and foreign Press representatives were invited, and at which the German White Book No. IV, *Documents concerning the Anglo-French Policy of Extending the War*, was distributed. *Frankfurter Zeitung*, April 28, 1940. Translation prepared by the Information Department.

constantly made known their desire to live in peace and friendship with the English and French peoples. The German people, however, in these circumstances, accepted with solemn determination the war which was thrust upon them. The scheme of the Anglo-French rulers to break up the German nation, to deprive the German people of its political rights, and to destroy them economically, will be parried by the united strength of the German nation, and thus frustrated.

As a direct attack on the German West Wall was recognized from the outset to be hopeless, and the Polish ally whom the English and French rulers egged on against Germany failed, a desperate search was made for new possibilities of getting to grips with Germany. Accordingly, the extension of the war was elevated by the political and military leaders of the Western Powers into the ruling principle of their war policy. England and France have therefore, since the beginning of the war, been trying by all possible means to bring about a transposition of the theatre of war by bringing in neutral States. The smaller European countries in particular seem to the English rulers to be the most suitable objects for this purpose, and their people are regarded as welcome auxiliary troops, so that, according to the old English tradition, the English can avoid the shedding of their own blood.

In order to provide propaganda support for this policy of extending the war, the English and French statesmen began a systematic campaign against the principle of neutrality in itself and against every endeavour of a neutral State to defend its neutrality and to keep itself out of the war. On January 21, 1940, Mr. Churchill opened this campaign with his notorious speech against neutrality and his call to neutrals to associate themselves with the Anglo-French war against Germany. Up to now no speech of an English or French politician has failed to include the demand that neutrals should take part in the fight against Germany. I will give just a few examples.

Mr. Chamberlain, on January 31, severely criticized the neutrals for their 'callous indifference'.¹ On February 24, after the flagrant English violation of neutrality and the attack on the German ship *Altmark* in Norwegian territorial waters, Mr. Chamberlain stated

¹ Mr. Chamberlain's speech at a luncheon of the National Defence Public Interest Committee on January 31, 1940, contained the following passage: '... On the other hand, our enemy threatens the existence of States which are too small or too weak or too near to defy them, and they continue to show the most complete and the most callous indifference not merely to their interests but to the ordinary dictates of common humanity ...' (*The Times*, February 1, 1940.) It will be noted that the words 'callous indifference' refer to Germany and not to the neutrals.

that this was only a 'technical' breach of neutrality.¹ On February 27 Mr. Churchill said that he was getting rather tired of thinking about the rights of neutrals.² On March 20 the English War Minister Stanley said that the English were willing and apt pupils of the doctrine that disregard of the rights of neutrals was advantageous.³ On March 30 Mr. Churchill said that it would not be just if the Western Powers held fast to legal agreements in a life and death struggle.⁴ On April 5 Lord De La Warr stated that neither Germany nor the neutrals could expect England to let her hands be tied by observing the letter of the law.⁵ On April 6, 1940, the English Minister of Labour stated that neither Germany nor the neutrals could count on the Western Powers keeping strictly within the provisions of international law.⁶ On April 10, 1940, Lord Halifax warned the neutrals not to leave it until too late before asking for help, because waiting was dangerous for them.⁷ M. Reynaud, on April 11, told the neutrals in a threatening tone that they had every reason to reconsider their situation now.⁸

¹ In a speech at Birmingham on February 24, Mr. Chamberlain described the *Altmark* incident as 'a mere technical breach of neutrality which takes no neutral life and touches no neutral property.' (*The Times*, February 26, 1940.)

² Mr. Churchill's speech in the House of Commons contained the following passage: 'Apparently, according to the present doctrine of neutral States, strongly endorsed by the German Government, Germany is to gain one set of advantages by breaking all the rules and committing foul outrages upon the seas, and then go and gain another set of advantages through insisting, whenever it suits her, upon the strictest interpretation of the International Code she has torn to pieces. It is not at all odd that His Majesty's Government are getting rather tired of it. I am getting rather tired of it myself.' (*Hansard*, February 27, 1940, col. 1923-9.)

³ Mr. Oliver Stanley, at a luncheon of the National Defence Public Interest Committee on March 20, 1940, after saying that he had read in the foreign Press criticisms of the Government for its timidity and lack of enterprise because it was sparing of the rights of neutrals, continued: 'That is a very dangerous lesson for neutrals to start teaching. It may be a lesson we may be only too willing to learn. We have learned that it is the person who ignores the rights of the neutrals who gets the advantage. We now learn that it is the person who ignores the rights of neutrals who also gets their admiration. It is a lesson which may find willing and apt pupils in this country.' (*The Times*, March 21, 1940.)

⁴ In a broadcast on March 30, Mr. Churchill, after expressing sympathy with Germany's neutral neighbours, continued: 'There could be no justice if in a life and death struggle the aggressor tramples down every sentiment of humanity, and those who resist him remain entangled in the tatters of violated legal conventions.' (*The Times*, April 1, 1940.)

⁵ Lord De La Warr, speaking at the Sorbonne on April 5, 1940, said: 'Neither Germany nor the neutrals must rely on our keeping one hand tied behind our backs by sticking to the letter of the law while they spurn, or allow to be spurned, not only its letter but its spirit.' (*The Times*, April 6, 1940.)

⁶ No speech by Mr. Ernest Brown on this date can be traced.

⁷ In a speech at a luncheon of the National Defence Public Interest Committee on April 10, 1940, Lord Halifax said: '... this kind of thing, I venture to think, is liable to happen if neutral States are not prepared to ask in time for the help that they often ask for when it is all too late to render it effectively.' (*The Times*, April 11, 1940.) See above, p. 66.

⁸ M. Reynaud, in an interview given to a representative of the *New York Times*, said: 'Le monde entier se rend compte que l'aggression allemande a été une agression contre les neutres plus que contre nous; et ceci doit conduire tous les neutres, et en particulier

Whereas up to that point the utterances of English and French statesmen represented either a veiled demand or a veiled threat to neutrals, Mr. Duff Cooper on April 12 let fall the mask completely and declared with brutal candour:

'Having made plain to them (the neutrals) that it is their own freedom and independence that are at stake, we must tell them frankly what we demand—what part each of them has got to play in the alliance that is to destroy the German menace. If one or the other of them shows signs of hesitation, we must so act as to ensure that such hesitation will be immediately overcome.'¹

England and France saw in the Finnish-Russian dispute the first welcome opportunity to achieve their object of extending the war. M. Daladier on March 12² and Mr. Chamberlain on March 19³ publicly declared that they were determined to intervene in the conflict with military forces, making use of the territory of the Northern States as a base of operations, but that they would make their action conditional on the assent of the Scandinavian States to the passage of their troops. These public declarations of the heads of the Governments of England and France were sheer untruths. The German Government is acquainted with the report of the Finnish Minister in Paris to his Government on March 12. In this report the Minister says that M. Daladier and Mr. Churchill had given him a definite assurance that immediately on the receipt of a Finnish appeal the English and French troops, who were standing by, would sail from their harbours to land in Norway. Norway and Sweden would simply be informed of the passage by a note, without the Governments of those two countries being asked for their permission. The diplomatic relations of England and France with the Soviet Union would be broken off immediately. As appears from the report, Mr. Churchill himself had flown to Paris on the evening

les États-Unis, à reconsidérer leur position. Je ne dois pas, à l'heure présente, insister pour démontrer que nous ne formons que leur première ligne de défense.' (*Le Temps*, April 13, 1940.)

¹ In an article in the *Daily Mail*, April 12, 1940. Herr von Ribbentrop, in his speech, translated the words 'alliance that is to destroy the German menace' by 'Bündnis . . . das der Vernichtung Deutschlands dient', and the official English translation issued by the German propaganda authorities says, 'the campaign to destroy Germany'.

² Speech in the *Chambre des Députés* on March 12, 1940, reported in *Le Temps* of March 14.

³ Mr. Chamberlain, in the House of Commons on March 19, 1940, said: 'No effective expedition could arrive in Finland except by passing through Norway and Sweden. Therefore, before such an expedition could be dispatched or before it could arrive in Finland it was necessary to obtain the assent of the Governments of those two countries.' (*Hansard*, March 19, 1940, coll. 1842.)

of March 11 in order to make a last-minute attempt to prevent the conclusion of a Russo-Finnish peace.

Further convincing proof of the extent to which England and France had at that time prepared for their intervention in the North is provided by a large number of documents which fell into the hands of the German troops when they entered Norway, and of which a small section are being made public to-day. The documents found at Narvik furnish a comprehensive insight into the activities of the English Secret Service in Norway, which had to carry out reconnaissance work and make preparations for the landing of the British and French expeditionary force and the occupation of Norway, along the whole Norwegian coast as well as in Oslo and other towns in the interior of Norway. It is clear from these documents that the English had, in an amazingly systematic way, secretly worked out every detail of the landing and march of their troops through the espionage organization of the Secret Service, although—and I shall return to this point later—the Norwegian Government of that time had already for a long time past been secretly in sympathy with the English.

The fact that the intentions of the British and French Governments in planning the sending of an expeditionary force went far beyond helping Finland against Russia is shown by a report of the French naval attaché in Oslo dated February 8, which states that all the inquiries which he had to make of the local Norwegian authorities with a view to the landing would be made under the pretext of transport to Finland in secret.

While these English preparations for the extension of the theatre of war against Germany in the North were carried out in secret, Mr. Churchill, in a number of incautious utterances which nevertheless came to the knowledge of the German Government, revealed their true objects and aims. Among the documents which are being published to-day there will thus also be found a report of the Norwegian Minister in London to his Government concerning a Press conference which Mr. Churchill held in London on February 2 with the Press attachés of neutral nations. In the report of this conference it was stated first of all that Mr. Churchill 'raged against Norway and Sweden', saying that Swedish ore should no longer be allowed to reach Germany, and then openly admitted that the main object was to bring the Scandinavian States into the war, and that the best way of achieving this would be that the Scandinavian States should fight on the side of Finland.

In connexion with this I must now, on the basis of the abundant

information which was already in the possession of the German Government at that time, and which has now been supplemented by equally important discoveries, make the following declaration:

1. It is perfectly clear from all the information and documents which have come to the knowledge of the German Government that the Swedish Government interpreted its declaration of neutrality in the most serious way, and at no time did or permitted anything which would have been in contradiction with it.

2. The German Government must maintain—and will proceed to prove it by publishing the documents—that the former Norwegian Government was ready not merely to tolerate such action tending towards the extension of the war, but, if necessary, to take an active part in it or support it. From all the documents, especially those recently found by our troops in Norway, it is clear beyond doubt that British espionage in Norway was not only carried out with the most far-reaching connivance of the local and central authorities, but that in addition, many Norwegian authorities, especially the Norwegian Navy, gave the most extensive assistance to this British activity.

Proof that the Norwegian Government had already been contemplating coming into the war, if necessary, on the side of England and France will also be found in the report of a Government conference held on March 2, in the presence of the then Norwegian Prime Minister Nygaardsvold.

On this occasion the Minister Koht declared in the most cynical way that if England proposed that Norway should give assistance against Russia—a demand which would really be for the extension of the war—Norway must say ‘no’ in such a way that she would be able easily to transform the ‘no’ into a ‘yes’. And Hr. Koht gave the characteristic reason that if Norway could not avoid being drawn into the conflict, the Norwegian Government should take steps in advance to ensure that Norway did not come into the war on the wrong side.

After the conclusion of peace in Finland had for the time being deprived the Western Powers of the wished-for opportunity of intervening in the North, they at once endeavoured to find new ways and means of achieving their object of extending the war. The continued efforts of England and France to stir up trouble in South-Eastern Europe, the constant endeavours of the English Secret Service to carry out sabotage in various parts of the Balkans,

the mobilization of Weygand's army, and so on, are part of the same policy.

In order to provide a moral basis for their intentions, the rulers of England and France, after the conclusion of the Russo-Finnish peace, which came so inopportunately for them, made increasingly obvious attempts to accuse Germany of alleged violation of Norwegian territorial waters. A characteristic example of the innumerable Press articles ordered for this purpose is the report of *Le Temps* of March 27—at a time when the preparations of the Western Powers for the occupation of Norway were already nearly complete—in which this journal speaks of what is alleged to be a systematic violation of territorial waters by Germany and maintains that the Allies therefore regard themselves as entitled for their part also to cease to respect the neutrality of these waters. A similar tendency is shown by a report of Havas of the same date in which it was said that passivity falsifies the true sense of neutrality and that the action of the Allies is confined to restoring the balance which has been disturbed.

How this action of restoring the balance was to be understood was made clear to the German Government by a conversation which took place a few days later, on March 30, between the Prime Minister Reynaud and a foreign diplomat in Paris. The purport of the unguarded statement made on this occasion by the French Premier was an assurance that danger in the West—and more particularly in the South—no longer existed, because in the next few days important and decisive events would be brought about by the Allies in the North of Europe.

As the result of these declarations it seemed prudent to the German Government to complete without delay the measures which they had already begun, and to ensure a heightened state of preparedness for all eventualities in such a way that action could be taken at any moment. Realization of the imminent danger was strengthened when the German Government, a few days before April 8, learned of the intention of the English and French Governments to declare on that date that the territoriality of Scandinavian waters no longer existed and consequently to begin definite action at once. The *Führer* thereupon gave orders for the German fleet to sail, so as to be able to intervene at once if the intentions of which the German Government had been informed were carried out.

The reason for the British mine-laying in Norwegian territorial waters, which was in fact announced to take place on April 8, was stated by the British Government on the preceding day to be that

it was intended to close Norwegian territorial waters to German commercial shipping. In reality, however, the mines which were to be laid before the Norwegian harbours were intended to protect the English expeditionary force, which was at this time already afloat on the North Sea. On April 8 the British troops which were to occupy Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik had already embarked and put to sea.

At this juncture, in the course of April 8, the British Admiralty learned of the presence of German naval forces in the North Sea. The Admiralty connected this with its intended landing, and immediately sent the transport ships back or endeavoured to do so, and apparently tried to make contact with the German fleet in order to engage it. It was, however, too late to get all the transport ships back to port, and some of these were caught and destroyed by German bombing aircraft. The German counter-action, which was carried out in the morning of April 9, was thus just in time to prevent the Anglo-French landing operation on the Norwegian coast and to frustrate it.

As the responsible statesmen of England and France now realized that their plans for the occupation of Scandinavia had failed, Messrs. Chamberlain, Churchill, Halifax, and Reynaud came before the public with their usual dramatic airs and brought the most serious accusations against the German action, with a categorical assurance that they themselves had never intended to do anything on Scandinavian territory except for the laying of mines. The actual words used by the English Premier in the House of Commons were as follows:

'It is asserted by the German Government that their invasion of Norway was a reprisal for the action of the Allies in Norwegian territorial waters. This statement will, of course, deceive no one. At no time did the Allies contemplate any occupation of Scandinavian territory so long as it was not attacked by Germany. Any allegations by Germany to the contrary are pure invention and have no foundation in fact.'¹

In the name of the German Government, but above all in the name of truth and justice, I will now, gentlemen, lay before you the documents which show that these assurances of the English and French rulers are nothing but lies and falsifications.

While you, gentlemen, have in the last few days learned from the

¹ See pp. 60-1. The two halves of the quotation, in inverted order, appear in two passages of Mr. Chamberlain's speech of April 9.

war communiqués of our enemies of the great and victorious battles of the Allies and their associates at Hamar and Elverum, there has in fact been fighting at these places. English troops were among those which took part. In this fighting the Germans have penetrated all the enemy positions and thrown back the opposing English and Norwegian formations in headlong flight.

In clashes with the English formations the German troops in the district of Lillehammer took prisoner the British brigade staff there as well as some of the 8th Battalion of the Sherwood Foresters of the 148th English Infantry Brigade. In the possession of the brigade staff and of prisoners who were brought in from successful fights to the north of Trondheim were found, among a quantity of other documents, the complete plan of operations for the English occupation of Norway. The various subsidiary orders to the brigade and to subordinate units were captured at the same time. These military orders, the first series of which is being made public to the world to-day, prove that the English landing in Norway had long been prepared in all its operational details, and that the order for landing for the first part of the expeditionary force was given on April 6 and 7. Among these orders are the operation orders of the 8th battalion of the Sherwood Foresters of April 7, which prove that this battalion was on that date already on board the English cruiser *Glasgow* and on the way to Norway, with the intention of landing at Stavanger. They also show that other troops in this formation had orders to seize the airport at Sola after landing. When it became known in the course of April 8 that the German fleet was at sea, this battalion was brought back and disembarked.

I do not intend, gentlemen, to explain the contents of these documents in detail now. They speak for themselves. They are supplemented by a large number of diaries of English officers and men, as well as by statements made in the meantime by British prisoners.

The German Government will, in a series of publications beginning now, produce documentary proof that:

1. England and France had long ago prepared for the occupation of Norway and that
2. The Norwegian Government was aware of this fact and that
3. Unlike Sweden, the Norwegian Government had acquiesced in this fact and was ready to enter the war on the side of England and France, as it in fact did, and that

4. Only the intervention of Germany, within a period of a few hours, frustrated the British attempt, and finally that
5. The subsequent declarations of the English and French rulers are lies.

21. EXTRACT FROM BROADCAST SPEECH BY THE RT. HON. SIR
SAMUEL HOARE, HOME SECRETARY, APRIL 27, 1940.¹

. . . We know this man.² He is a dangerous adventurer who has played a sinister part in public affairs. No honest man trusts his word. No impartial neutral believes what he says. I need, therefore, only say that it is a despicable lie to say that we have ever plotted against any neutral country and that it is sickening hypocrisy when this charge is made by the murderer of Czecho-Slovakia and Poland.

Let me leave this man to his lies and come to the crime that Hitler and he are committing in Norway. They have challenged us to fight this war on a new front. They have made Norway their battlefield. We take up the challenge, and there we must meet them with all the resources that we can develop, all the power that we can muster for the fight. Let no one have any illusions. The war has entered an intense and vital phase. The enemy will wage it without mercy. He will give us no quarter. For our part we will not imitate his dastardly conduct. We will not let helpless seamen drown. We will not bomb open towns. We will not attempt to defeat the Germans by terrorizing their women and children. All that we will leave to the enemy. But we will not leave him any monopoly of energy and skill and resolution. We must show those qualities to a degree far excelling the determination and ingenuity that he displays. Nor shall we pay the least attention to any threats that he may make.

We have now been given a duty that must be accomplished. Step by step the Allied forces must destroy the German grip upon the Norwegian seaports and air bases. But if the task before us is clearly marked that does not mean it is easy. It will not be accomplished in a day. It will not be accomplished without sacrifice. It will not be accomplished without steadfast and unshakable conviction. The Germans worked stealthily. They moved with treachery. They struck without warning. They stabbed in the back. They struck in defiance of God's law and man's law. And for that dark deed, there can be no forgiveness here or hereafter. The advantage that they won by a foul and cowardly blow, must now be redeemed by hard

¹ *The Times*, April 29, 1940.

² Herr von Ribbentrop.

fighting, by vigorous action, and by patient planning. And it will be redeemed. . . .

22. PROCLAMATION FROM THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT, APRIL 28, 1940.¹

The Norwegian Government has learned through the radio that the Government of the German Reich has proclaimed on April 26 that the German Reich is in a state of war with Norway.

The Norwegian Government has known of this state of war ever since the night of April 9 when the German Reich started an attack upon Norway without declaration of war; an attack that must have been prepared a good time beforehand since German forces were able to break into Norwegian territory at many points simultaneously from Oslo as far as Narvik.

Just as this attack was started in violation of all international law, without Norway having done the very least thing which could justify such an act of violence, so the German forces in Norway have since carried on the war without any regard to the general principles of international law. In particular, German bombers have harried defenceless villages and towns which were in no way armed and could not on any other grounds be considered as legitimate objectives of war.

The Government of the German Reich has issued denials that it allowed its forces to shoot at civilians who were not participating in the war. But the Norwegian Government has personally witnessed such acts of violence, so that it knows that such things cannot be denied.

The Norwegian Government has already learned by experience that even if the German Government now proclaims that it is at war with Norway, it will not for that reason wage war in accordance with the principles of international law. Norway must still expect that it will be exposed to what the Government of the Reich itself in its 'memorandum' of April 9² calls 'military operations which may be of the most terrible character'.

The Norwegian people has not allowed itself to be terrorized by bombing and other raiding. The Norwegian people regards its independence as so precious that it will rather endure war than submit to German tyranny.

The German Reich itself has placed itself in a state of war with

¹ *Ny Norsk Kvittbok*. Translation prepared for the Information Department.

² See above, p. 57.

Norway; Norway did not desire any war, and armed itself against no one.

But the Norwegian people meets the war with a firm determination to guard its independence, and it is the duty of the Norwegian Government to carry on the struggle on behalf of the nation.

The proclamation of a state of war makes no difference to Norway. The war goes on now as before. And it will last until the aggressors are thrown out of the country and Norway is once more free.

The Norwegian Government sends its thanks to the British, French, and Polish Governments who are helping Norway in this struggle. Together all these Governments are waging a fight against an aggressor who violates international law and wishes to cow the small nations.

The Norwegian Government trusts that the ideas of justice and liberty will conquer in the end. It knows that breaches of law and acts of violence can cause great damage to the country. But it knows with equal certainty that the Norwegian people will not on that account surrender the freedom which the Constitution of 1814 has founded in Norway.

The Norwegian Government is saying nothing new when it proclaims:

The struggle for independence goes on.

23. STATEMENT BY PROFESSOR KOHT, NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, APRIL 29, 1940.¹

The statement that the Norwegian Government knew in advance that England intended to place minefields in Norwegian territorial waters and that Norway approved, as alleged by Ribbentrop, is absolutely false. The British mine-laying action came as a complete surprise to the Norwegian Government, which immediately protested and demanded that the British should at once sweep up the mines.

After Professor Koht on the same day had read the protest to England in the Storting the Government decided that if the mines were not removed quickly by England the Norwegian fleet would be ordered to do so. This is a complete refutation of the false German statement which has been issued merely to try to justify the German invasion of Norway.

When Ribbentrop tries to make use of documents allegedly taken

¹ Issued through the Norwegian Telegraph Agency. *The Manchester Guardian*, April 30, 1940.

from the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and dated March 2¹ to support his charges this is the strangest case of falsification that can be imagined.

The decision reached by the Norwegian Government on March 2 was to refuse permission for British and French troops to pass through Norway to Finland. This decision was strict maintenance of Norwegian neutrality and a refusal to allow the Western Powers to use Norwegian territory as a battle-ground to carry on their war.

24. EXTRACTS FROM SPEECH BY THE RT. HON. NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, PRIME MINISTER, MAY 2, 1940.²

. . . The House will, of course, remember that some three months ago we had made preparations for the dispatch of an Allied force to the assistance of Finland. The possibility of reaching Finland was dependent upon the collaboration of the Governments of Norway and Sweden and, realizing that even their acquiescence in the passage of Allied troops might involve them in an invasion by Germany, we prepared other forces to go to their assistance in that contingency. It did not escape our attention that in such a case Trondheim and other Western ports of Norway as well as the aerodrome at Stavanger might well be the subject of attack by Germany, and accordingly further forces again were made ready to occupy these places. I should, however, make it clear that the instructions to the commanders of these forces provided that they were only to proceed to the occupation in one of two conditions: either that they were invited to do so by the Norwegian Government, or that Norwegian neutrality had already been violated.

The House is aware that permission to send troops to Finland through Norway and Sweden was refused; and, after a certain period, the greater part of the forces which had been accumulated were dispersed, since both they and the ships which were allocated for their transport were wanted elsewhere. About a month ago, however, it was decided that certain small forces should be kept in readiness to occupy Norwegian Western ports at short notice, in case of an act of aggression by Germany against South Norway. It will be noted again that any action contemplated by us on Norwegian soil was conditional upon prior violation of Norwegian neutrality by Germany.

It has been asked how it was that, in spite of these preparations,

¹ See above, p. 85.

² In the House of Commons. *Hansard*, May 2, 1940, coll. 908-15.

Germany was able to forestall us. The answer is simple. It was by long-planned, carefully elaborated treachery against an unsuspecting and almost unarmed people. We had been aware for many months that the Germans were accumulating transports and troops in Baltic ports, and that these troops were constantly being practised in embarkation and disembarkation. It was evident that some act of aggression was in contemplation, but these forces were equally available for attack upon Finland, Sweden, Norway, Holland, or this country, and it was impossible to tell beforehand where the blow would fall. If we had known that Denmark and Norway were to be the victims, we could not have prevented what happened, without the co-operation of those countries. But, in the belief that their neutrality would save them, they took no precautions, and they gave us no warning of an attack, which, indeed, they never suspected.

It will be remembered that in the early days of April, His Majesty's Government decided that they could no longer tolerate the continued use of Norwegian territorial waters as a long communication trench by which Germany could obtain constant supplies of iron ore and other contraband, and they had decided that on April 8 minefields would be laid at three points within Norwegian territorial waters, which would force this traffic out on to the high seas, where it could be intercepted. It is a curious chance that this date of April 8, decided upon by His Majesty's Government for this minor operation, should have coincided almost exactly with that chosen by the German Government for their long-prepared invasion of Norway.

The Norwegian campaign opened on Sunday, April 7, when we got information that a large German naval force was moving towards and along the West Coast of Norway. That evening the main Battle Fleet and the Second Cruiser Squadron sailed from Scapa and Rosyth in the hope of engaging the enemy. On Monday, April 8, the First Cruiser Squadron sailed to join in the operations. On the morning of April 9 German land forces entered Denmark, and, aided by internal treachery, prepared long beforehand, naval forces seized and landed troops at Oslo, Stavanger, Bergen, and Trondheim.

On the same day His Majesty's Ship *Renown*, which was accompanying the destroyers watching over the minefield near Narvik, engaged the German battle cruiser *Scharnhorst* off the Northern coast of Norway opposite Narvik in extremely bad weather conditions and low visibility, inflicting considerable damage, although full reports of this were not available until April 11. In the meantime, our destroyers had discovered a number of enemy vessels which had entered the Narvik Fjord under cover of a snowstorm, and on the

next day they fought the action in which their gallant commander, Captain Warburton-Lee, lost his life, and other losses were sustained, but in which heavy damage was inflicted on the German destroyers and the merchant vessels in the fjord.

In view of the obscurity of the situation in Central Norway and the importance of securing Narvik, our first military forces, which we had promptly assembled, sailed direct to the Narvik area, arriving there on April 15. In the meantime, the very successful naval attack on April 13 completely destroyed the enemy's naval forces at that port, and made it unnecessary to utilize for the capture of Narvik all the forces originally earmarked for that operation.

In deciding upon our further action, the objectives which we had in view were: first, to give all the support and assistance in our power to the Norwegians; second, to resist or delay the German advance from the South; and, third, to facilitate the rescue and protection of the Norwegian King and Government.

It was obvious that these objectives could be most speedily attained if it were possible to capture Trondheim, and, in spite of the hazardous nature of the operation, with the Germans in possession of the place and in occupation of the only really efficient aerodrome in South-West Norway at Stavanger, we resolved to make the effort.

Since any landing would probably be opposed, it was essential that the first contingents should go as light as possible, to secure bases to which the heavier equipment could subsequently be transported, and two landing places were selected, respectively North and South of Trondheim.

At Namsos, in the North, naval forces landed on April 14 and were followed by British troops on April 16-18. A few days later the French Chasseurs Alpains landed, and the arrival of these staunch and experienced troops was a welcome support to our men. Part of this force advanced rapidly to the neighbourhood of Stenkjer to support the Norwegians who were known to be holding that place. South of Trondheim, the naval party landed at Åndalsnes on April 17, followed by troops on April 18 and 19. These advanced to the important railway junction of Dombaas, and a contingent went on to the South and joined the Norwegians who were opposing at Lillehammer the main German advance from the South.

I cannot to-day give any details of the fighting which has taken place on both fronts since the landing took place. All that can be said at present is that our troops fought with gallantry and determination, and inflicted heavy losses upon the enemy. Nevertheless,

the Allied forces in these regions were faced, as we had realized that they would be faced, with serious difficulties. Foremost among these was the fact that the available aerodromes were already in enemy hands. The most effective defence against air attack—the use of fighter aircraft—was thus largely denied to us, and any hon. Members who have suffered the experience of being bombed from the air by low-flying aeroplanes will know how greatly the supply and movement of troops are hampered.

In the circumstances, it became evident to us some days ago that it would be impossible, owing to the German local air superiority, to land the artillery and tanks which would be necessary in order to enable our troops to withstand the enemy drive from the South. It must be remembered that, in spite of the magnificent work by British submarines and a French flotilla in the Skagerrak and the unceasing efforts of the Royal Air Force, particularly in bombing the aerodromes at Aalborg in Denmark, the starting point, and Oslo, the landing place, of German troop carriers, it has always been possible for the Germans, with their usual disregard of life, even of their own people, to send reinforcements to Norway at a much greater rate than would be open to us with the inadequate landing places that we have to rely on.

Accordingly, we decided last week that we must abandon any idea of taking Trondheim from the South, and that we must, therefore, withdraw our troops from that area and transfer them elsewhere. The operation of withdrawal in face of the enemy is one which has always been recognized as among the most delicate and difficult of military operations, and the action of Sir John Moore at Corunna, though accompanied by heavy loss of life, including the Commander, has taken its place among the classic examples of British military skill. In the present instance, we have been more fortunate. Thanks to the powerful forces which the Navy was able to bring to bear and the determination and skilful dispositions of General Paget, in command of the British land forces in the area, backed by the splendid courage and tenacity of the troops, we have now withdrawn the whole of our forces from Åndalsnes under the very noses of the German aeroplanes, without, as far as I am aware, losing a single man in this operation. I should like to express my profound admiration for the manner in which all ranks have performed their tasks in the area South of Trondheim. . . . Although in the face of the overwhelming difficulties of the situation, it has not been possible to effect the capture of the town, I am satisfied that the balance of advantage lies up to the present with the Allied Forces.

It may be useful if I examine this point in somewhat greater detail. I have no doubt that the Germans expected a walk-over in Norway, as in Denmark. That expectation has been frustrated by the courage of the Norwegian people and by the efforts of the Allies. After three weeks of war, in which heavy losses have been sustained by the enemy on the sea, on land, and in the air, Norway is not conquered, while the considerable supplies of ore which Germany was formerly obtaining from Narvik have been indefinitely suspended. During the period of just over three weeks the German naval losses amount to a serious figure. They include two capital ships damaged, certainly three, possibly four, cruisers sunk, eleven destroyers sunk, and five U-boats sunk. Thirty transports and store ships have been sunk, scuttled, or set on fire, with a loss of several thousands of lives. A further ten transport or store ships have been struck by our torpedoes and probably sunk.

The losses sustained by the Royal Navy in the same period are: four destroyers, three submarines, one sloop, and five trawlers sunk. Five other warships have been damaged by air attack, and one store ship has also been sunk by U-boat torpedo. It will be seen from these figures that, whereas the strength and efficiency of the Royal Navy have been little, if at all, affected, the injury to the German Navy has been so substantial as to alter the entire balance of naval power, and to permit an important redistribution of the main Allied fleets. In this connexion I might mention that it has been thought possible to revert to the more normal distribution of ships in the Mediterranean, which has for some time been affected by our requirements in the North Sea. A British and French battle fleet, with cruisers and ancillary craft, is already in the Eastern basin of the Mediterranean on its way to Alexandria.

Returning to the Norway campaign, the German losses in men, whether from the sinking of war vessels, from the destruction of transports or in the course of the fighting in Norway itself on land and in the air, cannot be estimated with any accuracy, but they must have amounted to many thousands. At this moment, I would say to any who may be drawing hasty conclusions from the fact that for the present we have not succeeded in taking Trondheim, 'It is far too soon to strike the Norwegian balance-sheet yet, for the campaign has merely concluded a single phase in which it is safe to say that if we have not achieved our objective, neither have the Germans achieved theirs, while their losses are far greater than ours.'

But I would take this opportunity of addressing a warning both to this House and to the country. We have no intention of allowing

Norway to become merely a side show, but neither are we going to be trapped into such a dispersal of our forces as would leave us dangerously weak at the vital centre. We know that our enemy hold a central position. They have immense forces always mounted ready for attack, and the attack can be launched with lightning rapidity in any one of many fields. We know that they are prepared, and would not scruple, to invade Holland, or Belgium, or both. Or it may be that their savage hordes will be hurled against their innocent neighbours in the South-East of Europe. They might well do more than one of these things in preparation for an attempt at a large-scale attack on the Western Front or even a lightning swoop on this country. It would be foolish indeed to reveal to the enemy our conception of the strategy best calculated to secure their defeat. But this can be said—for it is obvious—that we must not so disperse or tie up our forces as to weaken our freedom of action in vital emergencies which may at any moment arise. We must seize every chance, as we have done and shall continue to do in Norway, to inflict damage upon the enemy, but we must not allow ourselves to forget the long-term strategy which will win the war. . . .

25. BROADCAST BY PROFESSOR KOHT, NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, MAY 5, 1940.¹

Fellow-countrymen in all parts of Norway! I am speaking to you from London. I am here for a couple of days, sent by the Norwegian Government, and am to discuss how our country can best be helped in the fight against the aggressor who is now harrying the land and desires its subjugation. I shall leave here for Paris on the same mission. Then I shall come straight home and join once more in the struggle for liberty over there.

Before my journey here to the west, I had already seen all too much of the work of destruction in which the German forces are now engaged in Norway. I have seen German bombers cruising to and fro and up and down over the peaceful village of Trysil in the east, and sending down on houses and people a rain of incendiary and high explosive bombs and of machine-gun bullets. I have seen the same thing along Gudbrandsdalen. I have seen how planes have come back day after day to the beautiful town of Molde till the whole town at last was in red flames. I have seen trembling women and weeping children escaping into the woods or congregating in dark cellars in the hope of being able to shelter from the murderous

¹ *Ny Norsk Kvittbok*. Translation prepared for the Information Department.

weapons of the Germans. And I know of many, many other places where the same drama has been enacted. One day when I was sitting in the snow under one of the pine-trees in the Trysil woods, whilst bombs were hailing around us, I asked a couple of peasant boys, who were sitting under another tree, if they knew what these chaps who were flying over our heads and trying to shoot us dead were called in German. They looked at me first with a question in their eyes. But when I said, 'In German they are called heroes,' they answered shortly, 'Yes, we know that!' This is German heroism which is displayed in this fashion. What the Germans have not dared to do to the lands they were at war with—Great Britain and France—they do boldly and courageously to poor defenceless Norway who only wanted to be neutral. All that part of our country which they did not succeed in subduing at the outset, and which still resists their aggression, is harried with a merciless savagery which otherwise we have only heard of in old barbarous times of Huns and Vandals. They burn towns and villages, and lay waste the country wherever they come. Now at last they have got an enemy whom they think they can discipline by terrorism and frighten into subjection—this Germanic, Nordic people which has been unwilling to accept Nazi doctrine.

A man who has himself had to take part in the decision which made Germany our enemy experiences the keenest distress in realizing how much the country and people must suffer from these hideous acts of violence. And of course he must continually ask himself if the country could have been spared all this. I remember during one of the days before the invasion that one of the Norwegian Ministers abroad said with a bitter smile that if Norway should now be forced to choose between the belligerent Great Powers, it was perhaps best to take sides with Germany; for, said he, England and France would be more merciful enemies. He knew Germany, and he knew that the Germans would at least be merciless enemies.

But what in any case was bound to be clear to all was that the choice at last no longer lay between war and neutrality, but as to which of the parties we should side with. For seven months the Government had managed to keep Norway neutral. Time after time our neutrality had been violated by one or other of the parties, and many difficult questions of international law had arisen. The Government always endeavoured to resolve each individual question in the way which was in best accordance with the spirit and letter of treaties and rules of law. Both sides in the war repeatedly complained that we maintained a too strict neutrality. And that was

precisely the best possible evidence that our policy of neutrality was completely impartial: that its aim was really to keep Norway out of the war.

Germany wished to compel us by force and violence to come into the war on her side. She came with demands to us which would make us a German instrument in her war with the Western Powers. Indeed, she began to invade our country *before* she had presented any of her demands. For she intended to have Norway in her power to use in the conduct of the war.

It is stated in the memorandum which the German Minister in Oslo gave me on the morning of April 9¹—five or six hours after the German Navy had broken into Norwegian territory from Oslo in the south to Narvik in the north—that the German Government only wanted to keep the peace for Norway and not to use the country in her war against England and France unless these two countries compelled her. But no one who reads the long series of demands which were at this time presented to the Norwegian Government² can doubt that by accepting them Norway would have been involved in the war against the Western Powers. If all the thirteen points are taken one by one, it can be seen how each one by itself led us straight into the war. Even the first of all—that German forces should be allowed without resistance to occupy all important points in the country and get control of all military defences, particularly the coastal forts—showed clearly and distinctly that Norway would thus become a cog in the great German war-machine. Next, the German army was to be given control of Norwegian railways and steamboats, post, telegraph, and telephone. Next, all communications with countries west of the ocean were to be cut off: neither ships nor planes, post or telegrams or telephone messages were to go to any country to the west, whether neutral or belligerent. Communication should only be maintained with Germany and the Baltic States. Can anything more unneutral than all this be imagined? Can any one doubt that England and France would count us as enemies if we accepted anything of the kind? No, this was a step in the war against the Western Powers and nothing else.

In the justification for these demands, in the memorandum which introduced them, it is stated that the Western Powers 'hypocritically set themselves up as defenders of small countries. In reality, however, they do them violence.' But it would be hard to find any document more hypocritical than this German memorandum. Just consider the first sentence where it is said that Germany during

¹ See above, p. 57.

² See above, p. 49.

the whole period of the war has striven to protect neutral rights, and then remember how the Germans have sunk peaceful Norwegian ships on their lawful occasions and killed hundreds of Norwegian seamen. Can any Norwegian let himself be fooled by such assertions?

And then this document ends by stating that Germany will not, either now or in the future, make any breach in the integrity or independence of Norway. But the whole of the thirteen points in the list of demands would make Norway a protectorate under Germany for the whole duration of the war. And who will believe that the German Government would restore us our freedom when the war was over? All who remember what has happened to Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, after all the fair promises they have received from Germany, must refuse to believe fresh German promises of the same description. This moral defeat is perhaps the worst that Germany has suffered in recent years, that no one in the world dares any longer put faith in the words of the new Government in that country. It has conducted a policy paved with fraud and broken pledges. This is something we all must regret, as well as all the rest of the moral deterioration in German politics and culture.

Norway *could* not take the risk of submitting to a control of this kind. It might be the extinction of our independence for ever. We know too well what German control means with the policy which now rules in Germany, to think of allowing Norway to fall under such control. It would be the end of all the liberty, all the fine social life, which we have worked up to in our country, and which brings us prosperity and happiness in our country. We say now as our fathers said in 1814: 'No Norwegian shall be a slave!'

To punish this our spirit of independence, the Germans are now striving to carry to a conclusion the invasion which they started on the night of April 9. They say now, after the event, that they acted as they did because England had laid mines in Norwegian waters the morning before. But it is perfectly clear that they had planned this invasion long beforehand. How else would it be possible that German warships, only fifteen to eighteen hours later, should be on the spot fully prepared to enter our ports, even so far north as Narvik, inside the English minefield? And how else could the Germans who sailed to Trondheim have had with them appeals, already printed, to the Norwegians to submit to the new German Government? No, the attack on Norway was thought out and prepared. Germany *intended* to have Norway in her hands. Hypocritical speeches cannot hide this fact.

The German attack on Norway will fall into the category of the

most dastardly actions known to history. And the way in which the Germans are waging war in Norway will equally come to be mentioned among the most brutal which history knows. Yet this Government dares to issue warnings to the Norwegian people that they really must not break the international rules of warfare in their resistance to this brutality, and it has announced that in Norway all peaceful citizens can be safe. It is disgraceful to proclaim such lying assertions. But the worst of course is that a civilized people such as the German nation should be can permit itself to wage war with such contempt for justice and human life.

I cannot imagine that the Norwegian people will allow itself to be cowed by the horrors which German violence is thus introducing to our country. Rather must they excite a will to resistance which will eventually sweep the perpetrators from the country.

Our army and navy were not so prepared as could have been wished for so sudden an attack; for this every one may share the responsibility. But both the navy and the army nevertheless put up a resistance which deserves all honour. In particular, the fleet and the coastal forts outside Oslo destroyed more German ships than could have been expected of such small war-craft against the great Germans. And in the eastern provinces the lads of our army under their new general, Otto Ruge, carried on a manful struggle against odds. Unfortunately there was a shortage both of guns and anti-aircraft defences, and yet it cost the Germans longer time to conquer the Eastern Province than they needed to subjugate the whole of Poland. The Norwegians still control a great part of the country and are loyal to their King and their legal national Government.

We are getting help in our struggle from Great Britain and France, and the Polish Government is also sending 4,000 men. It is clear that it takes time to make all this help fully effective; Norway herself needs so many things before arms and man-power from the Western Powers can come to full use. But I would beg people at home not to be impatient if they think things are moving slowly. Remember: it is not only an interest, it has become a question of honour for the Governments of the Western Powers to free Norway from German clutches. And I am sure they will exert all their energies to do it. This they have solemnly bound themselves to do, and this they *will do*.

Then we on our side must not abandon the struggle. It would be a self-sacrifice which would cost us our liberty for a long, long time. And a Norwegian nation which is not free—can we imagine it? No. Those who have hurled themselves upon us with no fault on our

side, those we *must* cast out. It is a duty to ourselves, it is even more a duty to our children, it is most of all a duty towards the land we love, and wish to survive free and independent through the ages.

Norway has been conquered: yes. But Norway and the Norwegians stand to-day, in spite of the misfortune which has struck us, with unspotted shield and a clear conscience.

Norway did not want to be drawn into the war. Norway wished to be neutral, strictly neutral to both sides. But in spite of this absolute neutrality of ours we were invaded. And the invasion was started in the fashion of thieves and robbers: it was started in the obscurity and darkness of the night.

And as the invasion was, so has the war been. Elverum, Nybergsund, Kristiansund, Molde, Bodø, and hundreds of other Norwegian place-names will for ever remain as monuments of disgrace in the future history of Germany.

The Government has sought to work in conformity with the authority of the Storting. Both in Gudbrandsdalen and especially in Romsdalen we tried to achieve arrangements which might settle and ease the existing situation. I may mention, for instance, that in Romsdalen we reorganized the Bank of Norway and took pains to bring its resources into safety—a fact which the Germans no doubt have noticed. At the same time we established an arrangement which made it possible to continue the activities of our merchant fleet without hindrance from the German invader.

By reason of the Allied withdrawal from Åndalsnes and Molde the Government found that it must try to maintain the defence of Northern Norway. Military and administrative activity was therefore organized in Tromsø.

I will not speak of the military administration. On the other hand I should like to say a few words on the civil administration. We tried, and I think we succeeded, to reorganize the whole civil administration for the non-occupied part of Northern Norway. Accident and sickness insurance were settled and extended to include those liable to military service, soldiers and civil air defence. The Norwegian Fire Fund, the Mortgage Bank, the small-holders' and housing banks, the Fishery Bank with loan funds for fishermen and small-holders were organized. Questions of local administration, banks, schools, agriculture, fisheries, and industry were treated and solved. The supply of Northern Norway with necessities was one of the biggest problems, and I venture to say that in this sphere we succeeded in solving the problem, so that Northern Norway

has seldom been so well supplied as when the Government had to conclude its labours there.

How far these supplies are now available, and if they will be renewed in course of time, I cannot venture to say.

I think these few and concise observations will show that the Government, in spite of all difficulties, was a working Government, a Government which, with the Storting's authority before its eyes, sought to assuage and prevent need and want, and to order and reconstruct what the war situation had overturned.

We found, however, as I have already said, that we must lay down our arms, and thus the whole of Norway was in the hands of the enemy. Therefore the question presented itself: shall the King, the Crown Prince, and the Government remain in the country and thereby become prisoners of the Germans, or shall we follow the instructions given by the Storting on April 9? After long and serious consideration we chose to follow this instruction and temporarily remove the lawful Government authority to an allied country.

From the enemy's side it is said that we thereby failed in our duty as a Government. No, we did not, we did the opposite, we did what it was our duty to do. We can now work for Norway's cause in a free country. We are now free to tell the aggressors the unvarnished truth about their behaviour and their lying propaganda both during and after the hostilities. And I beg you Norwegian women and men to rest assured that in one way or another our voice will be heard, and our watch over the interests of Norway be known to you also. It is a sad time for all of us who love our fatherland, and have intended to make it richer and happier by their work, but I beg you—do not lose courage! I am convinced that justice will one day triumph over violence and injustice. We may pass away, but Norway will never lack sons and daughters who keep the thought and ideal of liberty living in our country. Our programme hereafter shall consist of merely four words—Norway for the Norwegians!

26. APPEAL OF H.M. THE KING OF NORWAY AND HR. NYGAARDS-VOLD, PRIME MINISTER, TO THE NORWEGIAN PEOPLE, MAY 7, 1940.¹

During the war which is in progress between Germany and the Allies Norway has kept herself strictly neutral towards both sides for the whole time.

¹ *Ny Norsk Kvittbok*. Translation prepared for the Information Department.

We intended to stand in friendly relations with all foreign Powers. With no sort of provocation from our side and without a declaration of war or warning of any kind, Germany nevertheless attacked our most important ports and bombed our forts and aerodromes on the night of April 9. Important military districts, depots, magazines, and stores of supplies fell into the hands of the aggressors as an easy prey. The mobilization of our land forces was made impossible so far as many of our detachments were concerned.

It is perhaps not to be wondered that some people found the situation hopeless. The King, the Storting, and the Government were, however, conscious of their responsibilities, since it was resolved unanimously not to accept the conditions dictated by the aggressors.

Just as Germany's aggression was started in a criminal and brutal manner, so their methods of warfare have been cruel and barbaric during the four weeks which now have passed. Open towns, defenceless villages, fishermen in their small smacks, and hospital ships with large, easily visible Red Cross markings have been bombed and fired on with machine-guns. It is not war, it is murder and arson which the Germans are practising in Norway.

In spite of the heroic struggle of our fleet and the brave resistance which has been given by our own troops and those of our Allies, the superiority in force has been too overwhelming.

After our Allies had found it necessary to withdraw their troops from Åndalsnes and Namsos and place them in other spots, the whole of Southern Norway is now, practically speaking, in the hands of the enemy. But the situation is not hopeless. It is the numerical and technical superiority of the enemy both in the field and particularly in the air which has driven us back.

We have reason to believe that these conditions will now soon be changed. In Northern Norway we are still standing strongly, and from this place we shall succeed, with the help which is contemplated, in recovering the rest of the country. Under approximately equal conditions our soldiers are fully as good as the Germans and more so. The German losses both by sea and on land have hitherto been many times as great as our own. Neither the inhuman warfare waged by the Germans against the civilian population through bombing raids nor their incendiarism has had the expected result. The *morale* of the nation is unshaken. Every burnt house, every assassination of defenceless civilians, strengthens the fixed resolution of the people to cast the aggressors out of the country.

We do not doubt that the people in the occupied territories will behave with the dignity which circumstances demand. The King

and the Government are firmly determined to hold out until the land is free.

We address an urgent appeal to the Norwegian people to stand with us in the fight for liberty. Even if the burdens are heavy and sorrow and loss strike our homes, do not lose courage. The issue of the struggle is the future of Norway.

Norway for the Norwegians!

HAAKON R.

JOHAN NYGAARDSVOLD.

27. EXTRACTS FROM SPEECH BY THE RT. HON. NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, PRIME MINISTER, MAY 7, 1940.¹

When I spoke on Thursday last, I . . . intimated that I was obliged to impose a certain reticence upon myself, in order to avoid saying anything which might involve risk to our troops. Since then, no doubt, hon. Members have realized that, while at that time it was known that our forces had been withdrawn from Åndalsnes, we still had to withdraw troops from Namsos, and I was extremely anxious not to give any hint of an operation that was bound to be even more dangerous than the withdrawal from Åndalsnes, both on account of the larger number of men to be taken off and of the fact that it would be possible for the Germans to bring there the whole available force of their bombers. Now, I am able once again to pay my tribute to the very remarkable skill of our naval and military forces, who managed to effect this withdrawal, in the course of one single short night, without suffering any loss in the operation. The danger which they were running is illustrated by the fact that early on the following morning the Germans discovered that the troops were returning in their ships, and they sent a force of some fifty bombers to attack them. Considering that this convoy was outside the range of our fighters and that it had to depend, therefore, solely upon the anti-aircraft fire of the ships, I think we may count ourselves fortunate that we did not lose more than one British and one French destroyer—His Majesty's Ship *Afridi* and the French ship *Bison*. By this time the men from Namsos and those from Åndalsnes are back again, and the campaign in Southern Norway is at an end.

Whatever criticisms may be made about any one else, I am sure everybody will agree that the troops who have been engaged in this campaign carried out their task with magnificent gallantry and in a way which has added still further to the great traditions of the

¹ In the House of Commons. *Hansard*, May 7, 1940, coll. 1075-83.

Service. Whether in hard fighting, or in stolid endurance, or in quick and skilful movements, exposed as they were to superior forces with superior equipment, they distinguished themselves in every respect, and man for man they showed themselves superior to their foes. I should add that we have also watched with pride and with admiration the splendid gallantry and dash of the men of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, both of whom have had continuous difficult and dangerous tasks to perform, and both of whom have performed great achievements.

I do not propose this afternoon to give an account of the military operations in Southern Norway, but what I rather want to do is to present to the House a picture of the situation, and also to consider certain criticisms of the actions of the Government that have been made. No doubt the news of our withdrawal from Southern Norway created a profound shock, both in this House and in the country. . . . There were reports emanating from Stockholm—maybe invented by the enemy—which roused expectations which were never justified, and which were certainly never endorsed by any Ministers. . . . We did our best to damp down these unfounded reports. Of course, we had to be careful not to say anything which would inform the enemy of the true situation, and I am afraid that in the circumstances the shock and the disappointment were inevitable. I will try and examine the history and the causes of this failure, and I will try to answer some questions. I do not wish to extenuate anything, but at the same time I hope we shall not exaggerate the extent or the importance of the check which we have received. The withdrawal from Southern Norway is not comparable with the withdrawal from Gallipoli. There were no large forces involved. The fact was, it was not much more than a single division, and our losses, therefore, were not really great in number, nor was there any considerable or valuable amount of stores left behind. It must be remembered, as I have already pointed out, that if we had losses, the Germans had far heavier losses in warships, in planes, in transports and in men.

Still, I am quite aware that the result of these recent events is not to be measured merely in losses on the spot. We have to take account of the fact that we have suffered a certain loss of prestige, that a certain colour has been given to the false legend of German invincibility on land, that some discouragement has been caused to our friends, and that our enemies are crowing. We must accept that position for the moment, though we need not help our enemies by making it worse. As to the reaction upon foreign countries, I think

it might well have been more serious. Throughout the whole of this difficult period France has shown remarkable steadiness, and, as in this country, the only effect of the reverse has been to stiffen her determination. Turkey, our Ally, remains unperturbed. Egypt continues to strengthen her defences. In the Near and Middle East the position has been quietened by a reversion to normal of our fleet disposition in the Mediterranean. As you would expect, the reaction has been more serious in Sweden than anywhere else, and I fully appreciate the reasons why. I regret certain comments of a polemical character which have appeared in the Swedish Press, because although the expression of Swedish disappointment may be very natural, it does not help Sweden, nor the Allied cause. What we are concerned with is not recriminations, which could equally well be made by either side, but rather the measures to be taken in the future, and in Sweden, if the Swedish Government and people decide for a policy of neutrality in the face of pressure, I trust that at least that neutrality will be strictly impartial as between the belligerents.

Now I come to the sequence of events and the successive decisions of the Government. I have said already that the first force which was assembled after the German invasion of Norway was dispatched to Narvik. I have not heard any criticism of our decision to send a force to Narvik, the gateway into the North Sea from the precious ore-fields of Sweden, and I assume that our decision in that respect at any rate was generally approved. But it perhaps may be asked, Why did we attempt an expedition to Trondheim when we must have known from the beginning that we should be faced with a local air superiority and that there was a strong probability that reinforcements would be sent up from the valleys which lead up from the direction of Oslo? I am not going to pretend that in those first anxious days we foresaw everything that was going to happen. I doubt if there is any one, even in this House, clever enough to have done that, but we did realize that the expedition, if we undertook it, would be full of risks. We did realize that it would be difficult to take Trondheim and difficult to hold it unless we were able to check those reinforcements, and I may add that the aerodrome facilities at Trondheim were known to us to be inadequate to allow our aeroplanes to operate from it without extensive repair and extension.

On the other hand, we had to consider the effect on the Norwegian Government, the Norwegian forces, and the Norwegian people if we made no attempt to hold Central Norway. We received the most

urgent and repeated appeals from the Norwegian Commander-in-Chief to attack Trondheim at all costs, as a place essential to the Government for a port and as a seat for the Government and the King. It really was made clear to us that unless we were ready to assist in the only way which the Norwegians themselves felt to be effective, namely, by an attack on Trondheim, the Norwegians were not likely to feel able to continue their resistance, and the whole country would have fallen at once into German hands. In those circumstances we felt unanimously that, hazardous as this expedition might be, in the absence of aerodromes from which we could operate, and in view of the inadequate landing places which were all that were open to us, we must run that risk; we must do our best to give help to a brave people who, with extraordinary courage, in spite of their tiny numbers, in spite of the fact that they had almost forgotten what war meant, whose thoughts had been only of peace, yet had had the stamina to stand up to the German bully and to make an effort to save the freedom and independence of their country. Is there anybody here who would have done otherwise? I do not believe it, and I feel, myself, that if we had refused to answer the call that was being made to us from Norway, we should have justified the reproach that our only object in Scandinavia was the iron ore in Sweden and that we cared nothing for the freedom of small nations.

Now I come to the next point. Ought we to have made a direct attack upon Trondheim instead of confining ourselves to the attacks made from the landing places at Namsos and Åndalsnes? This is a point upon which experts may and will differ, and there will be opinion which deserves respect, and will command respect, no doubt, on both sides of the case. Since in fact the operation was not tried, it will never be possible to decide the question finally and once for all, and all I can say now is that that idea was constantly before us, that plans for a direct assault on Trondheim, combined with the operations of the forces at Namsos and Åndalsnes, were prepared and were carefully considered. Operations of this kind are necessarily complicated in character and must need a considerable time for thorough preparation if success is to be assured. Moreover, for a time it did seem as if the capture of Trondheim might be effected by the forces alone that had been landed elsewhere. We always supposed that German reinforcements would be delayed by the blowing-up of railway bridges, by the obstruction of the roads which led up these two valleys from Oslo. In that, we were disappointed. No demolitions in time to delay the Germans, except a couple of

bridges blown up by a British party, were made. The rapid advance of the Germans, accompanied by tanks, artillery and mortars, first held up our troops and then forced them to retire.

Now I come to a criticism which has had a considerable circulation and has appeared in many organs of the Press. It has been suggested that the Anglo-Finnish force, if I may so call it—the force which was designed for the assistance of Finland—should never have been dispersed and that if it had been kept in being, either we might have forestalled the German seizure of the Norwegian ports, or, if we could not do that, at least we might have been able to send larger forces more quickly to the scene of operations. Let me point out to the House, first of all, that whatever forces we had had at our disposal we could not have forestalled the Germans unless the Norwegians had either invited us or at least allowed us to come in, for I do not suppose that any one would suggest that we should have invaded Norway before Germany did so. Unfortunately, in their determination to preserve the strictest neutrality, the last thing the Norwegians would do was to allow us to enter those ports unopposed, and consequently we were helpless to prevent the German stroke, which was made easy by treachery from inside Norway and which had been prepared long beforehand by the concealment of troops and materials in apparently innocent-looking ships.

If the argument is that by dispersing the Anglo-Finnish force we missed an opportunity of successfully attacking after the Germans had delivered their blow, why, then, I say that that argument is founded on a complete misconception. Let me explain. These are the facts. The forces prepared for the Anglo-Finnish expedition consisted of two parts. One part was advance troops, who were to be sent first to Finland; the other part was a larger body, who would have followed after the first had reached Scandinavia. This second contingent was the main body of the force. When the Finnish campaign was given up, it was decided that there was no need to keep this larger force in this country, and accordingly it was dispatched to France, where it had originally been intended to go, but the advance troops were retained here. The House must understand this, that the rate of dispatch of troops to Norway was not governed by the availability of troops in this country, it was governed by the speed with which they could be landed at those very few and inadequate ports of entry which alone were open to us to use. Therefore, hon. Members will see that under this arrangement there would have been no delay in following up the first troops with the main

body from France if we could have established the first troops in Norway. The fact that the main body was in France would not have involved any delay whatsoever, provided that that establishment could have taken place. Therefore, I say that no time was lost by the dispersal of that part—the only part—of the Anglo-Finnish forces which in any case would not have gone with the first contingent, and which, if the first contingent could have established itself, would have been able to follow it in just as quick time although it came from France.

There is just another consideration. It is as well not to forget that for the transport of the Anglo-Finnish forces a substantial amount of shipping was required, and for a considerable time that shipping was kept standing idle until it should be required. The Germans, of course, who cannot use their ships on the high seas, can afford to keep them standing by until they think that the favourable moment has arrived for another assault on an innocent neutral. We are in a different position. We can usefully use every ton of shipping space for carrying foodstuffs, raw materials, munitions or equipment to this country, and it would be quite unjustifiable to keep a whole fleet waiting indefinitely on the chance that they might be wanted for an expedition to Scandinavia. Nevertheless, I stress again to the House that we did keep ready certain forces to occupy certain Norwegian ports if their neutrality had been previously violated by Germany. We had reason to believe that a relatively small force would have been sufficient to occupy and hold these places until further forces could be landed, but after the forestalment they were insufficient to restore the position, although they were available for, and embodied in, the forces which were landed at Namsos and Åndalsnes.

Lastly, there is the question: Was it right when we had decided that our operations could not capture Trondheim to withdraw our forces, or should we have reinforced those forces which we had already in Norway with a view to making a further attempt? I believe it was right to make the first attempt and equally right to withdraw our troops when it was clear that the plan would not succeed. The failure of the plan was due to two factors. First of all, our inability to secure aerodromes from which to operate our fast fighters; secondly, the rapid arrival of German reinforcements. We always believed that if our troops could get ashore, they would not suffer heavy casualties from the air, and, in fact, that proved to be the case. But the absence of fighters enabled the enemy to attack our communications and hindered our reinforcements, while

his own land communications enabled him to bring up an ever-increasing superiority of strength. It became clear to us that we could only maintain our forces in the Trondheim region by such a concentration of men and materials and aircraft as would have drawn off altogether an undue proportion of our total resources, and in these circumstances we decided that we could carry on the campaign in Norway, elsewhere, with greater vigour and effect. So, thanks to the skill and courage of all three Services, we successfully withdrew all our forces from the Trondheim area.

I have dealt with the criticisms that I have seen, and I will leave my right hon. Friends to fill in the details and answer any questions which may arise on technical matters, including the composition and equipment of our forces. There are, however, some general observations which I desire to offer to the House and which I want to impress upon hon. Members of all parties, because I do not think any sound judgement can be arrived at on the question we are discussing if these considerations are overlooked. First of all, I want to ask hon. Members not to form any hasty opinions on the result of the Norwegian campaign so far as it has gone. It is quite obvious that the Germans have made certain gains and equally clear that they have paid a heavy price for them. It is too early to say on which side the balance will finally incline, but I may remind the House that the campaign is not yet finished. A large part of Norway is not in German hands. The King and the Government are still on Norwegian soil, and they will rally round them the remainder of the Norwegian forces to carry on the fight against the invader, in which we shall be at their side. The Norwegian Foreign Minister, in a broadcast, has told his people to be patient. That is wise advice. Although we shall give all help to Norway that we can, and as soon as we can, we must not forget that there are other fronts which may at any moment blaze up into a conflagration. . . .

28. EXTRACTS FROM SPEECH BY THE RT. HON. WINSTON CHURCHILL,
FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY, MAY 8, 1940.¹

The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Hillsborough (Mr. Alexander) has placed the House under some obligation, because he has devoted the greater part of his speech to the topic which was set out as being the staple of our discussion during these two days of Debate—I mean, the Norwegian campaign. . . . The right hon. Gentleman's speech dealt with the Norwegian campaign; that is the

¹ In the House of Commons. *Hansard*, May 8, coll. 1350-64.

first part of the Debate this evening, and it is the part of the Debate to which I intend to devote myself in the first instance. But at about five o'clock quite a new issue was sprung upon the House. We were invited to consider all the faults which the Government have committed in the last three, four or five years, and to consider the question of a vote of confidence, a Vote of Censure, which is to be taken quite unexpectedly, with only this little notice, upon the Adjournment to-night. That is the second part of the Debate, and I will deal with that when I come to it.

I would like to say a few things about the subject of the Norwegian campaign and also about the general war. In this war we are frequently asked, 'Why do you not take the initiative, why do you repeatedly wait and wonder where the enemy is going to strike you next?' Obviously, he has many chances open. We always seem to be waiting, and when we are struck, then we take some action. 'Why,' it is asked, 'is the next blow not going to be struck by Britain?' The reason for this serious disadvantage of our not having the initiative is one which cannot speedily be removed, and it is our failure in the last five years to maintain or regain air parity in numbers with Germany. That is an old story, and it is a long story. . . . The fact of our numerical deficiency in the air, in spite of our superiority in quality, both in men and material—which is, I believe, established—has condemned us and will condemn us for some time to come, to a great deal of difficulty and suffering and danger, which we must endure with firmness, until more favourable conditions can be established, as assuredly they will be established. . .

For instance, the right hon. Gentleman asked me a number of questions about the Skagerrak and why we had not cut the communications there. Our present naval preponderance, it is said, ought to make it feasible for us to dominate the Skagerrak with our surface ships and thus cut the communications with Oslo from the first moment and continuously. But the immense enemy air strength which can be brought to bear upon our patrolling craft has made this method far too costly to be adopted. It could only be enforced by maintaining a standing surface patrol and a patrol, mark you, not of destroyers, because it is close to the enemy air bases and it is also close to their cruisers and their battle cruisers of which they still retain two. Consequently, very important forces would have to be employed, in order to maintain a steady surface patrol, and the losses which would be inflicted upon that patrol from the air would, undoubtedly, very soon constitute a naval disaster. We have to face a fact like that.

Then, it is said, 'Instead of maintaining a regular patrol, you might have had a raid.' Here again, air strength, in this period when the nights are already shortening, impedes the approaching forces and either the transports are removed from the area and sent back to the ports, or adequate forces are provided by the enemy to deal with the approaching raid. I am sorry, indeed, that things should be so, but it would be very foolish in these days, when we are repeatedly asked, in almost every speech, to face facts, if they were ignored. We, therefore, adopted the submarine blockade as the only method at our disposal, and in doing this, I followed the opinion of our naval authorities, who are responsible for handling the fleets not only from the Admiralty but on the ships at sea.

Here let me say a word about responsible opinion. There is a great deal of difference between being responsible for giving an order, on which the loss of several valuable ships might swiftly follow, and merely expressing an opinion, however well-informed, however sincere, however courageous, without such responsibility. I have to be guided in the advice which I offer to the Cabinet, by responsible expert naval opinion. . . . Therefore we limited our operations in the Skagerrak to the submarines. In order to make this work as effective as possible, the usual restrictions which we have imposed on the actions of our submarines were relaxed. As I told the House, all German ships by day and all ships by night were to be sunk as opportunity served. This statement was most falsely and grotesquely twisted and travestied into a sort of promise that all German ships would be sunk. . . . No one could ever have given so absurd a promise as that. I said the toll would be heavy, and heavy indeed it has been. There has been a ghastly success: 7,000 or 8,000 men have been drowned, and thousands of corpses have been washed up on the rocks at the entrance of Oslo. At the foot of the lighthouse, the most frightful scenes have been witnessed. But what does the loss of 7,000 or 8,000 men matter to a totalitarian State? What do they matter to a Government such as that which we are fighting? They are not announced, no criticism is allowed, no murmur is allowed, and no news. If there is a cry or a whimper, it is probably dealt with by a brutal blow. Therefore that heavy loss does not operate in the moral or psychological sphere at all at the present time. . . .

Then we were asked why we did not go into Bergen, Trondheim and other ports in the first few hours. My right hon. Friend the Member for Sparkbrook (Mr. Amery) said we had been rather led astray or decoyed away by the two German heavy battle-cruisers which came out to sea, and that they were a fake and a lure. They

may have been a fake and a lure, but they were certainly a reality. If we had tried to send transports carrying troops across waters where they, although unlocated, were known to be lurking, they might have cut the whole squadron of transports to rags. It would have been a very tragic incident, and we were happily spared from it. The only object of going into these fjords, unless you had troops to land and fight the Germans who had just arrived, would have been to destroy such enemy cruisers and destroyers as were there. These were largely destroyed from the air by the Fleet Air Arm. . . .

I now come to the much more important question of Trondheim. There is no dispute that it was our duty to do our best to help the Norwegians and that the capture and defence of Trondheim was the best way to do it. My eye has always been fixed on Narvik; there, it seemed to me, is a port which may lead to some decisive achievement in the war. But when the German outrage occurred, there is no dispute that we were bound to go to the aid of the Norwegians and that Trondheim was the place. A plan was prepared by the joint staffs for two diversionary landings at Namsos and Åndalsnes and for a direct landing in Trondheim Fjord of a force superior to that of the enemy which had seized that port. This was undoubtedly a hazardous operation. The forts at the entrance presented no serious difficulty, and the guns were not of a very formidable character; but the fact that a very large number of valuable ships would have to be continuously exposed for many hours to close bombing meant that grievous losses might be sustained. And although perhaps only one in two or three hundred bombs hit—we have had scores of ships under hours and hours of bombing—yet every now and again there is a hit, and the injury is disproportionate altogether to the power and value of the aircraft which inflicts it. Nevertheless, the Navy were perfectly ready to carry the troops in, and no doubt was entertained about their ability to do so.

Why, then, was this plan, which was timed for April 25, abandoned? It was abandoned because, on the 17th, the two diversionary landings had made good progress, and it seemed much easier to capture Trondheim by this method than to incur the heavy cost of direct attack. I must make it perfectly clear that the Admiralty never withdrew their offer or considered the operation impracticable in the naval aspect. Grave doubts were, however, entertained by the military as to the possibility of making an opposed landing under heavy hostile air superiority, apart from the existence of machine-guns, and in these circumstances the Chiefs of Staff, and not only the Chiefs of Staff, but their Deputies, or Vice-chiefs, as

they are now called, without the slightest difference of opinion, so far as I am aware, advised that it would be less costly and surer to convert the diversionary landings into the main attack. No one has the slightest right to suggest that the Navy withdrew from this undertaking or that the politicians overruled the Admirals. I take the fullest responsibility—and so do the Prime Minister and the other Ministers concerned—for having accepted the unanimous view of our expert advisers. I thought they were right at the time and on the information we then had, and I have seen no reason to alter my view by what I have learned since.

However, the situation rapidly became worse. In the first place, the German thrust north of Oslo developed enormous strength. The Norwegians were unable to hold the mountain passes, and they did not destroy the roads and railways. By the 25th or 26th the possibility of the arrival in the region south of Trondheim of very large German forces, thoroughly equipped and maintained, had to be foreseen. At the same time the intense and continuous bombing of the bases at Namsos and Åndalsnes prevented the landing at these small fishing-ports of any large reinforcements, even of the artillery for the infantry we had already landed, and of the many supplies for the troops already landed. It was, therefore, necessary to withdraw the troops, or leave them to be destroyed by overwhelming force. The decision to withdraw was undoubtedly sound, and the extrication and the re-embarkation of those 12,000 men—for that is all there were, less than a division—was accomplished with very great skill and, I may also add, with very good luck.

Now, that is the story of what happened, and why. As I have said, all the responsible Naval and Military and Air authorities, together with the Ministers principally concerned, and the War Cabinet, were at every stage united; and I expect that if any dozen Members of this House had been brought into this matter day by day they would equally have been united. But that does not, of course, end the question.

MR. H. MORRISON: I am sorry to interrupt, but this really is important. I did ask the right hon. Gentleman categorically whether the naval authorities on the spot at Trondheim, with all their experience of aerial bombardment of ships, were willing and anxious to enter Trondheim and whether their desire was overruled or not sanctioned by Whitehall.

MR. CHURCHILL: I am not only denying that, but I am making a much stronger denial. There were no naval authorities on the spot at Trondheim. We had not got our naval authorities on the spot at

Trondheim; but no authority that we consulted or were advised by, differed, so far as I am aware—and I deal with the responsible officers—from the advice tendered by the Chiefs of Staff, supported by their officers. I do not think that settles the question. Ministers are not sheltered by the fact that they accept their experts' advice; on the other hand, they are very unsheltered if they override that advice. But whether they were sheltered or unsheltered, the results were very bad and very disappointing, and the question arose whether, if we persisted in the direct naval attack, events would have turned out better. Personally, I have always believed that the Navy would have carried troops into Trondheim Fjord, and that the troops would have been able to make their lodgment in the fjord and come to grips with the enemy. I would have been very glad to take all possible responsibility for the step, provided that it was properly supported by expert opinion.

Even if we assume that that view is right and that we could have been masters of Trondheim, or its ruins, for such it would have speedily become, by April 25, the question immediately arose: Could we have brought to bear a sufficient army south of Trondheim to hold the invader or drive him off? It is true that we should have had, as the right hon. Gentleman has said, one good aerodrome, together with proper quays for landing larger forces, and artillery, and that we might by this time, perhaps, have been building up a front on a line, south of Trondheim, between the sea and the Swedish border, but even if we had, at the present time, got 25,000 or 30,000 Allied troops into action on this front, which, in view of the enemy's air superiority, is highly questionable, such a force would not have been able to arrive in time or be equipped with the necessary artillery in time, or to get anything like equal air support in time. I do not believe that it would have been able to withstand the immense weight of the attack which was being delivered by the Germans from their magnificent base at Oslo and up the two lines of railway and road from Oslo to the North. There can be no doubt whatever that the German base at Oslo and the German communications northward were incomparably superior to anything that we could have obtained at Trondheim, and at the various small ancillary landing places which we used. It would have been a very unsatisfactory struggle, at a great disadvantage and at a disproportionate cost to the Allies. There are already over 120,000 German troops operating in South and Central Norway and although we could have thrown in continual reinforcements, I cannot believe that there was the slightest chance of ultimate success, and it would have

been a struggle between an army based on Trondheim and a German army based on Oslo. That aspect of the matter had to be considered by the military experts as to whether the Germans could reinforce more quickly than we could. There was no means by which their air superiority could have been overcome. We should therefore have been committed to a forlorn operation on an ever-increasing scale.

Therefore, whatever view we may take of the chances of the attack on Trondheim, the decision to abandon it, although it was taken for different reasons from those I have just mentioned, was not only reasonable at the time, but has, I believe, saved us in the upshot from a most disastrous entanglement. . . .

We are now fighting hard for Northern Norway, and in particular for Narvik, and I will not attempt to predict how the struggle will go, nor will I give any information about it at all. I will content myself with saying that the conditions in that area are much more equal so far as ability to reinforce it is concerned—much more equal and much more favourable than those which would have developed in Central Norway. . . .

29. BROADCAST SPEECH BY H.M. THE KING OF NORWAY, MAY 17, 1940.¹

I suppose that all in this country understand that it is with deep grief and distress that I recall to-day the many occasions when I and my family from the Palace in Oslo have received the children's procession of May 17, representing a happy and rejoicing Norway.

If I cannot do this to-day, it will be understood that I feel a deep desire to send a greeting to the whole Norwegian folk on this our day of liberty.

For over a century this day has rallied the people of Norway about the idea of liberty and about the work of liberty done at Eidsvoll, and we have always promised each other that we would continue to possess this country.

Our foreign policy has always been based upon keeping Norway outside all European conflicts, but in spite of the fact that we have taken a strictly neutral attitude to all sides, we were on April 9 attacked by a nation which, because it does not know itself what personal liberty means, cannot understand what a frightful wrong it has perpetrated against a liberty-loving little people.

We were presented with the choice between submission and

¹ *Ny Norsk Kvithok*. Translation prepared for the Information Department.

surrender, or an attempt to defend all that we regard as sacred and worth living for. For the defence of our independence and our self-respect as a nation there was only one way to choose. We chose as far as possible to stake everything to preserve our independence. It has already cost considerable sacrifices, and after three weeks' heroic resistance the whole of Southern Norway has had to be given up. But Northern Norway we can still call our own. This district in earlier years has perhaps not been respected as it deserved, but in these days shows that it can represent a free and independent Norway with efficiency and dignity. And it is my hope that we may be able to organize from this place, with the help of our Allies, our defence once more, and through this recover liberty for the whole Norwegian people.

I thank all who in the past weeks of war have done what they could to stop and check the advancing enemy.

I wish to express special thanks to the Navy for its contribution, which has stood fully on a level with the best traditions of our Navy and which has won great recognition from our Allies as well. I thank the Army for what it has been able to achieve in spite of the most desperate conditions for mobilization.

Further, I express thanks to all who in different ways have helped the military organization in these difficult days, as for example, telegraphists, railway workers, labourers who under attack from the air and from machine-guns have co-operated in keeping our communications in order as long as possible.

Last, but not least, my hearty thanks to the civil population in all parts of the country for its self-control, will to sacrifice and resignation which has been shown in spite of the fact that so many have had to see their homes and their life's work destroyed. To my countrymen in the occupied territories I would express the hope that you may not lose courage, that before too long it may be possible to win back your freedom, and I beg you not to give up faith and hope in your liberation.

Be sure that it will be of decisive importance in the coming generations who will rebuild the country after all the destruction that you exert all your energies to preserve Norway as a free independent land. If we look upon it this way, the time of trial will perhaps seem lighter.

In conclusion I will recall the words of the poet:

"This dwelling place is ours and we love it for what it is, what it was, and what it shall be, and as love grows from the soil of

our homes, there shall be a growth from the seed-corn of our love once more.'

God bless our dear Fatherland!

IV. THE GERMAN OCCUPATION OF NORWAY

1. APPEAL BY H.M. THE KING OF NORWAY AND HR. NYGAARDS-VOLD, PRIME MINISTER, TO THE NORWEGIAN PEOPLE, JUNE 7, 1940.¹

The King and the Government have at this moment seen themselves compelled to remove their abode and their activities outside the frontiers of the country. By means of the brutal attack which the German Government started without warning, the German forces succeeded in securing a foothold in Norway and gradually subjugating the greater part of the country.

The Allied Governments who were at war with Germany—the British, French, and Polish Governments—came nobly to the help of Norway with man-power and arms, and up to the present it has been possible to preserve a part of the country for its lawful National Government.

But the hard necessity of the war has compelled the Allied Governments to muster all their strength to fight upon other fronts, and they have full scope for all their men and material on those fronts.

Under these conditions it is impossible to maintain the struggle in this country against a preponderance like that of Germany.

Our defending forces, which have fought with courage and heroism for two months, lack the necessary war material, especially ammunition and fighter planes, and can no longer get them.

A continuation of the struggle would lead to the complete devastation of the parts of the country which still are free. For the Germans in their warfare spare the most peaceful towns and villages as little as the military forces opposed to them.

The Higher Command of our defence has therefore advised the King and the Government for the present to give up the struggle within the country, and the King and the Government have considered it their duty to follow this advice. They are, therefore, now leaving the country.

But they are not thereby abandoning the fight to regain the

¹ *Ny Norsk Kvitbok*. Translation prepared for the Information Department.

independence of Norway. On the contrary, they will continue it outside the frontiers of the country. They have a firm hope that the German aggressors will soon be compelled to surrender their booty, and that the Norwegian people, together with other peoples who are now suffering under German subjugation, will once more gain their rights and their liberty.

The King and the Government of Norway will in this time of struggle be the free advocates for the national demands of the Norwegian people. They will as far as is practicable maintain the independent life of the Norwegian kingdom, so that none of the rights which appertain to a free State shall be lost.

It will be their task to protect the political foundation of the country and the nation, so that our Fatherland in the hour of victory can come forward with authority and assert its national freedom. The President of the Norwegian Storting has associated himself with the King and the Government in this struggle, also the commanders of the army and navy of Norway.

And as a pledge that the Government will be a Government for the whole Norwegian people without regard to old party divisions, it has to-day strengthened itself by the appointment of new Cabinet Ministers from different parties.

We thank all those who at this time have done their duty to their Fatherland and fought for its liberty, and we unite in an appeal to the Norwegian people to keep their hope and courage still alive through all oppression and hardship. We are confident that no Norwegian will betray the cause of our liberty. We merely cry to you all:

Continue in loyalty towards our dear Fatherland.

We who send this call to you at the moment when we are compelled to abandon the soil of Norway, are resolved to place all our forces, our lives, and all we possess at the disposal of Norway's cause. We believe that we shall soon be able to come back to a free and independent Norway, and we hope to be able to do this with honour. The thought which will govern all our action abroad, and which we know we share with all who remain at home lies in the words:

Long live Norway! All for Norway!

HAARON R.
JOHAN NYGAARDSVOLD.

2. STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE BRITISH MINISTRY OF INFORMATION,
JUNE 10, 1940.¹

With the foreknowledge and understanding of His Majesty the King of Norway and the Norwegian Government, the British and French troops have been withdrawn from Northern Norway.

The King of Norway and the Norwegian Government are now in Great Britain and a proportion of the Norwegian armed forces have been withdrawn from Norway in order to be re-formed for action on other fronts.

The capture of Narvik enabled action to be taken to prevent the Germans using it for the export of iron ore for a considerable time.

Troops and material from Northern Norway can now be used to greater advantage elsewhere in the main struggle to defeat German attempts at domination, upon the outcome of which Norwegian independence finally depends.

3. EXTRACT FROM STATEMENT BY THE RT. HON. C. R. ATTLEE,
LORD PRIVY SEAL, JUNE 11, 1940.²

... Because of the pressure of war on other fronts, Allied Forces have been withdrawn from Norway, and the Norwegian forces in North Norway have laid down their arms. In order to save Norwegian territory from further destruction by the Germans and to watch over Norwegian interests during the war, the Norwegian King and Government have left Norway and come to this country. It was with deep regret that His Majesty's Government were forced to take the decision to abandon their campaign in North Norway at the moment it had turned in our favour and Narvik had fallen into our hands. The campaign had been bravely fought by the combined Allied forces under arduous conditions and had succeeded during the past two months in retaining vastly superior German forces away from other theatres of war. The time, however, had come when it was clear that all the available resources at the Allies' disposal must be employed on the main front where the issue of the war and the fate of Norway and all other free and democratic countries will be decided.

It was also a hard decision for the Norwegian King and Government to leave their own country. They had held out for two months against the full weight of the German forces and were undefeated

¹ *The Times*, June 11, 1940.

² In the House of Commons. *Hansard*, June 11, 1940, coll. 1167-8.

at the end. During this time the example of the King's courage, devotion and dignity in distress had been the mainstay of the Norwegian resistance. Norway has decided to continue the struggle against Germany on other fronts. The Norwegian Government have made this clear in the Royal Proclamation issued on June 9. Whereas before the British, French and Polish Governments have been helping the Norwegians in a war of independence, the Norwegian Government will now use all their resources to help the Allies in their war against Germany. This decision, for which the Allied Governments are deeply grateful, is evidence of the conviction of the Norwegian people that the only hope for the future lies in an Allied victory and that the Allied cause, with which they are now more than ever identified, will surely prevail. . . .

4. BROADCAST SPEECH BY PROFESSOR KOHT, NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, JUNE 19, 1940.¹

I came to London to-day and have here received information of a telegram from Stockholm which said that the Oslo newspapers on June 14 had all contained similar articles attacking the Norwegian Government because, as was said, it had not been willing to negotiate with the German Government, and had thereby failed to procure the best possible conditions for the Norwegian people; instead of this the Government had merely fled from the country to protect their own persons.

No one need doubt that these articles were written in accordance with German orders. But it should nevertheless be pointed out, out of regard to the people in Norway, that what they contained was not correct.

As early as the month of May the question of a kind of armistice in Norway was taken up for discussion in Stockholm. The idea was that a line of demarcation could be drawn between the two parts of Norway which had been created by the war, one part occupied by German forces, another part free. The idea was thus to be that the rulers in these two different parts of the country should not carry on war against one another, and that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from that part of Norway which lay north of the line of demarcation.

The Norwegian Government was not able immediately to take up this idea with a view to carrying it through. It was difficult for it to give up the struggle to win back that part of Norway which the

¹ *Ny Norsk Kvübok*. Translation prepared for the Information Department.

Germans had occupied. All Norwegians are bound to entertain the thought and hope of getting their whole country freed from foreign domination.

But the Government was bound more and more to come to see that it would not be practically possible to regain for Norwegian control the whole of the rest of Norway in the immediate future, and therefore it resolved to consider a proposal of the kind referred to. This proposal was sent on through the Swedish Government on June 3. The Swedish Government promised to forward the proposal immediately to the Germans.

In the days which followed no answer arrived from Germany. The Norwegian Government thereupon set a time limit which was reported to Germany, to the effect that if no answer came before Saturday, June 8, at 2 p.m., this must be regarded as a refusal.

No reply was received within the limit fixed. But the Government did not wish to expose more of Norway to raiding by German bombers than that which had already been raided, and it therefore resolved to move away from Norway. It was at the same time that the British and French Governments on other grounds removed their troops from Norway. In this way the struggle within the country came to an end.

But the idea of freeing Norway must continue to live. The Government must work actively for this. It is its supreme duty. And this duty can only be fulfilled outside Norway.

We realize that the people in Norway are not getting full information as to the intentions and plans of the Norwegian Government, for example, the work which it is engaged in to procure help for those parts of the Norwegian people which may come to suffer hardship by reason of the German occupation. It is not our fault that the people in Norway do not get information about all this. The Government tries to send reports of it, and I must warn the people in Norway against basing any conclusion merely on that which the German control in Norway allows them to hear. Everything of that kind can only be one-sided and give a false picture.

5. BROADCAST SPEECH BY HR. HAMBRO, PRESIDENT OF THE STORTING, JUNE 22, 1940.¹

When the Storting held its meeting at Elverum on April 9, the President, with the approval of the Storting, expressed the view that for the sake of the country it must be avoided that the King,

¹ *Ny Norsk Kvübok*. Translation prepared for the Information Department.

the Crown Prince and the Government should fall into the hands of the enemy even if they had to take up their abode outside the frontiers of the country.

When the Allied forces in Northern Norway, especially the aeroplanes and the aircraft defences, had to be withdrawn by reason of the developments in Flanders and France, that occurred which we had feared two months before: the King and his Council had the choice between allowing themselves to be taken prisoner or abandoning the country in order temporarily to establish the seat of the Government outside Norway. It was a bitter and painful choice, but if the whole of Norway's struggle was to have any meaning, if the line which the unanimous Storting resolved to take was to lead to any end, if the possibility of preserving the future of Norway as an independent State was to be preserved, it was bound to be the duty of the King and Government to carry on the policy of the country from the only soil where it could be conducted freely and with exclusive regard to the interests of the country's future.

No one who shared in the councils which preceded the decision which had inevitably to be taken will ever forget them or the firmness, the dignity with which King Haakon, under all trials, has devoted himself to the country's interests alone. The Government had to take its decision on the strength of the authority which it received from the Storting on April 9. It has not been able to divest itself of any responsibility by asking that the Storting should be summoned afresh.

No member who remains in the districts which are occupied by a foreign Power has the liberty of speech and action which our Constitution demands. So strongly was this felt by the creators of our Constitution that at the extraordinary Storting in the autumn of 1814 the authorities of the representatives who came from districts in Swedish hands were not recognized. And in Clause 85 of the Constitution a clear expression is given to the way in which the Constitution regarded those who assist any Storting to be held under foreign influence:

'He who obeys an order, the object of which is to disturb the liberty and security of the Storting, makes himself thereby guilty of treason against the Fatherland.'

Cut off from hearing the free opinion of free men, the King and his Council during these months had to act upon their sense of duty and their conscience, deeply and unshakenly convinced that only by leaving the country could they continue to serve it; but it was

a consolation for all those who shared in the decision to know that the man who had organized the defence of the country under the severest tests with such patience, courage, and equanimity, General Ruge, as representative of the fighting forces, entirely concurred in it. It was on June 7 that the King and his Council left Norway. And in a very real sense this particular day was historically appropriate. The work of national liberation could no longer be carried out in Norway. Only by choosing a site where they could act freely were they in a position to work for the political future of the land, or to take care of its economic interests, or make a contribution to provide help to the whole occupied country which may come to be threatened by hunger and need. Heavy trials await us all, heaviest for those who are living under the pressure of a foreign Power within the frontiers of the country, cut off from every opportunity of independent examination of the facts and all access to those proud utterances on the subject of government which the Constitution presents. Their power to hold out, their willingness to obey the spirit of the national laws instead of the dictates of foreign power, may for painful years to come decide the fate of Norway.

We outside the country are more fortunate than they because we have only lost everything except our right to free thought and free speech and to follow our conviction and the voice of our conscience unhindered; we follow them with our deepest sympathy, with a fellow-feeling which shares their lot, convinced that every Norwegian from the bottom of his heart at this time feels that there is one goal for our wishes and our determination: one country, one People, one King.

6. DECLARATION FROM THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT, JUNE 24, 1940.¹

The Government has seen reports from Oslo that the German authorities there are trying to get Norwegian representatives to agree to an arrangement by which the King should abdicate from his functions given him by the Constitution, the legally appointed Government under Prime Minister Nygaardsvold should be dismissed, and a State Council should be set up which would take over the functions both of the King and the Government.

It is said that representatives of the different parties in the Storting will be compelled to give their consent to this plan.

It is quite clear that if such an arrangement is made in one way

¹ *Ny Norsk Kvittbok*. Translation prepared for the Information Department.

or another, this will merely be a result of the pressure which can be exercised by foreign military power in the country, and an approval of this course cannot possibly be an expression of the will of the nation or of those who represent the Norwegian people.

Neither is it possible to get such a consent made in a constitutional manner, since there exists no legal assembly which has the right to act on behalf of the Norwegian Storting. And any such agreement is in open conflict with the Norwegian Constitution.

The Constitution lays it down in its first paragraph that the Kingdom of Norway is a free, independent, indivisible, and inalienable kingdom. It prescribes in its last paragraph that no change may ever be made in the Constitution which conflicts with its spirit. Independence is the greatest and highest principle in the Constitution, and every one who undertakes anything contrary to this principle infringes the Constitution. The Constitution also expressly lays it down that any one who in any way impedes the Storting's freedom of decision makes himself guilty of treason against the Fatherland, so that even decisions of the Storting made under duress must be regarded as illegal.

A reconstruction of the Government in Norway such as is proposed cannot therefore be valid and can have no effect upon the position either of the King or of the Government.

The Government will not participate in the guilt of anything that violates the Constitution of Norway. It will always with all its power defend the full independence of Norway, and it cannot advise the King to give up any of the functions which he enjoys as King in a free and independent Norway.

King Haakon is still the lawful King of Norway by virtue of the free choice of the nation, and he exercises the functions which are allotted to him by the Constitution.

The Government he has appointed has received the unanimous vote of confidence of the Storting at the last meeting which could be held in complete liberty, and on that occasion the Storting unanimously decided in agreement with the Government that Norway must refuse to submit to the German demands, which were in manifest conflict with the independence and liberty of the Kingdom.

It is the constitutional duty of the Government to continue this policy and maintain the independent government of Norway as far as is possible.

The Storting resolved at its last meeting that if a free and independent Government could not exist within the country it must for

the time being take up its abode outside the frontiers of the Kingdom. That is why the King and the Government are for the moment in Great Britain. But with the forces which they will have at their disposal here—military, economic, and administrative—they will continue to fulfil their duties to Norway according to the authority which the Storting gave, and they will according to their powers watch over everything which can be done in the best interests of the Norwegian people.

The Government is sure that it is acting in full conformity with the free will of the Norwegian people when it thus continues to carry on the struggle for the independence of Norway, and it has the firm hope that this struggle sooner or later will be conducted to victory.

7. BROADCAST SPEECH OF HR. NYGAARDSVOLD, PRIME MINISTER OF NORWAY, JUNE 25, 1940.¹

Men and women of Norway! If at this time, so fateful for our civilization and personal liberty, I turn to you, it is not only to send you an ordinary greeting, but also to take the opportunity to report on the work of the Government and its outlook upon the circumstances as they have developed. I can very well understand that for many it will appear that there are no points of light in the dark night which has fallen over our Fatherland. Our Allies, England and France, were forced by reason of the developments upon other fronts to withdraw their assisting forces away from Norway. The Government, which has followed the resistance which our own troops have made, together with the Allies, from the east country through Gudbrandsdal and Romsdal and now most recently in Northern Norway, were clear that in one way or another we must now attempt to have the hostilities and devastation stopped. In particular we were clear about this after Bodö, a non-military objective, was levelled to the ground.

We considered, however, that it was our duty to see if there was not any possibility that at least a small part of Norway could be preserved under Norwegian administration, and Norwegian self-government. With the mediation of Sweden, we therefore attempted to see whether such an arrangement could not be reached. But Germany did not even vouchsafe us an answer.

There was then no other course open than to lay down our arms and send our brave officers and soldiers home. I know that this decision was a hard blow for all these. They had fought boldly

¹ *Ny Norsk Kvittbok*. Translation prepared for the Information Department.

under the leadership of General Fleischer against those who had invaded our country, and precisely at the time when the Government found itself compelled to take this decision that arms should be laid down, our troops together with the Allied forces had won perhaps the only real victory on land to which the Allied forces up to that time could point, namely the recapture of Narvik. And in the attainment of this victory our soldiers played the greatest and most decisive part. Their courage, their resolution in battle, will live in the glow of memory generations hence.

Besides the decision as to the laying down of arms and demobilization the position of the Government after the whole of Norway was occupied by the Germans had to be taken into consideration.

But before I go further into that question I should like to say a few words about the work which the Government carried out during the two months which the war lasted.

I have heard on the radio and I have also seen in the propaganda which the victors have started, that the Government was merely a fugitive Government and that it did not in any way take charge of the interests which it was appointed to care for. The Government at the meeting of the Storting at Hamar and afterwards at Elverum on April 9, 1940, received the most extensive authority which any parliamentary Government in Norway has ever received. I report the resolution of the Storting according to the report which is available:

'The Storting gives the Government the most extensive authority to take the decisions and resolutions which are necessary in respect of the protection of the interests of the kingdom until the Storting after the conference between the Government and the Presidential Board of the Storting can again be summoned to a fresh meeting.'

This authority was unanimously passed by the Storting. With the unanimous approval of the Storting President Hambro afterwards spoke as follows:

'It is of the greatest importance to maintain the lawful Norwegian Government even if it has to be exercised from a place outside the frontiers of the country. The King, the Crown Prince and the Government must not on any consideration fall into the hands of the enemy.'

I wanted to report these fundamental points as accurately as possible so that you who are listening to me this evening can get a

cold, clear, and impartial account of what has happened, and of what the authority of the Norwegian Government really is. And it is upon this authority that the Government has worked.

There have been great difficulties; difficulties which we naturally could not have foreseen on April 9. Perhaps the greatest difficulty we have had to contend with—and one which is confirmed by the diaries of German airmen who have been shot down—was that the Germans laid special importance on bombing the King, the Crown Prince and the Government. I thank the Germans for the attention which was shown us in that way. German planes flew so low that I saw the crews, and machine-gun bullets sprayed all round us. I got the impression that German airmen found as much sport in shooting at unarmed persons, women and children, as a hunter who goes after hares and ptarmigan in the autumn.

I will also remind you that this winter we had negotiations for a trade agreement with Germany. We did our utmost to meet the wishes of Germany. We came to agreement. And hardly a month later they attacked us. Such a policy may seem clean to Germans; it certainly does not accord with Norwegian ideas of clean conduct.

And here we Norwegians have at any rate one point of light which I think may console us just now, and our successors with pride and joy in coming ages.

8. CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENTIAL BOARD OF THE STORTING AND THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT.

(a) *Letter from the Presidential Board of the Storting to H.M. the King of Norway, June 27, 1940.*¹

After Oslo and the surrounding districts had been occupied by German troops on April 9 and the following days, and Hr. Vidkun Quisling, in the absence of the Government, had considered himself entitled to form a Government, the necessity of having an order established which secured the population against unnecessary sufferings occurred to Norwegians of all occupations and classes of society in the occupied territory. For this reason the Administrative Council was appointed, with the approval of the German occupation authorities, on April 15 to conduct the civil administration in the occupied territories. An attempt was made beforehand to get into communication with Your Majesty to have this order approved. When this did not succeed, the Supreme Court considered that it ought to undertake the nomination of the Council. This step helped in creating orderly

¹ *Ny Norsk Kvittbok*. Translation prepared for the Information Department.

conditions and has given the population such security as has been possible under the existing circumstances.

After the whole country was occupied by German troops and the King and Government had left the country the question arose of changing this arrangement. The members of the Presidential Board of the Storting who have been able to meet, were therefore assembled in Oslo on June 14 together with representatives of the four great political parties and the workers' trade union organization, and held discussions, in some of which the Administrative Council took part. On the basis of these discussions between the above representatives the following arrangement was concluded with the German authorities:

'Since the King and his Government are outside Norway and are therefore prevented from carrying out the functions imposed upon them by the Constitution, the Presidential Board of the Storting regards it as its duty to the country and people to nominate a National Council (*Riksråd*).

'The Storting is therefore being summoned to give its consent to this step and to reach further agreement about the authority of the National Council as regards the administration of the country. The Presidential Board of the Storting is laying before the Government proposals to include the following resolutions:

'I. The authority which was given to the Nygaardsvold Government at the meeting of April 9 is no longer valid.

'II. The Nygaardsvold Government can no longer be recognized as a Government.

'III. Since the King is outside the frontiers of the country he is not in a position to exercise his constitutional functions.

'Note: on this point the Presidential Board reports that in consideration of the situation it has asked the King to resign his constitutional functions for himself and his House.

'IV. The National Council takes over until further notice the business of the Government and the King's constitutional functions. A new Parliamentary election is postponed till after the conclusion of peace, while it is an instruction to the National Council to arrange a new election as soon as conditions permit, but at latest three months after the conclusion of peace.

'V. The members of the Storting who at present are abroad shall not be summoned during the rest of the period of the Storting's functions and shall be given no opportunity to take part in its meetings.

'VI. Until a new election the National Council has authority, in conformity with Point IV, to take all decisions which are required for the good of the country.

'VII. Norway's constitutional form of government as a monarchy shall still continue in the future.'

As will be understood, it is a condition of this arrangement that the King resigns for himself and his House his constitutional functions. And out of consideration for the prosperity of the people and the future of the country we address, painful as it may be felt by Norwegian minds, an urgent prayer to Your Majesty to accede to our request on this point.

Trusting that Your Majesty will understand our action, we ask to have a report of Your Majesty's decision by July 12 at latest.

With deep respect,

MAGNUS NILSSEN, GABRIEL MOSEID, P. THORVIK, NERI VALEN, IVAR LYKKE (added to the Presidential Board by the Conservative Group).

(b) *Reply from H.M. the King of Norway to the Presidential Board of the Storting, London, July 3, 1940.*¹

I have received a communication of June 27, 1940, from the Storting's Presidential Board, and have with the full realization of my personal responsibility and of the seriousness of the situation conscientiously considered the resolution so fateful for our country which is dealt with in the letter of the Presidential Board.

I came to Norway in 1905 on an invitation from the Norwegian people, and I have in the years that have passed sought to the best of my ability to fulfil the duties which were thus imposed upon me.

My new Fatherland became infinitely precious to me, and I became bound to the Norwegian people by intimate ties. My motto, 'All for Norway', has always been and still is the guide of my actions, and if I could be persuaded at this time that I should best serve my people by resigning my royal task, or if I could be sure that behind the Storting's Presidential Board in this matter there was a majority of the Norwegian people, I would—however deeply it would pain me to be separated from Norway—comply with the request that the Presidential Board has addressed to me. I see from the letter of the Presidential Board that the proposal which the Presidential Board

¹ *Ny Norsk Kvitebok*. Translation prepared for the Information Department.

has thought of laying before the Storting has been arrived at through an agreement with the German occupation authorities in Norway. It is thus not an expression of a free Norwegian decision, but the result of a compulsion exercised by foreign military occupation.

It appears further from the letter that those members of the Storting who have evaded this compulsion by taking up their abode outside the frontiers of Norway are not to have an opportunity to take part in the meetings which are to come to a decision on the proposal in question.

The Storting in 1814 maintained an entirely opposite principle, since it refused to recognize the mandate of those members of the Storting who came from districts occupied by foreign military power. It founded itself on the logical consideration that such an occupation must fetter the freedom of decision of the members: *now* the representatives—including even the President of the Storting—who still retain their freedom of decision are to be excluded from the Storting, while those who are living under the pressure of foreign power are alone to decide the fate of the country.

I should be failing in my constitutional duties by accepting a decision made by a Storting summoned under such conditions.

In Point III of the Presidential Board's proposal it is said, 'Since the King is outside the frontiers of the country he is not in a position to exercise his constitutional functions.' Section 11 of the Norwegian Constitution provides expressly that the King can be as much as six months outside the country without the consent of the Storting, and *with* such consent still longer. If the King is abroad on *active service* the provision in Section 41 of the Constitution suggests that special consent is on the whole not required.

At the meeting of the Storting at Elverum on April 9, 1940, the President, with the unanimous approval of the Storting, said that the King and the Government, if it should be necessary out of consideration for a free and independent Government, should be able to take up their abode outside the country, without any limit of time being suggested in this connexion. There is thus no constitutional foundation for the assertion that I cannot carry out the task which the Constitution lays upon me.

The present Norwegian Government under the leadership of Prime Minister Nygaardsvold was nominated on March 19, 1935; the composition of this Government has later undergone a number of changes, the latest being the appointment of Ministers belonging to other political parties than that which the Government originally **came from**. Thus a National Government has been created, which

has had the unanimous confidence of the Storting, expressly recognized by its vote in its meeting of April 9 of this year.

In accordance with Norwegian constitutional practice, the Storting is fully entitled to revoke a vote of confidence which has been given; but in such case this must be done by a Storting which acts with full constitutional freedom, and has not been arbitrarily deprived of a number of its members. Neither of these conditions is fulfilled by the assembly which the Presidential Board is now to summon.

In the agreement between the Presidential Board and the German occupation authorities it is said that neither can the Norwegian Government carry out its constitutional functions, since it is outside Norway. I and the Government have no higher wish than to be able to exercise our functions within the country; it is merely foreign power which has forced the Government, together with myself, to leave the country. We have done this in conformity with the resolution of the Storting, in order so far as possible to preserve a free and independent control of the Norwegian kingdom.

If such conditions could be created in Norway that I and the Government could return to the country to continue our activities in full liberty, it would be done immediately. The obvious condition for this must be that all foreign military forces should leave the country. The arrangement, however, with the German authorities on which the Presidential Board has come to an agreement assumes the continued maintenance of the German occupation, and in these circumstances I see no possibility for the existence of a free Government of Norway within the frontiers of Norway.

When in the proposal of the Presidential Board it is remarked that fresh elections to the Storting can first be held 'after the conclusion of peace', it is thereby assumed that Norway will not come to enjoy peace before the war between the Great Powers is carried to a conclusion. The Presidential Board is doubtless right in this, but that being so it is also clear that the proposed arrangement does not help the Norwegian people to the peace for which it so deeply longs.

Nor does the agreement with the German occupation authorities serve to promote several of the economic interests which are so important to the welfare of our people. I recall that the German demands to the Norwegian Government, at the time of the attack on the country on the night of April 9, involved *inter alia* a complete economic blockade of Norway in relation to all Western countries in and outside Europe. And important economic interests would,

under a new Government such as is proposed by the appointment of a new 'National Council', come to suffer even greater damage than at present, since it could not take charge of the vitally important interests abroad which are now looked after by the present Government.

I will further indicate an aspect of the question at issue which is not touched on in the letter of the Presidential Board, but which throws a vivid light on the arrangement now in question. I refer to the scope of the authority which the proposed National Council is to have. I will say no more of the fact, manifest to every one, that the National Council in practice will have to follow German directions as long as the German occupation of Norway lasts; but I will emphasize what follows from the resolution published at this time by the German Government in Berlin, that no foreign States are to have diplomatic representation in Oslo, and that the foreign policy of Norway will be conducted by the Department of Foreign Affairs in Berlin.

This clearly means that the new National Council in Oslo does not represent an independent kingdom, but merely a German dependency. An abdication on my part would therefore not even formally be to the advantage of an independent Government in Norway; the National Council would not acquire all the constitutional functions appertaining to the King. I cannot see that the Presidential Board of the Storting has any constitutional basis whatsoever for modifying the lawful decisions of the Storting which have hitherto been taken. It is on the contrary quite evident that the whole of the proposed arrangement conflicts with the Constitution.

I cannot see that I should be acting in the interests of the country by submitting to the demand addressed to me by the Presidential Board, whereby I should approve an arrangement which conflicts with the Constitution of Norway, and which it is sought to impose by force upon the Norwegian people. By doing so I should abandon the principle which has guided my actions throughout all my reign, viz.: to keep myself strictly within the framework of the Constitution.

The liberty and independence of the Norwegian people are to me the first commandment of the Constitution, and I consider I am obeying this commandment and watching over the interests of the Norwegian people best by adhering to the position and the task which a free people gave me in 1905.

(c) *Letter from the Norwegian Government to the Presidential Board of the Storting, July 17, 1940.*¹

The Norwegian Government wishes to lay before the Presidential Board and through them before the Storting some of its views regarding the proposals for which the Presidential Board intends to seek the Storting's approval.

H.M. the King has already expressed, in his answer of July 3 to the Presidential Board's letter of June 27, his opinion on the constitutional questions which were raised in the letter from the Presidential Board, and the Government expresses its full agreement with the views thus put forward by the King.

The basic idea in the King's reply was not of a formal character. The main point of his reply was a great reality: it was the question how far a Storting summoned whilst the country is in enemy occupation can be a true expression of the Norwegian people's will. And because he considered that he must give a negative reply to this question, it became his duty to reject the request addressed to him by the Presidential Board that he should abdicate the royal functions given him by the Constitution and the free vote of the people.

The King has also drawn attention to another great truth—that it is an illusion that peace can be won for the country by the creation of a Government which co-operates with Germany. When the Government on April 9 rejected the German ultimatum—a rejection which had behind it a unanimous Storting and certainly an overwhelming majority of the Norwegian people—every one was quite clear that, whatever attitude the Government assumed towards the crisis of the moment, Norway would in any case from that day forth be a battlefield for the conflicting Great Powers. And no one can be in doubt that so long as there is war between Great Britain and Germany, and one of these Powers keeps in occupation of Norway, our land will continue to be a theatre of war.

The German Government has maintained that it must occupy all important strategic points in Norway in order that the country should not be used by the Western Powers in the war with Germany. The British Government will with the same right assert that it must do what it can to hinder Germany from using Norway in the war against Britain.

The German Government forbids every kind of trade and intercourse between Norway and the lands to the west of the ocean (including even neutral countries), and the British Government is

¹ *Ny Norsk Kvitebok*. Translation prepared for the Information Department.

opposing all trade and communication which may profit the German forces of occupation in Norway.

Both from an economic and military point of view the war will continue for Norway without regard to Government or form of administration.

In addition, some of Norway's important economic interests might come to suffer special damage if the present Government should resign its position and give way for one co-operating with the German force of occupation in Norway. By maintaining Norway's independent existence the Government has succeeded in preserving for the country one of its greatest assets, our excellent merchant and fishing fleet. It will still be one of the chief tasks of the Government to keep the fleet free and Norwegian. It would fail in one of its duties to the country if it gave up the struggle for this.

The Government found itself compelled to leave the country when it could no longer defend it against the German superior force. This was a hard step to take but it was the only possibility for the Government of fulfilling the duty which the Storting had laid upon it—of keeping the struggle for the liberty and independence of the people going. All personal considerations had to yield to this duty.

The Government has since that time not been able to take charge of the internal administration of the country. From abroad it has worked in more than one way to procure help for the Norwegian people remaining at home; it has already seen results from this work, and it will as far as possible continue it. But in other respects the performance of internal tasks has gradually had to fall upon the temporary Administrative Council which was instituted at Oslo on April 16, so long as this was possible under German domination.

The King stated in a Cabinet resolution of April 17 that this was an emergency measure which had no legal foundation in any Norwegian law, but which nevertheless might to some extent assist in safeguarding the rights of Norwegian citizens during the time while the country was under enemy control. And on April 19 he stated in a fresh Cabinet resolution that he fully understood the emergency situation which had caused the Supreme Court to intervene to form such an Administrative Council.

The Government has thus clearly expressed its opinion that the Administrative Council might be useful and perhaps even necessary to the country. And even if it has had few reports of what the Council had achieved in the three months that have passed, it feels persuaded that the Council has fulfilled the duty laid upon it by the circumstances with all the conscientiousness and zeal for the nation

which the people in the existing circumstances had a right to demand of it.

But the Government must at the same time adhere to the opinion which the Supreme Court itself declared when it appointed the Council, that 'this temporary Administrative Council is not a Government but exclusively an institution for civil administration which has no political function'. And to this the Government must add the further consideration that no really independent Government can be created in Norway so long as the country is under control.

So long as the German occupation lasts, in other words, until the final peace is concluded, all changes in the Government in the country must be provisional, and whether the domestic controlling authority is called an Administrative Council or something else, it cannot take the place of the country's lawful Government. If the country is to have any hope of regaining its independence and not to sink to be a dependency or protectorate for all time, it must be a duty to maintain the Government which is still an organ of independent policy.

The Government must therefore emphasize in the strongest manner to the Presidential Board that everything which is agreed or done at this time in respect of government in Norway must have the clear stamp of temporariness, if nothing is to be lost for the future of the country. The Government is sure that in this it has the overwhelming majority of the Norwegian people with it. Our people have learnt what independence means, and no immediate advantages can induce it to give up the principle of independence.

JOHAN NYGAARDSVOLD.

9. BROADCAST BY H.M. THE KING OF NORWAY, AUGUST 26, 1940.¹

From the information which I have received from Norway since I last spoke to the listeners at home, it appears that the correspondence between the Storting's Presidential Board and myself, with reference to the question of my abdication, has not been published in Norwegian newspapers.

A misunderstanding seems in this way to have arisen at home regarding the whole political situation in Norway since April 9.

The Storting and Government have been reproached for leaving Oslo on the morning of April 9. But it must be remembered that the country had unexpectedly and suddenly been plunged into an extremely critical situation, and that the grave decision had to be

¹ *Norsk Tidend*, August 30, 1940. Translation prepared for the Information Department.

taken whether the country should surrender at once or whether we should defend ourselves.

The Storting and Government had to be given time and quiet to discuss the situation and reach their decision, and since it clearly appeared, from the reports of the German advance during the night, that such time and quiet could not be counted on in Oslo, the authorities charged with the decision had no alternative other than the transference of their activities to a safer place.

On its arrival at Hamar the same day, the Government handed in its offer of resignation, which was at once laid before the Storting. The Storting gave the Government a unanimous vote of confidence, requested it to remain in office, and advised that the Government should be reinforced with a representative from each of the three political parties outside the Government's party.

The three parties thereupon themselves elected their representatives, who were accordingly appointed Ministers. Of these three, however, there was only one, namely Sven Nielsen of the Conservatives, who later accompanied the Government during the campaign in Norway.

The Storting next resolved—also unanimously—that the country should be defended by arms as long as it was possible.

The Government seems also to have been blamed for not achieving enough in the first days of the war—for not succeeding in exercising its governmental authority. But it must be remembered that during the whole of this first period we were, so to speak, chased from place to place—that during Cabinet meetings there were continuous air-raid alarms, and that we had to carry on with our discussions even if we had the planes right over us. It was only after our arrival in Northern Norway, about a month after the outbreak of war, that there was some kind of quiet for us all for our work.

During the stay in Northern Norway a reconstruction of the Government was discussed, with proportionate representation of all parties in the Storting. By reason, however, of the lack of communication with the rest of Norway, I considered it impossible to undertake such a reconstruction of the Government, since it was impracticable to reach the occupied districts of the country with messages addressed to individuals who might be in question, and because it would be still more impossible for these persons to get to Northern Norway.

And since the Storting, at its last meeting, had given the Government in power its vote of confidence, I considered it was important to keep a Government which enjoyed the Storting's confidence, and

thus to adhere strictly to the parliamentary line, and much more so after Major Quisling on April 9 had formed a Government with no constitutional basis whatever.

For myself personally it was also material to be able to keep the men whom the Storting trusted, and with whom I had collaborated satisfactorily for many years. This my view of the matter was approved by the majority of the Government.

In order to carry out the resolution of the Storting that the Government should be supplemented with representatives of the three other parties in the Storting, it was decided to appoint advocate Arne Sunde from the Liberals, and Anders Fjeldstad, a farmer and agricultural representative in Europe, from the Agrarian Party, as Cabinet Ministers: both these were at this time outside Norway, and have now joined the rest of the Government.

In certain quarters it has been asserted that the departure of myself and the Government from Norway has created difficulties for the country and for those persons who remained.

I consider we acted rightly. If we had stayed in Norway, those at present in control could have forced us to accept everything they wished. It was to escape this that we withdrew from the country, and we had the Storting's decision to build on in doing so.

From the place where we now are, we can continue to represent a free Norway. Our action was partly determined by the fact that it was clear to me and the Government that the only possibility of recreating a free Norway is the victory of that side which like us maintains the right of the small nations to live their own lives.

I should like to take this opportunity of saying that I am convinced that the Administrative Council in Norway has certainly done excellent work and earned the thanks of the nation by undertaking the difficult task which it must be for any real Norwegian to act as an intermediary between the forces at present in control and the population of Norway. I express my warm thanks to the members of the Administrative Council for the unselfish and self-sacrificing task they have undertaken—not least because they have thereby managed to preserve peace and order under circumstances in which imprudent behaviour might easily have led to disastrous results not merely for individuals, but for the whole nation.

I send at the same time my thanks and my greetings to all Norwegian men and women, to those who work and suffer in silence, and to all who, in public positions or in other employment, have to work in conditions which I well understand involve a trial bordering on the intolerable.

Avoid everything which is inconsistent with our national dignity; remain Norwegian in mind and thought, even if your thoughts in existing circumstances cannot be translated into speech, writing, or action.

That this should be done is an absolutely necessary condition for preserving that strong national feeling which is a distinctive mark of our people, and which finally will render impossible every attempt to wipe out Norway as an independent kingdom.

God save Norway's land and people!

HAAKON VII.

10. EXTRACTS FROM BROADCAST SPEECH BY HERR TERBOVEN,
COMMISSIONER OF THE GERMAN REICH IN NORWAY, SEP-
TEMBER 25, 1940.¹

. . . The German people has not in the past, neither does it to-day, entertain any hostile feelings towards the Norwegian people. On the contrary, it feels itself bound by ties of kinship with it as a member of the great Nordic family of races, and attaches importance to living and working with it in friendship and mutual esteem—a declaration of friendship, however, the value of which can only be made a reality on condition that it is not on one side only. . . .

I now come to the consequences which must be drawn from this situation, and to the measures which it was necessary to take:

1. The Royal House—especially as it has been repudiated even by a two-thirds majority of the Storting—has no further political importance and will not return to Norway.

2. The same applies to the Nygaardsvold Government, which has also fled the country.

3. In consequence, any activity in accordance with the policy or in favour of the Royal House or the fugitive Government is of course prohibited.

4. The activity of the Administrative Council is terminated.

5. In accordance with the right conferred upon me by the decree of the *Führer* of April 24, I have appointed the following State Councillors, who have taken over the conduct of Government business as from to-day:

Trade, Handicrafts, Industry, and Fisheries: Commercial Councillor Sigurd Halvorsen-Johanessen; Shipping: Captain Kjeld Irgens; Public Worship and Education: Professor Ragnar Skanke; Internal

¹ Broadcast over the Norwegian wireless. *Frankfurter Zeitung*, September 27, 1940. Translation prepared by the Information Department.

Affairs: Director William Hagelin; Social Affairs: Professor Birger Meidell; Supply: Director Oeystein Ravner; Police: Jonas Lie; Justice: State Advocate Sverre Rissnes; Agriculture: Thorstein Jon Onstad Fretheim, veterinary surgeon; Finance: Bank Director Erling Sandberg; National Instruction and Culture: Director Dr. Gudbrand Lunde; Physical Training: Axel Stang; Public Works, Tormod Hustad, architect.

6. The old political parties are dissolved as from to-day. The necessary details will be made public later.

7. New formations for the purpose of political activity of any sort will not be allowed.

. . . The political development of the last years has shown beyond doubt the correctness of the political views of *Nasjonal Samling* and its leader Vidkun Quisling. The Norwegian people would have been spared much pain and distress if it had adhered to these views. I, and the German people too, have been and still am ready to co-operate with all my strength in the reconstruction of Norwegian economic life. I am convinced that a great future lies before Norway within the framework of the new European order which is coming into being. Henceforward there is only one road to a solution calculated to give the Norwegian people freedom and independence. It leads through *Nasjonal Samling*.

11. PROCLAMATION TO THE NORWEGIAN PEOPLE, SEPTEMBER 26, 1940.¹

The German Reichskommissar in Norway has yesterday announced that he has taken the following decisions:

The King and his House are deprived of all their rights in Norway.

The Nygaardsvold Government is dismissed, and the Reichskommissar has transferred the Government of Norway to a controlling body which he himself has nominated.

He asserts that he has received consent to this new arrangement from the leaders of the political parties in the country. In reality it is a pure act of duress by a foreign master whose domination is based on violence, which has thus been carried out. The new control has no other foundation than the power of the German conquest in Norway. And it will be compelled to govern exclusively according to the orders it receives from its German masters.

Already before this, important parts of the control of the country

¹ Approved by the King and Government, and broadcast from London by the Prime Minister, Hr. Nygaardsvold. *Norsk Tidend*, September 27, 1940: Translation prepared for the Information Department.

have been placed directly under German authorities. This is the case as regards both domestic and foreign policy, justice and economics; German courts can exercise jurisdiction in Norway, German police control Norwegian citizens, and all military power is collected under the Germans, whilst the Norwegian defence organization is dissolved.

The new control has no independence whatever, and does not represent any free and independent kingdom. It means in reality that the first and most sacred clause in the Norwegian Constitution is broken.¹ The very foundation-stone in the whole constitutional life of Norway is overturned and thrown aside. The people have lost the right to be masters in their own house. It is no longer permitted to organize any political activity in freedom.

The German Reichskommissar informs us that he has conducted negotiations with representatives of the Norwegian Storting. But it has proved impossible for him to obtain the Storting's acceptance of the arrangement which he desired. And not a single member of the Storting has put himself at his service by entering the governing body which he has now put in office.

It is with grief and shame that we must observe that he has been able to find Norwegians willing to accept his nomination to membership of such a governing body, and thus to render themselves guilty of treason against the first command of the Constitution, the liberty and independence of Norway.

These men represent a party which adorns itself with the proud name of 'National Union' (*Nasjonal Samling*), but which has never stood for anything in Norway but division and internal strife. They have never managed to collect sufficient votes to be able to seat a single man in the Storting, and they have been false to every national idea at the same time that they betray the national independence.

But the government which is instituted on such a foundation collapses spontaneously on the same day as the German army of occupation disappears from the country. And as truly as the Norwegian people clings fast to its Constitution and its liberty, so surely will the day of victory come.

The struggle in the cause of freedom and independence shall not be given up. The King continues to be Norway's King, even though the German Reichskommissar declares him deposed. And the Government which he has lawfully appointed, and to which the Storting in its last meeting gave its unanimous vote of confidence,

¹ Section 1 of the Constitution is as follows: 'The Kingdom of Norway shall be a free, independent, indivisible, and inalienable kingdom.' (*Note by the translator.*)

is still the legal Government of the country and continues its task in accordance with the authority given it by the Storting.

In the name and on behalf of the people the King and the Government will continue the struggle until the country has won back freedom and independence. It is their national duty, and they know that they have the Norwegian people strongly and vigorously with them, when they thus work and fight for its vital needs outside the frontiers of the country. In the certainty that they are the true representatives of the people's will to freedom, they cry to the Norwegian people at home:

Stand fast and endure in loyalty to the free Constitution of Norway, and together we shall win the victory of all Norwegians.

HAAKON.

JOHAN NYGAARDSVOLD.

Addendum by H.M. the King of Norway

My countrymen have heard the proclamation from the Cabinet to-day which the Prime Minister has read. I associate myself from my heart with all that has there been said.

I have at an earlier stage declared, in my answer to the Presidential Board of the Storting on July 3,¹ that the liberty and independence of the Norwegian people are to me the first commandment of the Constitution, and I concluded my answer by saying that I consider I am obeying this commandment best, and best guarding the interests of the Norwegian people, by clinging to the position and the task which a free people gave me in 1905. I repeat to-day that I should be failing in my duty to our common fatherland if I abandoned the struggle for the freedom of Norway which has been forced upon us.

I and my Government have been compelled to carry on this struggle outside the frontiers of the country. But it is our greatest and most precious hope to be able soon to come home again, and there to build anew the life of people and State which the war and the unmerited attack upon our country have torn to shreds.

I look forward to hard and difficult days for the Norwegian people under this foreign rule of violence. But I feel persuaded that the people will bear the pressure laid upon it with firmness and coolness, and that all Norwegian men and women will keep up their courage and thereby prepare for the restoration which shall and must take place.

¹ See above, p. 134.

We are luckily neither unarmed nor friendless, and just as we out here will do all that we can to ease conditions for you who are at home, so I beg all of you to be sure that we will never give up the task of creating a new, free, and independent Norway.

I say to-day, as I said in 1905 and shall say all my life: All for Norway! God bless Norway!

12. CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE NORWEGIAN SUPREME COURT
AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

(a) *Letter from the Norwegian Supreme Court to the Department of Justice, November 19, 1940.*¹

The Department of Justice has, on November 14, 1940, prepared an Ordinance giving the Constituted State Councillor² authority, *inter alia*, to appoint and dismiss members of Conciliation Commissions, and to remove from the panels jurors, expert witnesses and assessors, and to appoint others. This Ordinance applies equally to civil and criminal proceedings. It gives the Constituted State Councillor the opportunity of interfering in the composition of the Courts of Justice in a way which is in manifest conflict with the principles on which the constitution of our courts is founded. The Ordinance exceeds the limits of the authority enjoyed by the Constituted State Councillor as representative of the power in occupation, according to The Hague Convention of 1907, with the regulations which it contains for the conduct of war on land, especially Article 43, according to which the authority in occupation is to 'respect the laws applying in the country unless absolute impediments exist'. The Ordinance also exceeds the authority given to the Constituted State Councillors by paragraph 3 of the Reich Commissioner's Ordinance of September 28, together with paragraph 3 of the *Führer's* Ordinance of April 24,³ which lays down that laws heretofore valid remain in force, so long as this is consistent with the occupation. The independence of the Courts is prescribed in the Constitution, and is expressly recognized in accordance with international law, in the Reich Commissioner's ordinance of September 28, paragraph 5. If the Ordinance should be carried into effect it would have fateful effects on the administration of justice. To maintain this independence is of fundamental importance to the security of justice. As the highest representative of the judicial

¹ *Norsk Tidend*, December 27, 1940. Translation prepared for the Information Department.

² i.e. the Head of the Department appointed by Herr Terboven. (*Note by the translator.*)

³ See above, p. 78.

power, the Supreme Court must request that the Department's Ordinance shall not be carried into effect.

(b) Letter from the Norwegian Supreme Court to the Department of Justice, December 12, 1940.¹

The Reich Commissioner on December 3 sent the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court a letter, copy of which is attached.² The letter was received on December 7. After the Supreme Court had sent the Department of Justice its letter of December 9 regarding the Ordinance concerning the age limit, the members of the Court considered the Reich Commissioner's letter. Judges Broch and Stang were not able to be present. As will be seen, the Reich Commissioner has stated that neither the Supreme Court nor other Norwegian Courts can adopt an attitude towards the question of the validity of directions issued by the Reich Commissioner, or by the Constituted State Councillors by virtue of his Ordinance of September 28, since it is exclusively the province of the Reich Commissioner to settle what regulations can serve to promote public order and the interests of public life in Norway. We wish to maintain that the Courts according to Norwegian constitutional law have the duty to test the validity of laws and administrative Ordinances. During a military occupation the Courts in our opinion may in the same way take up an attitude as to the validity in international law of Ordinances which are issued by the organs of the occupying power, in settling questions of law which come before them in a case, to such an extent as international law allows. We cannot follow the view of the authority of the Courts which the Reich Commissioner's letter expresses, without acting in conflict with our duties as judges of the Norwegian Supreme Court. We therefore find that we are unable to continue in our office. We anticipate a further conference with the Department of Justice on the subject of the date for our resignation.

13. EXTRACT FROM SPEECH BY HR. TRYGVE LIE, ACTING
NORWEGIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DECEMBER
17, 1940.³

. . . We need something more than a Nordic co-operation. We need a political and economic co-operation with all free nations,

¹ *Norsk Tidend*, December 27, 1940. Translation prepared for the Information Department.

² Not available.

³ *Norsk Tidend*, December 17, 1940. Translation prepared for the Information Department.

both to build up what has been destroyed, and to create security and prosperity in the future. This is a great and difficult task. Able men have attempted it earlier without success. The League of Nations was such an attempt. It represented an idea which was great and sound, but it did not achieve its task. We, together with other free nations, will attempt to discover a form of co-operation which may have better prospects of success. We must therefore have clearly in mind what kind of co-operation we desire. It is, anyhow, something quite different from that which the present Germany wishes to force us into. We are a seafaring nation, an old Atlantic nation, and if we joined a German continental *bloc* we should be economically ruined, and the special Norwegian culture which has been built up through the determined work of many centuries would succumb. All that is Norwegian, all that we are justly proud of, would disappear.

The co-operation we need must first and foremost have links westward and bind us fast to those nations with which we from ancient times have had natural economic relations. Our prosperity, our economic future, the welfare of our community, is completely and absolutely dependent upon this. And the nations with whom we have most of all been associated in the economic sphere are nations with the same traditions of liberty as ourselves, and nations which are struggling for the same ideals. There is first of all the British Empire, the greatest constitutional structure in the world, and the powerful and wealthy United States of America. There is also Greece, which is in the midst of a heroic struggle against a superior enemy. There are finally all the peoples who for the present have lost their liberty, but who like ourselves look forward to the day when they can see their fatherland liberated from oppression.

This is a mighty alliance which our allies and all we liberty-loving forces in the world are working to build up and to make stronger. With this we are also laying the foundation for a co-operation which can and shall last after the war: a political co-operation, which secures our national liberty, so that we do not run the risk of being attacked by arrogant and tyrannous aggressors, and an economic co-operation which gives social security and prevents economic crises from ruining our industrial life and stopping the work of social progress.

14. PASTORAL LETTER FROM THE NORWEGIAN BISHOPS TO THEIR CONGREGATIONS.

(Ordered to be read in all Churches on February 16.)

We can point with thankfulness to the fact that the Church and all Christian communities and organizations have, broadly speaking, been able to continue their spiritual work up to this time. There has, however, gradually arisen a continually increasing uneasiness and anxiety concerning what is happening in our nation. Can the Church observe with indifference that the ordinances of God are set aside and that much is happening which is subversive of order and justice? The Church is a community, whose call is to preach the Gospel and gather all believers to a life according to the will of God. In its external aspects, the Church is a human institution, hampered not only by human imperfection, but suffering also from the fact that we sinful men are its instruments. Ever since the days of the Apostles the Lord of the Church has, nevertheless, called such men to be his servants and has promised them the grace and strength with which he himself advances his power. The Christian congregation is a living spiritual fellowship, founded by Jesus Christ, and it has in him its Redeemer and Lord. The Church is therefore God's work, and must carry out its task outspokenly and fearlessly, since God's word and God's will are superior to everything else in this world. In this task the Church stands in the national life with the full responsibility to preach here the word of salvation and the obligation to obey God's law. The Bishops of the Norwegian Church have, therefore, regarded it as their duty from a Christian standpoint, when faced by the disturbance of conscience and the questioning perplexity which have come upon us lately, to speak their mind clearly to those governing authorities who to-day control the life of the Church and the State. After close consultation with other Christians, the Bishops, on January 15, 1941, approached the Head of the Ecclesiastical and Education Department with a statement supported by documentary evidence.

(This statement ran as follows:)

According to its Confession, the relation of the Church to a State as the legal authority rests on the assumption that the State through its organs maintains the justice and righteousness which is ordained and willed by God. The Constitution of Norway lays down: 'the evangelical Lutheran religion remains the public religion of the

State'. It is therefore necessary and essential for the Church to be clear whether the State, which also has to deal with ecclesiastical affairs, accepts and feels itself bound by the same obligations of justice and morality as the Church. It has therefore been of the greatest importance that those in charge of the Church have been able to show that justice was being maintained both internationally and in matters of internal order, under the conditions which developed after April 9, 1940. In several circulars the Bishops have maintained this, for example the Bishop of Oslo in his elaborate circular 'The Temporal and the Eternal', July 1940, and each of the Bishops in their circulars in October and November. It was most recently expressed in a circular of November 15, agreed to by all the Bishops, where it is stated that our laws stand in full force and that all the authorities have promised to respect them.

Those in charge of the Church have also had good grounds for taking this line with their clergy and congregations, since the fundamental Ordinance of the *Führer* of April 24 is in full agreement with international law, and the Reichskommissar in his speech in June pledged himself to allow the religious liberty prescribed by Paragraph 46 of The Hague Convention dealing with war, and further, in his decree of September 28, laid down that the independence of the courts should remain unmolested.

Recently, however, there have arisen a series of grave doubts as to whether the position thus maintained by the Bishops to the members of the Church was tenable. We are faced with the question whether the State, through its organs, is willing to maintain order, justice, and righteousness, as the Confession of our Church assumes. There are three matters in particular which it is natural to link together, and which have been interpreted as showing that acts of violence are not being hindered but rather permitted, and that at the same time we have appeared to see signs that the administration of justice in its basic features is in process of dissolution. In concrete terms, the reasons for uneasiness are,—first the Hird's systematic recourse to violence, next the resignation of the whole Supreme Court and, last but not least, the interference with the obligation of secrecy laid upon the clergy in their pastoral capacity.

These matters are before us in documentary form and we will briefly summarize them here:

(1) The attack by the Hird on Oslo Commercial School on November 30, where even teachers and directors were knocked down and seriously maltreated, was grave enough in itself. The

alarming nature of the occurrence was increased by the programme slogan which was given the same morning in the official organ of the Party, where it was said, *inter alia*: "We will hit back till they lose sight and hearing. Hirdmen, close your ranks! Whoever strikes us once we will strike ten times back, that shall be our watchword." If a community admits such a watchword and does not strive for the union of order and justice, it must appear to have broken with the essential conditions for a community based on law. The question becomes so much the graver since in a number of cases there has been no suggestion of provocation; for instance, in the brutal attack on the Chairman of the Students' Association in Trondheim on November 29, or again the attack on December 11 on Volunteer Stabel, who was kidnapped in the dark, stripped naked and flogged by the Hird, and other instances both in town and country.

The gravity is increased by the fact that these cases have not come up for judicial treatment and the punishment of the guilty; on the contrary, the highest representative of public order on December 14 published instructions to the police not to interfere, but "actively to support the Hird". What was disturbing about the individual acts of violence seems in this way to have become a question of principle affecting the internal security of the whole community.

Further, a circular was issued from the Home Department on December 16, where all servants of the State and the municipalities were enjoined to support the Hird positively and actively. To do the opposite would be regarded as "action hostile to the State" and be the subject of "drastic punishments". If and in so far as these things are systematically carried out in future, the ministers of the Church will lose the grounds on which their guidance of conscience in the matter of respect and confidence in the administration of justice in the community is based. Therefore, we beg leave to be allowed to lay the above documented facts before the Chief of the Ecclesiastical Department.

(2) The second event which must naturally be connected with the above is concerned with the feeling of insecurity which is created for members of the Church by the fact that the entire Supreme Court has resigned its office.

The Supreme Court lays it down that the decree of the Department of Justice dated November 14 whereby the Head of the Department assumes authority to dismiss and appoint jurymen, assessors, and expert witnesses, involves an interference with the

administration of justice, which is in obvious conflict with recognized principles of law, and which will have the most fateful effects on the administration of justice, since the independence of the Courts is of fundamental importance to the security of justice and is expressly recognized in the Constitution. The very fact that all the members of the country's highest Court of law have felt themselves compelled to abandon their functions must also create within the Church a profound sense of insecurity as to the foundations of the legal rights of the community.

'Since the Church's Confession (Augustiana, Paragraph 16) emphasizes the legitimacy of the State's nature and activity and on this basis enjoins every Christian to be loyal to the State, you will agree that those in charge of the Church have a right and duty to speak freely, and to request information with regard to circumstances so grave as those referred to above.

'You will, however, understand that the gravity of our situation is not reduced by the fact that we see how violence breeds violence and a mentality of hatred is being worked up in the nation. This applies not least to the young generation which is growing up. Education of a Christian character is imposed by law on churches and schools and is in itself the central task of the Church's life. When, therefore, in a message sent to all Heads of schools from the Department for Ecclesiastical and Educational Affairs dated December 12, but dispatched at the end of December, it is stated that persons holding responsibility in the school are to pledge themselves in honour and conscience positively and actively to support all the undertakings and decisions of the new Government, the whole matter reaches the point of a conflict of conscience in what is essential in our functions.

'(3) An Order recently issued by the Department of Police, under which the duty of silence, imposed by their calling upon the clergy, can be revoked by the Department of Police, is a profound interference with the work of the clergy. Our obligation of secrecy is not merely established by law, but it has always been a fundamental condition of the work of the Church and of the clergy in discharging their pastoral functions and receiving confessions from persons in distress. It is an indispensable condition for this work of the Church that a person can be fully and unconditionally confident that the obligation of silence on the clergy is absolute, as this duty has been developed both in Norwegian legislation and in the ordinances of the Church through all ages and in all Christian countries. If this *Magna Carta* of conscience is repealed, it involves

an interference with the vital nerve of the Church's task, an interference which acquires a profoundly serious character from the fact that Paragraph 5 of the Order lays down that the Department of Police can cause a priest to whom it applies to be imprisoned, and can thus force a disclosure without his having been brought before the Courts.

Together with other important circumstances with which we do not deal, all that we have mentioned has compelled us to address this inquiry to the Ecclesiastical Department, in order that the matter may be cleared up, since we are confident that the gravity of our situation will meet with understanding.

'Signed by all seven Bishops.'

After a fortnight had passed the three Bishops, Berggrav, Stören, and Maroni, at the request of all their colleagues, asked for an interview with the State Councillor appointed (by the Reichskommissar) in order to stress the serious character of their report and to ask whether an answer could be expected. During the conversation which then took place, the Bishops were unable to feel that they had received any explanation which weakened the charge they had brought. Three days later the following letter to the College of Bishops arrived from the appointed State Councillor, Skanke, dated February 1:

'In an interview in October last year I made, *inter alia*, the following statement to the Christian Press Bureau, in answer to a question about the relations between the new administration and the Church and what our plans were in this connexion. "We have no plans beyond those which are expressed in our programme: that the fundamental values of Christianity shall be preserved. We hope and trust that the Church and its people have confidence in us when we say that we do not intend to interfere with the Church, which needs peace for its work in these difficult times." This statement is still valid. Nothing so far as I know has happened in the past months which can entitle any one to say that the State has interfered with the liberty of the Church to preach the Gospel in conformity with the word of God and the Church's confessional rules, and to exist and act as a community. The motto of the *Nasjonal Samling* is order, justice, and peace. It is the intention of the present administration as far as possible to act up to this motto in the whole of our public life. That during the present time of new development and ferment, when so very little suffices to bring minds out of balance, things can occur

which ought not to happen may be intelligible, but is none the less to be regretted. When clear proofs of such occurrences are present they will be brought to trial even when members of the Party are concerned.

'So far as the concrete cases of violence alleged in the letter are concerned, these will be sent to the Departments of Justice and Police respectively, for further action. As to the matter referred to in Point 2, the Bishops may rest assured that, even if the new order must also to some degree affect our judicial system, the administration has not lost sight of the necessity for preserving security of justice and order among our people. So far as the Ordinance of December 13 from the Police Department is concerned, relating *inter alia* to the duty of clergy to give evidence, it is remarked that the duty of clergy to keep silence was not absolute even before December 13. There are, as is known, several cases where the obligation of secrecy does not apply. This latest Ordinance must be looked upon as a new reservation with regard to the duty of silence, and it is not intended to abolish this as a whole. The Bishops of the Church may also be assured that they will meet with understanding in the present situation, but then they must also on their side meet the new form of government and the present administration with understanding. It is not only the Church which needs peace to enable it to carry on its work, but the State needs it too. The Church must be most earnestly warned against any actions undertaken by it, which increase the unrest in our nation. Imprudent behaviour may now come to have the most serious consequences for the Church. Now as formerly the Church needs the State to enable it to be a genuine national Church, and the State needs the Church in order that it may preserve order, justice, and peace. State and Church are united in service to the people entrusted to them. The Bishops of the Church, and through them the clergy of the Norwegian Church, are urged to contribute all their goodwill, to enable this collaboration to achieve the best possible success. It is at the same time requested that circulars from the Bishops to clergy or congregations may be submitted in triplicate to the Department.

‘(Signed) R. SKANKE.’

We consider that our congregations ought to be acquainted with this correspondence. We will merely observe with reference to the point in which a pertinent objection is raised in the letter of the appointed State Councillor that the question of the obligation of

secrecy was prominent during the personal conference which has been referred to. The Bishops then pointed out that the obvious exceptions applying to the absolute duty of silence from ancient times are a part of the statement of this duty as expressed in the law. They concern the rare occasions when a priest may be obliged to disclose a confidence, in order thereby either to prevent a serious crime, which some one is thinking of committing, or to stop any one from being punished when innocent. What is overwhelmingly new, we contended, about the Decree of December 13, is this, that a breach of the obligation to silence can be demanded when the highest administration of the police requires it out of consideration for important interests of State, and that there is even a threat to imprison people in order, in such cases, to force the priest to break his promise.

The Bishops consider that they ought further to emphasize what we suggested in the written memorandum which was delivered to the State Councillor during the personal conference of January 29. It ran as follows:

'In the second Article of the Creed, Christians acknowledge Jesus Christ as their Lord quite unconditionally. For the Church this obligation of loyalty stands above everything else. The national and political administrative machinery does not concern us as such. Only if it cuts across our loyalty to Christ are we naturally concerned. As Luther says: "Earthly government has laws which extend no farther than to life and property and what is external in the world." Over souls, God cannot and will not let any one rule except himself alone. To the ordinances of God belong justice, truth, and virtue, as the Church sees them realized in a State. How the outer construction of the community is in other respects arranged is a separate matter, but when it is a question of God's commandments, which are fundamental to the whole life of the community, then the Church is bound to speak out. It is no use here dismissing the Church with the remark that it is in that case meddling in politics. Luther says in clear words: "The Church is not meddling in earthly matters when it warns authorities to obey the Supreme Authority, who is God." When the authorities of the community allow violence and commit wrong and exert compulsion upon souls, then the Church is the guardian of conscience. A human soul is of more importance than the whole world.'

Therefore the Bishops of the Church have laid upon the table of

the State Councillor some of the facts and official announcements concerning the government of the community in recent times, which the Church considers in conflict with God's law, and which give the impression that there is a state of revolution in the country, and not merely a state of occupation, under which the laws are to be maintained so far as these are not directly inconsistent with the conditions of occupation. The Church is not the State and the State is not the Church. Externally, the power of the State may try to exercise compulsion upon the Church, but the Church is a spiritual and sovereign community founded on God's word and fellowship in the faith. The Church has, in all its human infirmity, the call and mandate of God to preach his law and his Gospel to all people. Therefore the Church can never be silent where God's commandments are set aside and sin appears. Here the Church stands unshakable and cannot in this its peculiar province be bound by any authority of State.

Basing ourselves on this call, we adjure the Governors of the community to make an end of everything which is in conflict with God's holy ordinances regarding justice, truth, freedom of conscience and virtue, and to build indestructibly on God's law of life. Equally we adjure our people in our preaching to abstain from violence and wrong. This applies just as strongly to ourselves as to all parties in a social conflict. Every one who nurses hate or provokes evil stands under God's judgement. Scripture says: Do not repay evil with evil, but overcome evil with good. Above all of us stands He who is the Lord of souls. There is now a ferment in the conscience of our congregations, and we regard it as our duty to let the men of the State hear clearly the voice of the Church.

